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Introduction and Executive Summary 
 
Since World War II, more WMD attacks have occurred in the Middle East and North Africa 
(MENA) region1 than in any other region of the world.2 Egypt used chemical weapons against 
Yemen from 1963 to 1967,3 Iraq used chemical weapons against Iran during the Iran-Iraq War,4 
Iran reportedly used chemical weapons against Iraq during that same war,5 and Libya used 
chemical weapons against Chad in 1987.6 In addition to these uses of chemical weapons against 
neighbors, Iraq used chemical weapons on Kurds within its territory in 1988,7 al Qaeda in Iraq 
has used chlorine gas,8 and chemical weapons have been repeatedly used during the Syrian civil 
war.9  
 
The most recent notable new user of chemical weapons in the Middle East is the Islamic State,10 
which is reportedly also pursuing biological and nuclear weapons. The director of NATO’s 
WMD Non-Proliferation Center recently published an article in which he warned that “there is a 
very real - but not yet fully identified risk - of foreign fighters in ISIL’s ranks using chemical, 
biological, radiological or nuclear (CBRN) materials as ‘weapons of terror’ against the West.”11 
 
In addition, at least four MENA region member states of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty 
(NPT) have violated their NPT-related obligations: Iran, Iraq, Libya, and Syria. Each has 
reportedly done so in pursuit of the capacity to build nuclear weapons. 
 
Over its first fifteen years, the Department of Defense Cooperative Threat Reduction program 
(DOD/CTR) focused its work to combat weapons of mass destruction (WMD) almost entirely on 
the Former Soviet Union (FSU). Since 2010, however, DOD/CTR has begun to expand into the 
Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region, undertaking peaceful cooperative projects to 
combat WMD proliferation in that region.  
 
Law-related issues had a pivotal impact on cooperative threat reduction work in the FSU. These 
included especially the difficulty of reaching and maintaining agreement on how to protect U.S. 
assistance and providers from host country domestic law risks (such as lawsuits for accidental 
damage).  
 
Both this and other law-related issues have already begun to have a significant impact on CTR 
work in the MENA region. This report is designed to analyze these issues and provide 
recommendations for more effectively addressing law-related challenges and opportunities that 
could play a pivotal role in the success of CTR work in the MENA region. 
 
In researching this report, it became evident that the long term effectiveness and sustainability of 
expanded cooperative threat reduction with the MENA region depends in considerable part on 
successful management of three major areas of law-related challenges and opportunities: the 
need to manage the domestic law risks posed to assistance providers by MENA host country 
governments, the importance of improving MENA governments’ poor record of implementing 
the nonproliferation obligations imposed on them by international law, and the challenges posed 
to WMD disposition by several provisions of international law. Each is the subject of one chapter 
of this report.  
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The second chapter draws in part from the more detailed paper at Annex I, by Victor Comras, 
titled “How to More Effectively Encourage and Assist MENA Governments to Implement their 
International Legal Obligations Relating to Nonproliferation.” The third chapter draws in part 
from the more detailed paper at Annex II, by Guy Roberts, titled “International Law Challenges 
to WMD Disposition Options: Legal Options to WMD Disposition in a Conflicting Law and 
Policy Environment.” Both papers were commissioned as part of this study. 
 
I. Striking a New Balance in Managing Host Country Domestic Law Risks 
 
Chapter One addresses the challenge of managing the domestic law risks posed to assistance 
providers by MENA host country governments. CTR projects can be severely hindered or even 
halted when assistance providers face excessive host country domestic law risks. The following 
have long been the CTR program’s principal host country domestic legal concerns:  
 
• How can U.S. assistance be protected from being diminished and diverted by host 
country taxes and customs duties?  
• How can U.S. government employees and contractors be protected from being arrested or 
otherwise detained on trumped up charges?  
• How can the U.S. government, its employees, and its contractors be protected from 
lawsuits in case of harm caused by project-supplied equipment or other assistance?  
• What sorts of audit and examination rights and end use assurances will the U.S. 
government receive to ensure that assistance is used for the purposes provided?  
• How can the U.S. government ensure that contracts are awarded pursuant to the Federal 
Acquisition Regulations and not on the basis of host country laws and procedures which 
might select on bases other than merit? 
 
The difficulty of reaching and maintaining agreement on how to protect U.S. assistance and 
providers from domestic law risks stalled several FSU CTR projects and reportedly contributed 
to halting the CTR program’s ability to continue achieving its objectives in Russia beyond the 
20-year mark. During the program’s first fifteen years, as it undertook large scale, high risk 
projects in the FSU, DOD almost invariably insisted that work not proceed in the absence of 
legally binding “one-size-fits-all” protective “umbrella agreements” between the United States 
and the host country government.  
 
Over the last several years, as the DOD CTR program has expanded into MENA and other 
countries outside the FSU and undertaken smaller scale and less risky projects, the program has 
begun to adopt a more tailored approach, including a willingness to sometimes proceed with 
lesser or no protections against host country domestic legal risks. However, few MENA 
countries are known for the fairness, predictability, and smooth functioning of their legal 
systems. Chapter One provides recommendations for how the U.S. can more effectively balance 
the need to mitigate domestic law risks posed by MENA host governments against the dangers of 
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Key recommendations include the following: 
 
• The benefits of avoiding the initial investment in painstaking negotiation of bilateral 
country-by-country “umbrella agreements” need to be balanced against the probability 
that, in the long term, a CTR program will likely be more successful (and more agile, 
flexible, and responsive) if the inherent legal risks posed by operating in a particular 
environment are mitigated or eliminated altogether at the outset of the implementation 
through the conclusion of a sufficiently comprehensive legally binding agreement. The 
negotiation of such an agreement clears the field so a specific program can operate 
efficiently and effectively, and be protected from potentially severe legal consequences 
resulting from unanticipated incidents and accidents. Such protection can help the 
program survive scrutiny from Congressional and other overseers for years to come. 
 
• It can be difficult or impossible to anticipate all of the different types of cooperative 
threat reduction projects that the U.S. might wish to undertake in a particular country as 
new threats arise. It can also be difficult or impossible to anticipate how a country’s 
operational environment and/or legal system might over time come to pose greater risks 
or provide lesser protections than at the time the need for a protective agreement was 
initially assessed. Because it typically becomes much more difficult to persuade the host 
country government of the need to increase protections once DOD CTR activity begins in 
a particular host country, there is value in prioritizing initial investment in negotiating 
protections that are as expansive as possible. 
 
• To maximize protections by prioritizing investment in negotiating them means, in part, to 
involve in the negotiations U.S. government officials at the political level (Deputy 
Assistant Secretary of Defense and above). Foreign governments are typically as or more 
hierarchical than is the U.S. government, with only political level officials authorized to 
make significant concessions. Foreign political level officials typically become 
personally engaged in negotiations only when a U.S. official of a similar level becomes 
involved. DOD CTR umbrella agreement negotiations with FSU governments typically 
involved senior officials, including at times cabinet secretaries and even the U.S. 
president. Over the past eight years, there has reportedly been a significant reduction in 
political level U.S. Defense Department officials engaging their foreign counterparts to 
address the need for legal protections for CTR efforts in host countries. 
 
• Some types of CTR program work do not necessitate the protections of a full traditional 
DOD CTR umbrella agreement. The CTR program should be prepared to proceed with an 
activity in a particular country, in the absence of a full traditional umbrella agreement, 
when the program has carefully and systematically determined that the urgency and 
magnitude of the particular threat to be reduced by that activity outweighs the particular 
risks to the United States and its personnel of engaging in that activity in that individual 
partner nation. In order to ensure that such determinations are sufficiently rigorous and 
tailored, they should be the subject of decision memoranda signed by an appropriately 
senior official. While it makes sense for low risk activities in a particular country to be 
approved on a categorical basis (e.g., “all classroom training of Saudi customs officials 
on commodity identification is hereby approved even in the absence of liability 
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protection”), medium and high-risk activities in a particular country should be approved 
only on a case by case basis. 
 
• It is essential that risk analysis be conducted systematically, with input from legal and 
other relevant professional specialists (e.g., engineers with regard to potential liability for 
equipment malfunction or architects with regard to construction failure). It is also 
essential that risk analysis of a particular activity per se (in and of itself) be seen as 
merely a starting point for risk analysis of that particular activity within the context of 
each particular host country’s legal system. Given the variability of host country legal 
systems, all but the least risky activity per se should be analyzed for risk in light of how 
that risk might play out in the legal system of the particular host country. 
 
• Congress has imposed draconian restrictions in response to foreign taxation of assistance 
provided by other U.S. government programs. The DOD CTR Program should derive 
lessons learned from the controversies that contributed to enactment of these laws, and 
take the several specific prophylactic measures recommended in the body of this report to 
ensure that similar controversies do not impact the DOD CTR Program. For example, 
ensure that protective agreements clearly specify tax exemption for all relevant 
companies (both prime contractors and subcontractors) supporting U.S. government 
efforts.  
 
• The purview of the Office of Foreign Litigation in the U.S. Department of Justice 
includes providing “legal advice to federal agencies, departments, and government 
officials regarding litigation risks abroad,” an undertaking which it achieves in part by 
retaining foreign attorneys to advise and represent the U.S. with regard to foreign legal 
systems. Surprisingly, the DOD CTR Program seems to have rarely if ever drawn on the 
OFL’s expertise in assessing and mitigating the legal risks to its personnel in potential 
host countries. The DOD CTR program should immediately begin to systematically 
confer with the OFL about the DOD CTR program’s host country domestic law risks and 
how to address them.  
 
• The DOD CTR Program has in recent years unduly relied on sovereign immunity to 
protect U.S. government employees from potential liability risks. The program should 
take the several specific steps to correct this and develop more effective protections that 
are recommended in the body of this report.  
 
• In assessing its ability to ensure that contracts are not awarded other than pursuant to U.S. 
federal contracting laws, the DOD CTR program should study, and draw prophylactic 
recommendations from, the USAID Inspector General and GAO investigations which in 
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II. Options for Increasing MENA Implementation of International Nonproliferation 
Law 
 
Chapter Two examines how the United States and the international community can more 
effectively encourage and assist MENA governments to meet and implement their international 
legal obligations relating to nonproliferation. Many governments in the Middle East and North 
Africa (MENA) region have a weak record of implementing their legally binding 
nonproliferation obligations. For example, as reflected in the chart on page 39,12 only three (Iraq, 
Jordan, and the UAE) of seventeen Arab League member states studied have implemented even 
40 percent of the measures required by UN Security Council Resolution 1540, which is binding 
on all UN member states.  
 
They also include obligations, pursuant to the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) and the 
Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), which are binding on all states which have chosen to 
adhere to those treaties. For example, amongst those MENA countries which are parties to the 
BWC, relatively few have complied with the requirement that each State Party submit an annual 
Confidence-Building Measures (CBMs) report. For example, according to the most recent annual 
report of the BWC Implementation Support Unit, dated November 3, 2015, the following MENA 
States Parties had not submitted a CBMs report covering the calendar year 2014: Bahrain, Iran, 
Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Oman, Saudi Arabia, Tunisia, United Arab Emirates, and Yemen.  
 
Amongst those MENA countries which are parties to the CWC, several have a poor record of 
implementation of it. For example, according to the most recent report of the Organisation for 
the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, the following MENA states parties have not yet adopted 
the national laws necessary to implement their CWC obligations: Bahrain, Jordan, Kuwait, 
Lebanon, Libya, and Syria. In other cases, such as that of Iraq and the UAE, the basic national 
laws were in place but the necessary implementing regulations were still in “draft” form or 
“under development.” 
 
In addition, a significant number of MENA countries have thus far failed to adhere to key 
nonproliferation agreements which are not obligatory but nevertheless foundational elements of 
the international nonproliferation system. These include the BWC, the CWC, the Convention on 
the Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials (CPPNM), the Amendment to the CPPNM, the 
Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism (CSANT), and the Additional 
Protocol of the International Atomic Energy Agency.  
 
The following MENA countries have not yet chosen to become party to the CPPNM: Egypt, 
Iran, and Syria. The following MENA countries have not yet chosen to become party to the 
CPPNM Amendment: Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Lebanon, Oman, Syria, and Yemen. The following 
MENA countries have not yet chosen to become party to the Convention for the Suppression of 
Acts of Nuclear Terrorism: Egypt, Iran, Israel, Oman, and Syria. In addition, the following 
countries which are NPT member states have not yet chosen to become party to the IAEA 
Additional Protocol: Algeria, Egypt, Lebanon, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Tunisia, and 
Yemen.  
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In the context of U.S. DOD Cooperative Threat Reduction programs, achieving host country 
implementation of an international legal instrument to which the country is a party should be 
easier than, for example, achieving implementation of a request by the U.S. government to take 
an action which is not already an internationally binding obligation on the host country 
government. Similarly, persuading a host country to join a nonproliferation agreement which its 
neighbors have already joined should be easier than, for example, achieving host country 
commitment to take an action which is not already an internationally binding obligation on its 
neighbors. U.S. government officials involved with CTR who participated in a workshop 
convened as part of this project confirmed that Security Council Resolution 1540 and other 
international obligations provide significant traction with at least some countries in the MENA 
region. Similarly, a retired U.S. government official who participated in the workshop 
emphasized that “we can often do things through international organizations that we can’t do 
ourselves – the international organizations have convening power and legitimacy and their 
mandates can make it easier for the target countries politically.” 
 
Key recommendations for how the United States and the international community can more 
effectively encourage and assist MENA governments to meet and implement their international 
legal obligations relating to nonproliferation include the following:  
 
• Several officials and experts from the MENA region told the author it was possible that 
fear of the Islamic State, and news of its use of chemical weapons and pursuit of 
biological and nuclear weapons, may lead Arab governments to be more willing than in 
the past to implement Resolution 1540, which includes specific legal obligations 
designed to prevent non-state actors from acquiring WMD and their means of delivery. 
The U.S. government clearly needs to place increased, results-oriented emphasis on 
encouraging and assisting MENA governments to implement Resolution 1540. 
 
• Another factor that could help inspire MENA governments to implement Resolution 
1540, and especially enhanced strategic trade controls, is increased antipathy towards 
Iran. Increased tensions between the Gulf states and Iran (as a result of Iran stirring up 
trouble in the region) may lead their governments to be more willing than in the past to 
crack down on diversions to Iran that could strengthen its nuclear or other military 
programs. Gulf Arab governments are now more afraid of Iran and more determined to 
keep it from acquiring nuclear weapons. This could provide incentive for these 
governments to adopt and implement controls on dual-use exports to Iran more 
vigorously than they have in the past. The regional officials and experts with whom this 
author spoke emphasized the importance of the U.S. and international community 
undertaking a systematic campaign to help the region understand the very complicated 
and confusing Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action and especially its remaining 
restrictions on trade with Iran. 
  
• U.S. and international policymakers need to develop and effectively present the case that 
rigorous implementation of strategic trade controls will in fact strengthen their countries, 
including by making Western companies more comfortable exporting dual-use 
technologies to them. This case could be developed with input from experts and 
practitioners, such as: economists who can empirically demonstrate that countries which 
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have adopted strategic trade controls have not harmed but rather boosted their economies; 
leading high technology manufacturers explaining why and how they are more 
comfortable exporting dual-use technologies to countries with comprehensive strategic 
trade controls and security and safety standards; and Economic development experts who 
can explain the importance of such dual-use imports to the economic development of 
countries in the MENA region.  
 
• The Linde case judgment holding Arab Bank PLC liable for terrorist attacks conducted 
with conventional munitions sets a precedent that could be used by victims of WMD 
attacks to sue banks that knowingly provided financial services to the national 
governments or terrorist groups that engaged in the WMD attacks. In August 2015, Arab 
Bank PLC settled the case for an estimated $1 billion. Because the U.S. dollar is the 
preferred currency of international trade, and most significant dollar transactions transit 
the United States, the U.S. government has enormous leverage over foreign banks. The 
international financial sector as a whole has strong incentives to avoid involvement in 
illicit transactions, vast amounts of data that can be analyzed to detect and understand 
such transactions, and significant influence over those foreign governments which are 
interested in economic development. Policymakers and legislators should carefully 
analyze whether and how the international financial sector can and should be harnessed 
to encourage MENA governments to implement strategic trade control and other 
obligations that would reduce illicit proliferation-related transactions and thus the 
international financial sector’s exposure to them. 
 
• Another set of multinational companies with a large stake in avoiding lawsuits and with 
considerable leverage over industry are risk insurers and reinsurers. One expert who 
participated in a workshop convened as part of this project suggested that with regard to 
large scale nuclear, chemical, and biological projects funded by governments in the 
MENA region, it might make sense for the U.S. government to reach out to relevant 
insurers and reinsurers as they could use the incentive of lower risk premiums to build 
compliance and other security and safety requirements into loan applications at the 
beginning of the process. 
 
• Two recent developments could be harnessed to build political will for enhanced 
implementation of the BWC and related requirements: increased regional interest in 
diversification into biotechnology and increased regional fear of biological weapons use 
by non-state actors. The governments of the U.S. and other key leading biotechnology 
industry hubs should take the opportunity to work with their industries to persuade UAE 
and other MENA country stakeholders that their investments in projects such as the 
Dubai Biotechnology & Research Park are more likely to pay off if the UAE and other 
MENA governments with such projects more rigorously implement their biotechnology-
related Resolution 1540 and BWC-connected obligations, including by developing robust 
export controls and biosecurity and biosafety standards and by submitting robust CBMs. 
 
• A growing regional interest in economic diversification, including into the chemical 
sector, is another factor that will increase the importance of, and could increase the 
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political will for, adoption and rigorous enforcement of CWC and other nonproliferation-
related implementing legislation. 
 
• The U.S. should strongly encourage each of the countries that have not yet done so – and 
especially Egypt, Iran, Iraq, and Syria in light of their current and past nuclear programs 
– to adhere to the CPPNM Amendment (as well as the CPPNM itself in the case of 
Egypt, Iran, and Syria). It was difficult for the U.S. to make a compelling case for 
ratification of the CPPNM Amendment until the U.S. deposited its own instrument of 
ratification in July 2015. Now that the U.S. is itself a party to the Amendment, it can and 
should mount a vigorous campaign to encourage additional ratifications. 
 
• It was difficult for the U.S. to make a compelling case for ratification of the CSANT until 
the U.S. deposited its own instrument of ratification in September 2015. Now that the 
U.S. is itself a party to the CSANT, it can and should mount a vigorous campaign to 
encourage additional ratifications. 
 
• Iran’s commitment to provisionally apply, and eventually seek ratification of, the 
Additional Protocol could be useful in encouraging other MENA countries to accede to 
the Protocol. An even more important inducement to encourage other MENA countries -- 
and especially those with burgeoning nuclear programs -- to accede to the Protocol could 
be achieved by member states of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) deciding to permit 




III. Options for Addressing International Law Obstacles to WMD Disposition 
 
Chapter Three addresses the challenges posed to WMD disposition by several provisions of 
international law. International law restrictions have posed in the Iraq and Syria chemical 
weapons destruction cases, and could potentially pose in other cases, significant hurdles to 
initiatives by the international community to dispose of newly discovered weapons of mass 
destruction (WMD) stocks and programs. For example, transfers of biological and chemical 
weapons to third parties, and acquisition of such weapons by States Parties -- whether for 
elimination, secure storage or any other purpose -- are prohibited, in all circumstances, by the 
Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) and the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) 
respectively. In addition, the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) contains narrower 
restrictions on transfers of nuclear weapons. 
 
Furthermore, international law can restrict the party’s options for eliminating WMD. For 
example, the CWC provides that chemical weapons may only be destroyed consistent with 
procedures specified in the CWC and its Verification Annex. 
 
The CWC transfer prohibition and CWC elimination restrictions posed significant hurdles in the 
Iraq and Syria chemical weapons destruction cases. Similar hurdles could occur with regard to 
elimination of one or more other MENA WMD arsenals. For example, Algeria, Egypt, Iran, Iraq, 
Saudi Arabia, and Sudan are other potentially unstable MENA countries which reportedly are 
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suspected or known to have some CW capability. In addition, the Islamic State is known to 
possess chemical weapons. 
 
Key recommendations for how the United States and the international community can exempt 
WMD disposition operations from international law restrictions include the following:  
 
• Article 103 of the UN Charter empowers the Security Council to override UN member 
states’ obligations under any other international agreement. UN Security Council 
Resolution 2118 overrode the CWC’s transfer and acquisition prohibitions with a 
categorical authorization to acquire, control, transport, transfer and destroy the specified 
Syrian chemical weapons. Such a categorical authorization might, in theory, be subject to 
abuse by a Member State that had its own ideas as to appropriate implementation.  
 
• Another option for overriding such transfer and acquisition prohibitions, which would 
maintain more control over implementation, would be to establish a committee of the UN 
Security Council that would approve specific transfers and acquisitions on a case-by-case 
basis. 
 
• In a sufficiently exigent situation, such as the need to destroy Iraqi chemical weapons, the 
U.S. could plausibly justify its failure to conform to CWC obligations by asserting force 
majeure; for example, an occurrence of an “unforeseen event, beyond the control of the 
State, making it materially impossible in the circumstances to perform the obligation” of 
compliance with the CWC during this destruction operation. However, it is important to 
use the force majeure exception sparingly, as it is relatively ambiguous and thus 
particularly subject to abuse by foreign governments who might try to argue force 
majeure when it is in fact not “materially impossible in the circumstances” for them to 
comply with the relevant international legal obligation. It is thus far preferable to, if 
possible, override the relevant international legal obligation with a Security Council 
resolution. 
 
• The right of a nation to suspend its treaty obligations under certain conditions is well 
established and codified in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (Vienna 
Convention). The Vienna Convention allows for five potential alternative reasons or 
justifications, one of which (“temporary impossibility”) is particularly relevant in 
scenarios such as those discussed in this chapter, to credibly and legally justify one or 
more State Parties to suspend their obligations under a treaty such as the CWC. As with 
the force majeure exception, it is important to use the temporary impossibility grounds 
for breach sparingly, as it is relatively ambiguous and thus particularly subject to abuse 
by foreign governments who might try to argue temporary impossibility when it is in fact 
not “temporarily impossible” for them to comply with the relevant international legal 
obligation. It is thus far preferable to, if possible, override the relevant international legal 
obligation with a Security Council resolution. 
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Chapter One: Striking a New Balance in Managing Host Country 
Domestic Law Risks 
 
One of the key challenges faced by the DOD CTR program from its beginning in the early 1990s 
has been how to protect U.S. government employees and contractors from various host country 
domestic legal risks. During the program’s first fifteen years, as it undertook large scale, high 
risk projects in the former Soviet Union (FSU), DOD almost invariably insisted that work not 
proceed in the absence of legally binding “one-size-fits-all” protective “umbrella agreements” 
between the United States and the host country government. Over the last several years, as the 
DOD CTR program has expanded into MENA and other countries outside the FSU and 
undertaken smaller scale and less risky projects, the program has begun to adopt a more tailored 
approach, including a willingness to sometimes proceed with lesser or no protections against host 
country domestic legal risks. This chapter analyzes these developments and provides 
recommendations for how to analyze and mitigate host country domestic legal risks so as to most 
effectively balance them against the risks of delaying CTR projects designed to counter WMD 
and related threats to U.S. and allied security. 
 
The following have long been the CTR program’s principal host country domestic legal 
concerns:  
 
• How can U.S. assistance be protected from being diminished and diverted by host 
country taxes and customs duties?  
• How can U.S. government employees and contractors be protected from being arrested or 
otherwise detained on trumped up charges?  
• How can the U.S. government, its employees, and its contractors be protected from 
lawsuits in case of harm caused by project-supplied equipment or other assistance?  
• What sorts of audit and examination rights and end use assurances will the U.S. 
government receive to ensure that assistance is used for the purposes provided?  
• How can the U.S. government ensure that contracts are awarded pursuant to the Federal 
Acquisition Regulations and not on the basis of host country laws and procedures which 
might select on bases other than merit? 
 
Section I of this chapter discusses how host country domestic legal risks were protected against 
during the DOD CTR program’s first decade and a half, as the program conditioned work in the 
former Soviet Union on the negotiation of legally binding “one-size-fits-all” protective 
“umbrella agreements” between the United States and the host country government. Section II of 
this chapter discusses how the DOD CTR program has in recent years begun to adopt a more 
tailored approach to protecting against host country domestic legal risks as it has undertaken 
projects, typically (but not always) smaller in scale and less risky, in the MENA and other 
regions outside the former Soviet Union. Section II of this chapter provides recommendations for 
how the DOD CTR program can on a case-by-base basis analyze and cost-effectively protect 
against the host country domestic legal risks to the United States and its personnel of engaging in 
a particular CTR activity in a particular partner nation. It emphasizes that the benefits of 
obtaining various types of such protection for a particular project must be carefully balanced 
against the risks that delaying the project could harm U.S. and allied security. 
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I. “Umbrella Agreements” and DOD CTR Projects in the Former Soviet Union 
 
In the FSU context, risks to U.S. government employees and contractors from host country 
domestic legal issues were almost invariably mitigated by legally binding “umbrella agreements” 
between the United States and the host country government, which often required protracted 
negotiations. Such bilateral government-to-government protective agreements were entered into 
with countries including Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Russia, Ukraine, 
and Uzbekistan.13 The agreements were typically written to expire after a fixed term of years, 
after which they could be extended. The umbrella agreements were typically designed to cover 
all of a U.S. government agency’s CTR work in the host country.  
 
The umbrella agreements were typically negotiated between the U.S. government and the host 
country government as a whole. Thus, agreements were typically entered into by the host country 
foreign ministry, in a form understood to legally bind the entirety of the host country 
government, rather than by, for example, the defense ministry in a form understood to bind only 
the defense ministry. Getting the entire host country government on the hook was considered 
important because an individual government agency, committing only itself and not its 
government as a whole, does not typically bind other agencies of that government. Thus, a 
defense ministry would not typically be capable of legally binding, for example, the host country 
government’s tax authorities (e.g., finance ministry) to not tax CTR assistance or its law 
enforcement authorities to respect CTR providers’ privileges and immunities.  
 
The umbrella agreements typically designated “executive agents,” for example the U.S. Defense 
Department and the foreign government’s Ministry of Defense. These “executive agents” were 
authorized to enter into implementing agreements with each other for particular projects within 
the scope of the umbrella agreement.  
 
The FSU umbrella agreements typically obligated the host country government to provide:  
 
• exemption from imposition of host country customs duties and internal taxes on foreign 
assistance resources related to the cooperation;  
• privileges and immunities for U.S. government employees engaged in the cooperative 
work; 
• protection from liability in the case of lawsuits claiming death or injury or property 
damage caused by the assistance (the host country committed not to itself bring suit and 
also assumed responsibility for third party claims);  
• audit and examination rights, and end use assurances, to ensure that assistance was used 
for the purposes provided; and  
• the right to award contracts pursuant to the Federal Acquisition Regulations. 
 
In the FSU context, the DOD CTR program typically was willing to halt work on major 
programs rather than accept liability, access, or other protection provisions only moderately less 
strong than those in the prototypical U.S.-Russia CTR agreement of 1992. The difficulty of 
reaching agreement on umbrella agreements and extending them stalled several FSU projects and 
reportedly contributed to the CTR program’s closure in Russia.14 For example, Russia’s 
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insistence on modifying the U.S.-Russia CTR agreement when it came up for renewal in 2013 
contributed to cancellation of U.S. CTR work with the Russian Ministry of Defense, including 
on the dismantling of ballistic missiles and chemical weapons and the transportation and 
securing of nuclear warheads.15  
 
However, proceeding with insufficiently rigorous protections also sometimes significantly 
delayed or otherwise complicated cooperative threat reduction work in the FSU. Weak 
protections in the FSU context contributed to distracting disputes between the U.S. and recipient 
governments, as well as Congressional and GAO inquiries. For example, a February 2007 report 
by the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) warned of continuing restrictions on U.S. 
access to facilities that store, manufacture, or dismantle Russian nuclear weapons.16 The GAO 
report noted that “access difficulties at some Russian nuclear warhead sites may… prohibit DOE 
and DOD from ensuring that U.S.-funded security upgrades are being properly sustained.”17 For 
example, “Russia has denied DOE access at some sites after the completion of security upgrades, 
making it difficult for the department to ensure that funds intended for sustainability of U.S.-
funded upgrades are being properly spent.”18 Specifically, neither DOE nor DOD has “reached 
an agreement with the Russian MOD [Ministry of Defense] on access procedures for 
sustainability visits to 44 permanent warhead storage sites where the agencies are installing 
security upgrades.”19 GAO warned that absent such agreement, DOE and DOD “will be unable 
to determine if U.S.-funded security upgrades are being properly sustained and may not be able 
to spend funds allotted for these efforts.”20  
 
Weak protections also contributed to private U.S. firms refusing to serve as contractors. For 
example, eight private U.S. firms reportedly declined, due to weak liability protections, to 
participate in the DOE program to improve the safety of Russian nuclear power plants under the 
International Nuclear Safety Program agreement. Largely because of the companies’ refusal, the 
program had to be refocused to concentrate on training rather than the provision of equipment.  
 
II. Current DOD CTR Policy Regarding Host Country Domestic Legal Risk Protection 
and Work Outside the FSU 
 
The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008 lifted restrictions on the 
Department of Defense expanding the longstanding Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) 
program to states outside the FSU. In the years since the restrictions were lifted, DOD CTR has 
begun activities in over 20 non-FSU countries in Southeast Asia, Africa, and the Middle East and 
North Africa (MENA) region. 
 
DOD CTR work in the MENA region began with a 2010 Determination that authorized the DOD 
CTR program to cooperate with Iraq on biological safety and security efforts.21 In October 2012, 
the Secretary of Defense, with the concurrence of the Secretary of State, authorized the DOD 
CTR program to undertake activities in the MENA region to assist several of the United States’ 
partners in addressing a critical emerging proliferation threat.22 The DOD CTR program 
currently has authority to engage with the following countries in the MENA region: Algeria, 
Bahrain, Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, 
Tunisia, Turkey, United Arab Emirates, and Yemen.23 To date, highlights of the DOD CTR 
program’s work in the MENA region have included: 
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• The DOD CTR Program provided transport, material handling equipment, and packaging 
materials to the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW)-United 
Nations (UN) Joint Mission to remove the declared chemical agent stockpile from 
Syria.24 The DOD CTR Program also provided all of the equipment, personnel, and 
expertise necessary to neutralize the most dangerous Syrian chemicals in international 
waters.25 
 
• The DOD CTR Program played a pivotal role in the destruction of Libya’s chemical 
weapons stockpile.26 This included providing the destruction technology, training, site 
upgrades, and expertise for the destruction.27 
 
• DOD CTR’s Cooperative Biological Engagement Program has been partnering with Iraqi 
entities since 2010, including with projects of the following types: (1) biosafety and 
biosecurity to enhance standards and procedures related to handling and storage of 
pathogens of security concern; and (2) disease surveillance, detection, diagnosis, and 
reporting to develop an integrated, secure, and sustainable network to detect and respond 
to deliberate or accidental release of select agents.28 
 
• Since October 2012, the DOD CTR Program has also worked with Jordan, Turkey, and 
Iraq through the Proliferation Prevention Program. The goal has been to enhance these 
partners’ capacity to prevent proliferation across their borders through equipment and/or 
training focused on enhancing border security at the points of entry and across the 
border; interdiction; detection, characterization, and isolation of suspicious materials; 
and consequence management.29 
 
• In Jordan, the DOD CTR Program has helped built the capacity of relevant Jordanian 
military and civilian ministries to interdict, secure, identify, and manage the 
consequences of chemical weapons through the provision of training and equipment.30  
 
The DOS CTR Program has operated in the MENA region since 2003.31 Its key objectives in the 
region have included strengthening the security of dangerous biological and chemical materials; 
engaging scientists with weapons-applicable expertise to decrease the likelihood that terrorists 
will gain the technical capability to develop a WMD attack capability; and bolstering partner 
government ability to detect, disrupt, and respond to potential WMD events.32 To date, highlights 
of the DOS CTR program’s work in the MENA region have included: 
 
• The DOS CTR program led the U.S. effort to secure Iraqi WMD scientist expertise after 
the fall of Saddam Hussein.33 
 
• The DOD CTR program spearheaded the U.S. government’s biological nonproliferation 
efforts in Yemen in response to threat posed by Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula.34 
 
As the CTR program has expanded beyond the FSU, work in new countries has faced the same 
question which CTR has confronted since its origins: How can the program most sensibly 
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balance the need for quick action against the challenge of protecting provider government 
employees and contractors against host country liability, tax, and other domestic law risks?  
 
In contrast with its insistence upon having legally binding government-to-government umbrella 
agreements, containing the full classic set of protections, in place before commencing work in 
FSU countries, the DOD CTR program has taken a different approach to work outside the FSU. 
It has in practice done away with the “one size fits all” approach and instead adopted a case-by-
case approach, involving a balancing of the particular threats to be reduced by an activity against 
the perceived particular risks to personnel and to the U.S. taxpayer of operating in that individual 
partner nation.  
 
With regard to countries outside the FSU, reliance upon the traditional legal tools -- including 
painstaking negotiation of bilateral country-by-country legally binding full “umbrella 
agreements,” supplemented by project-specific implementing agreements – is often perceived as 
unnecessarily time-consuming, insisting upon legal niceties of secondary importance, and 
imposing an unwarranted “obstacle” to CTR program activities. More specifically, the decision 
to proceed without the protection of a traditional umbrella agreement has typically been driven 
by reasons including the following: 
 
• In many cases, threat reduction projects have been deemed urgent, with delay posing an 
unacceptable risk of harm to U.S. and allied security. In light of the fact that negotiation 
of CTR umbrella agreements or other legally binding protections against host country 
domestic law risks has repeatedly taken years of resource-intensive engagement with host 
governments, a decision has sometimes been made to proceed with lesser or no 
protections rather than wait for negotiations to proceed. 
• The DOD CTR program has insufficient policy-focused staff to negotiate agreements 
with all of the new countries in which the far larger number of implementation-focused 
staff are prepared to do work. 
• CTR projects outside the FSU are typically of a nature that poses lesser liability risks 
than did the large-scale nuclear weapons and other WMD dismantlement initiatives in the 
FSU. Even in the FSU context, there was reportedly never a need to deploy the umbrella 
agreement liability protections to defend against a lawsuit. 
• Due to the nature (including smaller budget amounts) of its activities in countries outside 
the FSU, the DOD CTR program in those countries is also perceived by some not to 
require special customs, tax, access, and privileges and immunities protections beyond 
those available to other U.S. government programs operating in the same countries. 
 
The decision to proceed without first securing maximal protection has often been accompanied 
by a decision to request, or continue to request, consent to greater protection from the host 
country government while the work continues. However, once DOD CTR activity begins in a 
particular host country, it typically becomes much more difficult to persuade the host country 
government of the need to increase protections. 
 
The case-by-case approach has involved two principal types of changes from the prior insistence 
that all DOD CTR work be protected by a legally binding government to government umbrella 
agreement containing the full classic set of protections. First, while some of the traditional types 
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of protection (privileges and immunities and customs duty/tax exemptions) have been deemed 
essential to receive on a government-to-government basis where possible, the rest have been 
deemed less essential and accordingly deemphasized. Second, even with regard to the “essential” 
types of protections, DOD has expanded its menu of options by which those protections may be 
considered to be satisfactorily achieved. 
 
A.  A New Hierarchy of Protections 
 
1. Prioritized Protections 
 
The DOD CTR FY 2016 report to Congress states that “before significant project work begins, 
the DOD CTR Program seeks to use new or existing bilateral agreements with partner 
governments to obtain privileges and immunities for DOD CTR Program personnel; the right to 
use U.S. contracting laws for DOD CTR Program projects; the right to conduct formal audits and 
examinations (A&Es) of assistance provided; and exemptions from internal taxation on DOD 
CTR Program assistance by partner countries.”35 This list contained in the FY 2016 report to 
Congress includes all but the liability protections typically included in FSU umbrella 
agreements. The policy’s flexibility is reflected in the phrase “seeks to use” (as opposed to the 
categorical “uses”). 
 
In practice, DOD CTR has chosen to prioritize the following where possible:  
 
a.  Exemptions from Taxes, Customs Duties, and Similar Charges 
  
Interviews with DOD CTR program personnel make it clear that of all the traditional umbrella 
agreement protections, the program is currently placing the greatest emphasis on, where feasible, 
obtaining exemptions from taxes, customs duties, and similar charges. This emphasis reportedly 
results at least in part from Congressional opposition to foreign taxation of U.S. assistance. As 
discussed in Section III, no current U.S. law specifically prohibits foreign taxation of assistance 
provided by the DOD CTR program. However, Congress, the GAO, and various executive 
branch inspector generals have repeatedly shown considerable concern about foreign taxation of 
assistance provided by other U.S. government programs. For example, two recent federal laws 
have prohibited foreign taxation of assistance provided by other U.S. government programs. 
 
b.  Privileges and Immunities for U.S. Government Employees  
 
The DOD CTR program has also placed a relatively high priority on obtaining privileges and 
immunities for U.S. government employees engaged in program activity in the host country. In 
practice, this prioritization means that if other DOD officials, or officials from other agencies 
who are involved in analogous activities, enjoy privileges and immunities in the host country, the 
DOD CTR program will place significant emphasis on obtaining them also for DOD CTR 
program officials.  
 
As discussed in more detail below, U.S. status of forces agreements with foreign governments 
typically provide privileges and immunities for DOD military and civilian personnel engaged in 
"mutually agreed activities.” If the U.S. has such a status of forces agreement with the host 
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country of a DOD CTR program, the process of obtaining privileges and immunities for DOD 
CTR officials is relatively simple. The U.S. will seek formal acknowledgment from the host 
government that the DOD CTR program is a mutually agreed activity that falls within the 
protection of the status of forces agreement. Even in the absence of such a formal 
acknowledgment, there is an argument that DOD CTR activities within the host country are 
mutually agreed, by virtue of the fact that the host government is permitting the activities to take 
place in their country. 
 
Privileges and immunities have been prioritized because these protections are difficult or 
impossible to obtain in the absence of legally binding government-to-government agreements. 
However, in light of the fact that federal employees associated with the DOD CTR program 
typically travel to the host countries only for one week visits, the risk to them is considered to be 
relatively low (and comparable to the risk posed to other U.S. government employees engaged in 
one week visits to the host country). Thus, if other DOD officials, or officials from other 
agencies who are involved in analogous activities, do not enjoy privileges and immunities in the 
host country, the DOD CTR program does not place significant emphasis on obtaining them also 
for DOD CTR program officials.  
 
It is worth noting that there has been at least one public documented example of a major DOD 
program outside of the FSU context that the U.S. was willing to shut down rather than accept 
privileges and immunities that were deemed insufficient. The U.S. Naval Medical Research 2 
(NAMRU-2) facility in Indonesia opened in 1970 under a thirty-year agreement.36 It conducted 
scientific research on infectious diseases including plague, malaria, and avian influenza.37 
Negotiations over a new agreement began in 2000, “but they stalled when the United States 
insisted that technical and administrative staff at NAMRU-2 have some of the legal protections 
accorded by the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations.”38 Although Indonesia had 
reportedly provided protection to these administrative and technical staff in the past, it refused to 
do so as part of a new agreement.39 In a scholarly article about the incident, Frank Smith wrote as 
follows: “Ultimately, Indonesia only offered diplomatic immunity to a few officials. This was ‘a 
showstopper for the embassy’, which insisted that all American staff have some diplomatic 
protection.”40 “In the end,” says Smith, “NAMRU-2 shut down operations in Indonesia. . . and 
the last American staff left the country in June 2010.”41  
 
While the NAMRU-2 dispute revolved around privileges and immunities for U.S. government 
employees resident in the host country, recent events in Afghanistan have underlined the value of 
protections for contractors. A report by the U.S. Special Inspector General for Afghan 
Reconstruction asserted that a dispute between Afghanistan and the United States over the scope 
of a tax exemption for U.S. contractors had resulted in the Afghan government arresting some 
contractor personnel.42  
 
2. Protections Deemed Less Critical 
 
The remaining types of protections typically contained in FSU umbrella agreements have for 
various reasons been deemed less critical in the non-FSU context.  
 
a. Liability Protections 
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Liability protections have reportedly been dropped from the must have list because CTR projects 
outside the FSU are typically of a nature that poses lesser liability risks than did the large-scale 
nuclear weapons and other WMD dismantlement initiatives in the FSU. Even in the FSU context, 
there was reportedly never a need to deploy the umbrella agreement liability protections to 
defend against a lawsuit.  
 
Therefore, the DOD CTR Program has determined that it is sufficient to rely on the customary 
international law of sovereign immunity to protect U.S. government employees and on 
instructing contractors to protect themselves by purchasing liability insurance for themselves. As 
discussed in section III.C.3 below, because customary international law is not embodied in 
treaties, there are significant risks in relying on sovereign immunity to protect U.S. government 
employees from potential liability risks. 
 
b.  Audit and Examination Rights and End Use Assurances 
 
DOD contracting rules obligate the recipient to allow DOD access to confirm that provided 
equipment is used correctly and operating properly.43 The DOD CTR program has determined 
that sufficient assurance of DTRA’s right to perform audits and examinations, and sufficient 
protection against unauthorized end use, can be achieved by having the host country’s recipient 
agency sign on to appropriate language in DTRA’s Transfer of Custody or other contractual 
documents. The FY 2016 report’s description of SLBM/SSBN work at Zvezda Shipyard in 
Russia alluded to one way in which the program hoped to create some measure of access even in 
the absence of government to government agreements. The report stated that although “the lack 
of a signed access agreement under the MNEPR Framework Agreement… may hinder work 
verification in the future,” a contract was negotiated with Russian counterparts at the shipyard 
“to ensure full accountability” and “the contract calls for access and visual verification that work 
is complete prior to payment.”44  
 
c.  Right to Award Contracts Pursuant to Federal Acquisition Regulations  
 
The DOD CTR program has assessed that DOD could ensure this right by refusing to award 
contracts other than pursuant to the Federal Acquisition Regulations. 
 
 
B.  New Options for Achieving Protections 
 
The DOD CTR program has thus far managed to negotiate new full government-to-government 
protective umbrella agreements, specifically tailored to CTR Program needs, with only a few 
countries outside the FSU. For example, in September 2013, a legally binding CTR agreement 
was entered into by the U.S. and Libya regarding elimination of the remaining stock of chemical 
weapons there.45 In September 2014, a legally binding agreement was entered into with Jordan 
that “provides essential protections for DOD CTR program activities.”46 In July 2015, the United 
States and Kenya “signed a Cooperative Threat Reduction Agreement” to facilitate joint efforts 
related to “potential biological threats.”47 
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In a number of other countries outside the FSU, work has proceeded pursuant to existing legally 
binding bilateral agreements which had been originally negotiated for other purposes. In other 
countries where the program seeks to work, there is as of yet no legally binding agreement in 
place, even with regard to protections deemed essential to receive on a government to 
government basis where possible.  
 
With regard to the “essential” protections, DOD has added the following to its menu of options 
by which those protections may be satisfactorily achieved: 
 
1. “Piggyback” on Existing Bilateral U.S. Agreement with Host Country 
 
a. “Piggyback” on USAID Agreements 
 
The DOD CTR FY 2016 report to Congress stated that “as project urgency or other 
circumstances require, the DOD CTR Program has… worked with DOS and the U.S. Agency for 
International Development to develop arrangements providing political assurances that 
provisions in existing bilateral agreements will be applied to DOD CTR Program activities and 
personnel.”48 The report asserts that “the DOD CTR Program tailors these frameworks to the 
operating environment and planned threat reduction activities in each partner country to ensure 
appropriate mitigation of program risk.”49 USAID agreements typically provide many of the same 
protections as umbrella agreements, including two types of protections not typically included in 
status of forces agreements: 1) the right to audit and examine the use of assistance and 2) guarantees 
against unauthorized use, or retransfer to third parties, of U.S.-furnished assistance.  
 
However, since the FY 2016 report was published, USAID has reportedly been reluctant to allow 
its agreements to be used for DOD CTR purposes. Thus, only in the case of Tanzania and 
Vietnam has the DOD CTR Program “piggybacked” on a USAID agreement.  
 
b. “Piggyback” on Status of Forces Agreements 
 
As a result, DOD CTR has focused on using existing status of forces agreements to provide 
protections. The relationship between the DOD CTR program and a typical existing status of 
forces agreement is different than that between the DOD CTR program and a typical existing 
USAID agreement. Status of forces agreements typically apply to all DOD military and civilian 
personnel engaged in activities within a foreign country that have been “mutually agreed” to by 
the U.S. government and the foreign country government.  
 
If the U.S. has such a status of forces agreement with the host country of a DOD CTR program, 
the process of obtaining privileges and immunities for DOD CTR officials can be relatively 
straightforward. The U.S. will seek formal acknowledgment from the host government that the 
DOD CTR program is a mutually agreed activity that falls within the protection of the status of 
forces agreement. It typically does so by requesting from the host country a diplomatic note in 
which the host country government requests that DOD CTR undertake the agreed scope of work 
and acknowledges that the work falls within the ambit of the status of forces agreement.  
 
It can take months or even years to obtain such a diplomatic note from the host country 
government. However, even in the absence of such a formal acknowledgment, there is an 
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argument that DOD CTR activities within the host country are mutually agreed, by virtue of the 
fact that the host government is permitting the activities to take place in their country. 
 
Status of forces agreements are legally binding. They typically contain some but not all of the 
traditional umbrella agreement protections. Status of forces agreements typically: 
 
• Apply to DOD military and civilian personnel engaged in activities mutually agreed to by 
the U.S. and partner nations 
• Apply to DOD activities mutually agreed to by the U.S. and partner nations 
• Provide tax and customs duty exemptions for such activities 
• Provide privileges and immunities for DOD military and civilian personnel engaged in 
activities mutually agreed to by the U.S. and foreign government 
 
However, status of forces agreements typically do not provide the following which were 
typically included in umbrella agreements: 
 
• Do not provide rights to audit and examine the use of assistance 
• Do not provide guarantees against unauthorized use, or retransfer to third parties, of U.S.-
furnished assistance 
• Do not protect U.S. government personnel or contractors against third party lawsuits 
 
DOD CTR has used existing status of forces agreements to provide protections, and received 
acknowledgment from the host government of their applicability, in countries including the 
following: Guinea, Liberia, the Philippines, and Senegal. DOD CTR has identified potentially 
applicable existing status of forces agreements, and is seeking formal acknowledgment from the 
host government of their applicability, in several other countries (all outside of the MENA 
region). It can take months or even years to receive a diplomatic note containing such an 
acknowledgement. 
 
As discussed above, one downside of relying on status of forces agreements is that they do not 
typically provide all of the protections included in the FSU umbrella agreements. Consequently, 
when the DOD CTR program chooses to rely on a status of forces agreement, it works to 
minimize the liability, audit and examination, and end use risks in various ways discussed earlier 
in this report. For example, with regard to liability, the DOD CTR program relies on the 
customary international law principle of sovereign immunity to protect U.S. government 
employees from third party lawsuits and instructs contractors to protect themselves through the 
purchase of liability insurance. As discussed in section III.C.3 below, because customary 
international law is not embodied in treaties, there are significant risks in relying on sovereign 
immunity to protect U.S. government employees from potential liability risks. With regard to 
audit and examination (and proper end use), the DOD CTR Program insists on receiving before 
the transfer of equipment a document signed by a cognizant host country official.  
 
In addition to seeking to “piggyback” on USAID and status of forces agreements, the DOD CTR 
program should seek to identify other government to government assistance agreements on 
which it might piggyback or at least draw for negotiating precedent. For example, assistance 
agreements designed to protect Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) activities involving 
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equipment provision and Centers for Disease Control (CDC) activities involving dangerous 
diseases might also be useful. The FAA, CDC, and other non-military agencies might turn out to 
share USAID’s reluctance to allow their agreements to be used for DOD CTR purposes. 
However, if “piggybacking” on their agreements would enable the DOD CTR program to obtain 
important protections, the idea is certainly worth exploring. 
 
Another alternative means which the DOD CTR program has explored for obtaining protections 
deemed essential is entry into a new legally binding government to government umbrella 
agreement containing only those protections (and any less essential protections that are readily 
obtained). However, piggybacking on a status of forces agreement (when one exists with the host 
country government) should, in theory, be quicker than negotiating a new agreement. 
 
Regardless of the form that a legally binding government to government agreement takes, it is 
important to take into account that in many foreign legal systems, some or all protection 
provisions may not become applicable in local courts absent parliamentary action such as 
ratification and/or implementation into local law. In other words, a signed agreement can bind 
the foreign government yet not be valid law within the country absent legislative action. As 
discussed in Section III, it is important to determine whether this is the case in a particular host 
country and, if so, ensure that the appropriate legislative action is taken. 
 
2. Unilateral written commitment by host government to grant protections 
 
The DOD CTR program has, when faced with a host country government unwilling to enter into 
a new bilateral agreement or use an existing one, considered relying on the host country 
government providing a unilateral written commitment to protect against host country domestic 
law risks. Under international law, legally binding obligations typically are embodied in bilateral 
agreements rather than unilateral commitments.50 While there is some precedent for unilateral 
statements creating legally binding obligations,51 it seems substantially more reliable for CTR 
protections to be contained in legally binding bilateral agreements. 
 
3. Nonbinding memorandum of understanding in which host country government provides 
political commitment to provide protections 
 
The DOD CTR FY 2016 report to Congress indicated that the DOD CTR program was 
“assessing options for both binding and non-binding frameworks to cover DOD CTR Program 
work” with various countries. Outside of the MENA region, the specified countries in this status 
included Gabon, India, Indonesia, Sierra Leone, and Tanzania. One MENA country (Iraq) was 
also described as being in this status: “The DOD CTR Program is assessing options for both 
binding and non-binding frameworks to cover DOD CTR Program work with Iraq.”52 As of July 
2016, there was no agreement in place with Iraq. 
 
While the desire to negotiate binding legal frameworks is understandable, it is unclear how non-
binding frameworks could effectively protect U.S. government employees or contractors from 
host country domestic legal issues.  
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C.  New Willingness to Consider Working Without Protections in Place  
 
The DOD CTR FY 2016 report to Congress stated as a general matter that “where CTR-specific 
agreements or arrangements are not yet in place, the DOD CTR Program avoids or minimizes 
activities that would incur taxes, identifies tax reimbursement mechanisms available to the U.S. 
Government, and establishes the right to examine the use of any material, training or service 
provided through less formal transfer of custody arrangements.”53 Activities which have been 
deemed “low risk” and thus approved to be conducted without legally binding protections in 
place include: 
 
• development of joint plans 
• conducting needs assessments 
• providing classroom training 
• reviewing designs and providing technical advice for construction 
• transferring equipment when the host country government has committed to protections 
in the DTRA Transfer of Custody documents 
 
In the absence of special protections in place, the DOD CTR program attempts to mitigate risks 
through existing U.S. government mechanisms. These can include, for example, avoiding 
customs duties by shipping through the U.S. embassy located in the host country. 
 
“Medium” risk activities are considered for approval when “essential” protections (e.g., tax 
exemptions) are in place and other risks (such as a lack of liability protection for contractors) can 
be mitigated (e.g., by the contractors successfully acquiring insurance coverage for the activity). 
Activities which have been deemed “medium risk” include: 
 
• provision of equipment which is of relatively high value but poses a low liability risk 
• performing low cost, simple facility refurbishments  
 
Activities which are considered to be of “high risk” and thus relatively more in need of 
traditional government to government protections include laboratory construction and the 
provision of some sensitive equipment. The DOD CTR program is reportedly willing to consider 
proceeding with such “high risk” activities absent critical protections in light of factors including 
sufficient significance and imminence of the threat to U.S. national security. 
 
The decision as to whether a particular activity in a particular country should not proceed absent 
a particular level of protection is made by the program on a case by case basis. As of July 2016, 
there was no policy memo that authoritatively and systematically provided guidance on these 
matters.  
 
The lack of a protective agreement has reportedly contributed to slowed CBEP and Proliferation 
Prevention Program work in Iraq. As mentioned previously, the DOD CTR FY 2016 report to 
Congress stated that “the DOD CTR Program is assessing options for both legal and non-binding 
frameworks to cover Program work with Iraq.”54 It also stated that “the DOD CTR Program is 
assessing the WMD-proliferation threat against the risk of performing activities in the absence of 
a legal framework and identifying options the CBEP can use to mitigate legal risks.”55  
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III. Analysis and Recommendations 
 
A. Traditional “Umbrella Agreements” Remain Desirable Where Obtainable and CTR 
Work Poses Significant Risk 
 
The benefits of avoiding the initial investment in painstaking negotiation of bilateral country-by-
country “umbrella agreements” need to be balanced against the probability that, in the long term, 
a CTR program will likely be more successful (and more agile, flexible, and responsive) if the 
inherent legal risks posed by operating in a particular environment are mitigated or eliminated 
altogether at the outset of the implementation through the conclusion of a sufficiently 
comprehensive legally binding agreement. The negotiation of such an agreement clears the field 
so a specific program can operate efficiently and effectively, and be protected from potentially 
severe legal consequences resulting from unanticipated incidents and accidents. Such protection 
can help the program survive scrutiny from Congressional and other overseers for years to come. 
 
It can be difficult or impossible to anticipate all of the different types of cooperative threat 
reduction projects that the U.S. might wish to undertake in a particular country as new threats 
arise. It can also be difficult or impossible to anticipate how a country’s operational environment 
and/or legal system might over time come to pose greater risks or provide lesser protections than 
at the time the need for a protective agreement was initially assessed. Because it typically 
becomes much more difficult to persuade the host country government of the need to increase 
protections once DOD CTR activity begins in a particular host country, there is value in 
prioritizing initial investment in negotiating protections that are expansive as possible. 
 
To maximize protections by prioritizing investment in negotiating them means, in part, to 
involve in the negotiations U.S. government officials at the political level (Deputy Assistant 
Secretary of Defense and above). Foreign governments are typically as or more hierarchical than 
is the U.S. government, with only political level officials authorized to make significant 
concessions. Foreign political level officials typically become personally engaged in negotiations 
only when a U.S. official of a similar level becomes involved. DOD CTR umbrella agreement 
negotiations with FSU governments typically involved senior officials, including at times cabinet 
secretaries and even the U.S. president. Over the past eight years, there has reportedly been a 
significant reduction in political level U.S. Defense Department officials engaging their foreign 
counterparts to address the need for legal protections for CTR efforts in host countries. 
 
That said, some types of CTR program work do not necessitate the protections of a full 
traditional DOD CTR umbrella agreement. The CTR program should be prepared to proceed 
with an activity in a particular country, in the absence of a full traditional umbrella agreement, 
when the program has carefully and systematically determined that the urgency and magnitude 
of the particular threat to be reduced by that activity outweighs the particular risks to the United 
States and its personnel of engaging in that activity in that individual partner nation. In order to 
ensure that such determinations are sufficiently rigorous and tailored, they should be the subject 
of decision memoranda signed by an appropriately senior official. While it makes sense for low 
risk activities in a particular country to be approved on a categorical basis (e.g., “all classroom 
training of Saudi customs officials on commodity identification is hereby approved even in the 
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absence of liability protection”), medium and high risk activities in a particular country should 
be approved only on a case by case basis.  
 
B. Overall Criteria Relevant to Assessing Risk 
 
According to the Government Accountability Office, effective risk assessment with regard to 
federal programs “involves comprehensively identifying risks associated with achieving program 
objectives; analyzing those risks to determine their significance, likelihood of occurrence, and 
impact; and determining actions or controls to mitigate the risk.”56  
 
The value of particular protections to mitigate host country domestic legal risk depend in part on 
a project’s particular type and the specific country for which it is planned. The magnitude of the 
host country domestic legal risk posed by a given type of project in a particular country will 
depend on a combination of two major factors: a) the inherent riskiness of the type of project 
(e.g., what can go wrong with the project from a practical perspective that might foreseeably 
intersect with a host country legal system); and b) the characteristics of the particular host 
country’s legal system.  
 
1. Different Types of Activities Vary in Risk 
 
As discussed above, the DOD CTR program has begun to divide types of program activities into 
“high risk,” “medium risk,” and “low risk” categories. The risk category into which an activity 
falls helps inform decisions as to whether that activity should proceed absent a particular level of 
protection.  
 
It is essential that such risk analysis be conducted systematically, with input from legal and other 
relevant professional specialists (e.g., engineers with regard to potential liability for equipment 
malfunction or architects with regard to construction failure). It is also essential that risk analysis 
of a particular activity per se (in and of itself) be seen as merely a starting point for risk analysis 
of that particular activity within the context of each particular host country’s legal system. Given 
the variability of host country legal systems, all but the least risky activity per se should be 
analyzed for risk in light of how that risk might play out in the legal system of the particular host 
country. 
 
2.  Risk Depends on Characteristics of Host Country’s Legal System 
 
While subsequent subsections of this chapter focus on host country legal systems as they relate 
specifically to particular risks such as liability, it is important to note that there are also several 
overall characteristics of host country legal systems that should be taken into account. These 
include the following: 
 
a. To what extent does the host country legal system operate in an arbitrary, unpredictable, 
inefficiently protracted, or otherwise unfair manner?  
 
The more a particular host country’s legal system operates in an arbitrary, inefficiently 
protracted, or otherwise unfair manner, especially with regard to legal issues directly relevant to 
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DOD CTR program operations, the more important it is that the program obtain strong 
protections from host country domestic legal risks. Many developing countries, including in the 
MENA region, have large gaps between relatively fair laws on the books and a legal system that 
in practice operates in an arbitrary, unpredictable, inefficiently protracted, or otherwise unfair 
manner.  
 
One indicator of how countries’ legal systems work in practice is the World Bank’s Doing 
Business Project, which annually “provides objective measures of business regulations and their 
enforcement across 189 economies” worldwide.57 For the overall ease of doing business, most 
MENA countries are ranked at or below the world average.58 In light of the CTR program’s 
particular risks regarding taxation and the need to import equipment efficiently and without 
payment of customs duties, the World Bank ratings for ease of “paying taxes” and “trading 
across borders” are of particular interest. Several relevant MENA countries are ranked 
particularly low on these measures. For example, Egypt is 151th on ease of paying taxes and 
157th on ease of trading across borders, Yemen is 135th on ease of paying taxes and 189th on ease 
of trading across borders, Syria is 119th on ease of paying taxes and 173rd on ease of trading 
across borders, and Libya is 160th on ease of paying taxes and 107th on ease of trading across 
borders.59  
 
b. What is the level of corruption in the host country? 
 
One major contributor to unfair implementation of legal systems worldwide is of course 
corruption. The higher the level of corruption in a host country, the more important it is to obtain 
legally binding protections prior to engaging in risky activities. Officials in corrupt legal systems 
are more likely to have a personal incentive to engage in the behaviors against which umbrella 
agreements are designed to protect. For example, officials in a corrupt system are more likely to:  
 
• insist on imposition of taxes and customs duties when they are able to keep such 
payments for themselves 
• wrongly detain program employees when the local practice is that such detentions are 
resolved through bribery 
• retransfer provided equipment to unauthorized uses when the local practice is to steal and 
sell government assets 
 
In addition, at a systemic level, corruption in a legal system typically makes it harder to assess 
risk, including by making it harder to predict how a specific law will be applied to a particular 
set of facts.  
 
U.S. companies are bound by a U.S. law, the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, which prohibits all 
U.S. persons from paying bribes to foreign government officials60 and is aggressively enforced 
by the U.S. government. U.S. government contractors engaged in DOD CTR activities in a host 
country therefore cannot address a corruption-caused problem (e.g., a wrongful detention) by 
taking the same steps (e.g., paying a bribe) that host country companies take to address such 
problems. The Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index 2015 includes the 
following rankings of relevant MENA countries (number 1 is the least corrupt country and 
number 167 is the most corrupt country on their list): Qatar (22), UAE (23), Jordan (45), Saudi 
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Arabia (48), Bahrain (50), Kuwait (55), Oman (60), Tunisia (76), Algeria (88), Egypt (88), 
Morocco (88), Lebanon (123), Iran (130), Syria (154), Iraq (161), Libya (161).61 
 
High level foreign officials who have a constructive relationship with, and understanding of, the 
U.S. government are sometimes willing to override bribe requests from lower level officials. The 
DOD CTR program should consider specifying in its agreements with a host country government 
the high level official or officials to which U.S. government personnel and contractors can 
escalate issues associated with petty bribes demanded by lower level officials.  
 
c. Do protective international agreements require ratification? Are they self-executing? 
 
In many legal systems, some or all protection provisions may not become applicable in local 
courts absent parliamentary action such as ratification and/or implementation into local law. In 
other words, a signed agreement can bind the foreign government yet not be valid law within the 
country. 
 
It is essential that DOD CTR program leadership ensure that protective provisions are valid law 
within the host country, including by determining whether an existing or potential protective 
international agreement with a host country a) requires parliamentary ratification prior to entry 
into force as an agreement legally binding upon the host country, and b) has automatic domestic 
effect upon ratification (is “self-executing”) or instead is not applicable in domestic courts absent 
implementing legislation amending existing law. The term for an international agreement that 
becomes judicially enforceable only through implementing legislation is “non-self-executing.”  
 
C. Specific Protections Traditionally Provided by Umbrella Agreements 
 
1. Exemption from Taxes and Customs Duties 
 
No current U.S. law specifically prohibits foreign taxation of assistance provided by the DOD 
CTR Program. Nor does DOD’s department-wide policy rule out the payment of such taxes. 
However, Congress has imposed draconian restrictions in response to foreign taxation of 
assistance provided by other U.S. government programs. The DOD CTR Program should derive 
lessons learned from the controversies that contributed to enactment of these laws, and take 
prophylactic measures to ensure that similar controversies do not impact the DOD CTR Program. 
DOD’s department-wide policy to seek relief from foreign taxes to the maximum extent 
practicable is set forth as follows in DOD Instruction 5100.64:  
It is DOD policy to secure, to the maximum extent practicable, effective relief from all foreign 
taxes. This policy applies wherever the ultimate economic burden of those taxes would, in the 
absence of such relief, be borne by funds appropriated or allocated to the DOD (including 
security assistance and related appropriations) or under the control of its nonappropriated fund 
activities. However, in situations where the economic burden of a tax is so small that it may be 
considered a de minimis matter, or when the administrative burden of securing effective relief 
from a tax in a particular instance is greater than the amount of the relief likely to be obtained, 
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tax relief will be considered impractical and will not be sought under the provisions of this 
issuance.62  
This policy is far from an order to never pay foreign taxes under any circumstances. Indeed, this 
policy is far more flexible than DOD’s traditional insistence that CTR program work not begin in 
a particular country until the U.S. and the host country have entered into a legally binding 
government to government agreement exempting program assistance from all taxes, customs 
duties, and similar charges. 
 
However, Congress, the GAO, and various executive branch inspector generals have repeatedly 
shown considerable concern about foreign taxation of assistance provided by other U.S. 
government programs. For example, two recent federal laws have prohibited foreign taxation of 
assistance provided by other U.S. government programs. The DOD CTR Program should derive 
lessons learned from the controversies that led to enactment of these laws, and take measures to 
ensure that similar controversies do not impact the DOD CTR Program. 
 
Section 7013(a) of the Foreign Operations Appropriations Act 2016, which is not applicable to 
the DOD CTR program, provides as follows: 
SEC. 7013. (a) PROHIBITION ON TAXATION.—None of the funds appropriated under 
titles III through VI of this Act may be made available to provide assistance for a foreign 
country under a new bilateral agreement governing the terms and conditions under which 
such assistance is to be provided unless such agreement includes a provision stating that 
assistance provided by the United States shall be exempt from taxation, or reimbursed, by 
the foreign government, and the Secretary of State shall expeditiously seek to negotiate 
amendments to existing bilateral agreements, as necessary, to conform with this 
requirement.  
(b) REIMBURSEMENT OF FOREIGN TAXES.—An amount equivalent to 200 percent 
of the total taxes assessed during fiscal year 2016 on funds appropriated by this Act by a 
foreign government or entity against United States assistance programs for which funds 
are appropriated by this Act, either directly or through grantees, contractors, and 
subcontractors shall be withheld from obligation from funds appropriated for assistance 
for fiscal year 2017 and allocated for the central government of such country… to the 
extent that the Secretary of State certifies and reports in writing to the Committees on 
Appropriations, not later than September 30, 2017, that such taxes have not been 
reimbursed to the Government of the United States.63  
This provision requires that if a foreign government imposes taxes on U.S. foreign assistance and 
refuses to reimburse the taxes, assistance to that country for the subsequent fiscal year will be 
reduced by 200 percent of the imposed tax. This requirement was first included in the 2003 
Consolidated Appropriations Resolution. It applies to foreign assistance programs funded by 
select titles in the Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs 
Appropriations Acts, but not to the DOD CTR program. 
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This foreign operations taxation prohibition was spurred by Congress learning in 2002 that the 
Palestinian Authority and various other foreign governments were taxing U.S. assistance and 
especially assistance provided through USAID.64 This “raised concerns in Congress that U.S. 
assistance funds for programs to help developing country populations were instead being 
diverted to the treasuries of foreign governments.”65 The problem arose despite the fact that 
USAID had protective agreements with almost all of the countries or other entities (e.g., the 
Palestinian Authority) to which it provided assistance. Of the 90 countries or entities to which 
USAID provided assistance in fiscal year 2003, it had with 77 of them “bilateral framework 
agreements that include some type of prohibition on taxation,” and had with 6 others of them 
“other agreements that include such prohibitions.”66 In only 7 of the 90 assistance relationships 
did USAID “not have agreements that include such prohibitions.”67 
 
The foreign taxation of U.S. assistance which received the most attention was the $6.8 million 
which the Palestinian Authority had collected in “taxes on U.S. humanitarian assistance meant 
for the people of the West Bank and Gaza.”68 The Palestinian Authority was one of the entities 
with which the U.S. government did not have a legally binding protective agreement regarding 
taxation of assistance. Instead, the U.S. government was relying on a letter in which the 
Palestinian Authority stated that it would not assess VAT for any U.S. assistance activities.69 
USAID’s misplaced reliance on a non-binding letter from the Palestinian Authority, and the 
ensuing controversy, should serve as a warning to the DOD CTR program of the risks of relying 
on a non-binding commitment to protect the program from foreign taxes. 
 
Separately, the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2014 included a requirement 
that DOD withhold fiscal year 2014 assistance to Afghanistan in an amount equivalent to 100 
percent of all taxes assessed by the Afghan government on DOD assistance during fiscal year 
2013, to the extent such taxes were not reimbursed by the Afghan government.70 The 
requirement applied to all “funds provided during fiscal year 2013 to Afghanistan by the 
Department of Defense, either directly or through grantees, contractors, or subcontractors.”71  
 
The requirement was imposed in the wake of a 2013 report, by the U.S. Special Inspector for 
Afghan Reconstruction (SIGAR), that found that between 2008 and 2013, the Afghan Ministry 
of Finance had “levied over $921 million in business taxes, and associated penalties, on 43 
contractors that support U.S. government efforts in Afghanistan.”72 This occurred 
notwithstanding U.S. contracting agencies – including the Defense Department, State 
Department Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL), and USAID 
– having “negotiated agreements with the Afghan government that exempt their contracts from 
certain Afghan business taxes.”73  
For example, SIGAR found that “$93 million of the $921 million represented taxes levied on 
business receipts and annual corporate income – a tax category that both the U.S. and Afghan 
governments have agreed should be exempt for contractors operating under” protective 
agreements.74 “Agreements put in place to ensure that contractors supporting U.S. agencies’ 
contracts are not taxed appear to be failing in their purpose,” said SIGAR.75 SIGAR expressed 
concern that the Afghan government’s assessment of taxes on DOD assistance was increasing 
“the cost of projects to the American taxpayer.”76 Disputes relating to the Afghan government’s 
attempted enforcement of tax assessments also “resulted in arrests and arrest warrants for 
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contractor personnel and freezing of company bank accounts.”77 In addition, SIGAR reported 
that “at least nine of the contractors we interviewed had shipments of goods critical to U.S. and 
coalition operations delayed as a result of unresolved tax assessments.”78  
In the case of DOD, the protective agreement in place was a status of forces agreement that 
stated as follows: “the Government of the United States of America, its military and civilian 
personnel, contractors and contractor personnel shall not be liable to pay any tax or similar 
charge assessed within Afghanistan.”79 The status of forces agreement further stated that the 
acquisition of goods and services in Afghanistan by or on behalf of the U.S. government are not 
subject to any taxes, customs duties, or other similar charges.80 
SIGAR noted that part of the problem stemmed from a disagreement between U.S. and Afghan 
Ministry of Finance (MOF) officials “about the tax-exempt status of subcontractors.”81 “MOF 
officials,” explained SIGAR, “assert that the DOD and State INL agreements provide tax-exempt 
status only to prime contractors, and not subcontractors, whereas U.S. government officials 
contend that the agreements provide tax exemption for all non-Afghan companies (both prime 
and subcontractors) supporting U.S. government efforts.”82 In implementation of its position, the 
Afghan Ministry of Finance required “prime contractors to withhold a portion of subcontractor 
payments to meet tax obligations.”83 
SIGAR also “found that INL and DOD contracting officers do not fully understand 
Afghanistan’s tax laws and, as a result, they have improperly reimbursed contractors for taxes 
paid to the Afghan government.”84 SIGAR also concluded that DOD and INL did not take 
“sufficient steps to ensure that their subcontractors obtain required tax exemption certificates.”85  
In light of the Afghanistan taxation dispute and SIGAR’s recommendations for addressing it,86 
the DOD CTR Program should consider taking the following prophylactic measures: 
• Ensure that protective agreements clearly specify tax exemption for all relevant 
companies (both prime contractors and subcontractors) supporting U.S. government 
efforts. SIGAR found that Afghan Ministry of Finance officials stated that the SOFA 
agreement provided tax-exempt status only to prime contractors and not subcontractors, 
“because subcontractors are not mentioned in the agreements.”87 U.S. government 
officials told SIGAR they “disagree with this position” and stated the SOFA agreement 
provides “tax exemption for all non-Afghan companies (both prime contractors and 
subcontractors) supporting U.S. government contracts.”88 As SIGAR noted, the SOFA 
agreement used the term “contractors” but indeed did not specifically mention 
“subcontractors.” Based on this experience, the DOD CTR program should ensure that 
protective agreements clearly specify that their scope includes subcontractors and 
subcontractor personnel. To the extent that the DOD CTR program “piggybacks” on an 
existing SOFA or other agreement that does not so specify, it should strongly consider a 
supplementary agreement that does so. 
• Ensure that U.S. government agencies providing CTR and other assistance in the host 
country develop as consistent and unified a position as possible on host country taxation 
of assistance provided, including by contractors and subcontractors. SIGAR concluded 
that “the U.S. government has created a tax environment for contractors that differs from 
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agency to agency and allows the Afghan government to take advantage of differences in 
the application of the various agreements.”89 
• Ensure that DOD CTR program contracting officers understand that part of their 
responsibilities include providing advice to contractors on exemption from local taxes. 
SIGAR noted that with regard to Afghanistan, the DOD’s CENTCOM Joint Theater 
Support Contracting Command asserted that “tax issues are beyond the contracting 
officers’ responsibility” while at the same time, DOD’s Office of General Counsel, 
whose view on this issue is more authoritative, “stated that its policy is to resist providing 
advice to contractors because that is the responsibility of the contracting officers.”90 
• Ensure that DOD CTR program contracting officers have a sufficient understanding both 
of host country tax laws and how they are implemented in practice.  
• Ensure that DOD CTR program officials, to the extent necessary, work with the host 
country government to develop and clarify procedures for contractors and subcontractors 
to obtain appropriate documentation of tax-exempt status with the host country 
government. 
• Ensure that DOD CTR program officials provide sufficient guidance and training to 
contractors and subcontractors on how to obtain any required tax exemption certificates 
from the host country government. 
• Ensure that appropriate steps are taken to prevent the program from improperly 
reimbursing taxes to contractors. 
 
2. Privileges and Immunities 
 
In order to accurately assess the need for privileges and immunities with regard to a particular 
project in a particular country, it is essential to have a sophisticated understanding of the level of 
risk that U.S. government employees or contractors might be arrested or otherwise detained on 
trumped up charges in that country. The Office of Foreign Litigation (OFL) in the U.S. 
Department of Justice typically “represents the United States’ interests in foreign criminal 
proceedings involving prosecutions for criminal activity directed against the United States, its 
officers, and employees.”91 As noted above, the OFL’s mission is to protect “U.S. interests in all 
litigation pending in foreign courts, whether civil or criminal, affirmative or defensive.”92  
 
The OFL’s purview includes providing “legal advice to federal agencies, departments, and 
government officials regarding litigation risks abroad,” 93 an undertaking which it achieves in 
part by retaining foreign attorneys to advise and represent the U.S. with regard to foreign legal 
systems. 94 Surprisingly, the DOD CTR Program seems to have rarely if ever drawn on the 
OFL’s expertise in assessing and mitigating the legal risks to its personnel in potential host 
countries. The DOD CTR program should immediately begin to systematically confer with the 
OFL about the DOD CTR program’s host country domestic law risks and how to address them. 
 
The DOD CTR Program’s need to obtain privileges and immunities protection in a legally 
binding agreement has increased in recent years, at least on its face. While DOD employees 
travelling to CTR host countries were previously issued diplomatic passports, they are now 
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merely issued official passports. While DOD contractors travelling to CTR host countries were 
previously issued official passports, that practice has been discontinued in favor of the use of 
standard passports. As discussed below, simply carrying even a diplomatic passport, without 
formally being accredited as a diplomat to the host government, is not sufficient, in the U.S. and 
many other countries, to have a right to privileges and immunities. However, as a political 
matter, the DOD CTR program might find it easier to persuade a host country government to, for 
example, not prosecute a DOD CTR employee bearing a diplomatic passport.  
 
In contrast with sovereign immunity, which is largely governed by customary international law, 
diplomatic immunity is largely enshrined in treaties, most notably the Vienna Convention on 
Diplomatic Relations and the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations.95 
The Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, which entered into force for the United States 
in 1972, provides diplomats with strong protections against criminal prosecution. Various 
categories of diplomatic mission personnel receive different protections. 96 “Diplomatic agents,” 
including ambassadors and the other diplomatic officers who deal directly with host country 
officials, enjoy the highest level of privileges and immunities. 97 They enjoy complete personal 
inviolability, which means that they cannot be arrested or detained. 98 Nor may their property 
(including vehicles) or residences be entered or searched.  
 
Diplomatic agents “also enjoy complete immunity from the criminal jurisdiction of the host 
country’s courts and thus cannot be prosecuted no matter how serious the offense unless their 
immunity is waived by the sending state.” 99 They also have immunity from civil suits except in 
very limited circumstances. 100 
 
The next highest category is “members of the administrative and technical staff” of the mission, 
which includes those persons who support the activities of diplomatic agents.101 This category 
includes various clerical personnel, office managers, and certain professional security personnel. 
102 Members of the administrative and technical staff “enjoy privileges and immunities identical 
to those of diplomatic agents in respect of personal inviolability and immunity from criminal 
jurisdiction.103 However, their immunity from civil jurisdiction (lawsuits) is significantly 
reduced. They enjoy immunity from civil jurisdiction only in connection with the performance of 
their official duties. 104 This is commonly known as “official acts or functional immunity.” 105  
 
It is important to note that persons “sent to the United States on short-term official duty with 
diplomatic missions ordinarily do not enjoy any privileges and immunities.” 106 This is the case 
even if the persons carry a foreign diplomatic passport.107 Privileges and immunities are 
extended only to persons eligible for special identity cards issued by the U.S. Department of 
State to persons accredited to the United States or to designated international organizations 
located in the United States. 108  
 
Even for diplomatic agents who have been formally notified to the host country government, 
diplomatic immunity can be unreliable. As a result, when a diplomat is even merely rumored to 
be the potential subject of a prosecution, he or she is typically counseled to immediately return to 
his home country. 
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The vast majority of federal employees travelling to host countries to work on the DOD CTR 
program do so on short-term (also known as temporary) official duty. Assuming the host country 
is similar to the United States in denying privileges and immunities to even those persons on 
short-term official duty who carry diplomatic passports, federal employees (let alone contractors) 
temporarily working in host countries in connection with the DOD CTR program would 
typically have no privileges and immunities absent such being clearly specified in an umbrella, 
status of forces, or other government to government agreement. 
 
The DOD CTR Program should work closely with the OFL to: 
 
• assess the inherent riskiness, from a practical perspective, of the various major types of 
DOD CTR program activities (e.g., what can go wrong with project personnel from a 
practical perspective that might intersect with a host country legal system) 
 
• assess how the level of risk posed by these DOD CTR personnel acts could be impacted 
by the characteristics of the particular host country’s legal system (e.g., does this country 
have a particular tendency to arrest foreign government employees who engage in 
particular acts, etc.) 
 
• assess the relative efficacy of various types of agreements and other options for 
mitigating these risks 
 
• develop a systematic methodology for determining when and if a particular type of 
activity by U.S. personnel in a particular country should proceed with various types of 





In order to accurately assess the need for liability protection of a particular project in a particular 
country, it is necessary to have a sophisticated understanding of how liability issues are handled 
by the host country’s legal system. The Office of Foreign Litigation (OFL) in the U.S. 
Department of Justice is the leading source of U.S. government expertise regarding lawsuits in 
foreign courts. The OFL’s mission is to protect “U.S. interests in all litigation pending in foreign 
courts, whether civil or criminal, affirmative or defensive.”109 Its purview includes defense 
against “litigation arising from U.S. agency or military activities in foreign countries” and 
providing “legal advice to federal agencies, departments, and government officials regarding 
litigation risks abroad.”110 The OFL fulfils its mission in part by retaining foreign attorneys to 
advise and represent the U.S. with regard to foreign legal systems.111 According to the OFL, “at 
any given time, foreign lawyers under OFL’s direct supervision represent the United States in 
approximately 1,000 lawsuits pending in the courts of over 100 countries.” 112 
 
 Surprisingly, the DOD CTR Program seems to have rarely if ever drawn on the OFL’s expertise 
in assessing and mitigating the litigation risk in potential host countries. As a result, the DOD 
CTR Program has in recent years unduly relied on sovereign immunity to protect U.S. 
government employees from potential liability risks. In interviews with this author, attorneys 
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from the OFL cautioned that sovereign immunity is customary international law (i.e., not 
reflected in a treaty but rather in state practice accepted as law)113 and that many developing 
country courts, including in the MENA region, don’t fully understand and implement customary 
international law. Thus, while sovereign immunity can be relied upon to protect the U.S. 
government against lawsuits in U.S. courts in a manner predictably consistent with U.S. law, 
sovereign immunity is a much less reliable defense for the U.S. government in foreign courts, 
especially in the developing world. 
 
The risks of undue reliance on sovereign immunity are reflected in the literature. As one 
commentator put it, “most countries have not domestically codified state immunity principles 
and instead rely upon interpretation of customary international law… the lack of domestic 
legislation has sometimes resulted in inconsistent application of state immunity principles.”114 
 
The risk of reliance on sovereign immunity is exemplified by Italy’s recent willingness to defy 
an International Court of Justice ruling specifically ordering Italy to provide sovereign immunity 
in a particular circumstance. The International Court of Justice, in a 2012 case titled 
Jurisdictional Immunities of the State (Germany v. Italy), upheld the principle of sovereign 
immunity from civil suits, rejecting Italy’s attempt to create an exception to sovereign immunity 
in civil cases brought in response to grave human rights abuses by Germany during World War 
II.115 However, the Italian Constitutional Court subsequently defied the ICJ’s ruling and 
authorized such lawsuits to go forward.116 Anne Peters, director of the Max Planck Institute for 
Public Law and International Comparative Law, predicted in December 2015 that the Italian 
Constitutional Court’s ruling would have “systemic significance,” with other constitutional 
courts around the world giving less deference to sovereign immunity in light of the Italian 
court’s refusal to defer to sovereign immunity even in the face of a specifically applicable ICJ 
decision.117 
 
Advocates of reduced liability protection may also be overlying relying on the reported lack of a 
need, over the course of twenty years of FSU programs, to deploy the umbrella agreement 
liability protections to defend against a lawsuit. The existence of such protections may, of 
course, have served to deter such lawsuits from even commencing. With OFL defending 
hundreds of foreign lawsuits against the U.S. at any one time, the possibility of a lawsuit relating 
to a DOD CTR Program is far from theoretical. As one federal attorney involved with the DOD 
CTR Program said, liability protection is “like insurance, you hope you never need it but you get 
it anyway.” 
 
DOD CTR umbrella agreements traditionally protected against third party lawsuits not only U.S. 
government personnel but also contractors. One risk to the U.S. government of proceeding 
without such protection for contractors is that contractors might refuse to do some types of work 
in the absence of such protection.  
 
 In a not-for-attribution discussion with the author, a key official at a potential contractor 
cautioned that “pursuing bio work in some… countries might be viewed as too risky no matter 
what,” and especially in the absence of something like the traditional liability protection 
provision. He explained that “the ‘traditional’ blanket exemption/indemnification found in UA 
language has been critical to my being able to receive permission from senior corporate 
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executive leadership and from corporate legal to bid certain jobs.” “Commercial risk insurance,” 
he said, “is not available in all areas, or for all activities… insurance companies tend to get 
spooked (sometimes irrationally) when words like ‘pathogens’ are part of the description of the 
project for which one is seeking coverage.” He added the following:  
 
“My job addressing the risks and getting approval to bid is made considerably easier when I can 
point to the absolute protections on the Umbrella Agreement language (especially when the UA 
has been ratified by the country in question). I will have a much more uphill battle trying to 
convince our folks to let me bid… without a UA or… something that offers similar protection.” 
 
This is not the only major contractor who has indicated that they might be unwilling to do certain 
types of biological or chemical threat reduction work in the absence of sufficient liability 
protections.  
 
The DOD CTR Program should work closely with the OFL to: 
 
• assess the inherent riskiness, from a practical perspective, of the various major types of 
DOD CTR program activities (e.g., what can go wrong with project activities from a 
practical perspective that might intersect with a host country legal system) 
 
• assess how the level of risk posed by these DOD CTR program activities could be 
impacted by the characteristics of the particular host country’s legal system (e.g., does 
this country have a particular tendency to ignore sovereign immunity or award massive 
judgments in lawsuits against foreign entities, etc.) 
 
• assess the relative efficacy of various types of agreements and other options for 
mitigating these risks (e.g., is this a country regarding which the liability provisions in an 
applicable status of forces agreement are classified and this country’s legal system 
requires that agreement provisions can only be introduced in local courts if they have 
previously been published)  
 
• develop a systematic methodology for determining when and if a particular program 
activity in a particular country should proceed with various types of higher or lower 
levels of protection or other options for mitigating risk  
 
 
4. Audit and Examination Rights and End Use Assurances 
 
The principal objective of audit and examination rights, and end use assurances, is to ensure that 
assistance is used for the purposes provided and not diverted. The DOD CTR program has 
determined that sufficient assurance of DTRA’s right to perform audits and examinations, and 
sufficient protection against unauthorized end use, can be achieved by having the host country’s 
recipient agency sign on to appropriate language in DTRA’s Transfer of Custody or other 
contractual documents. As discussed previously, legally binding government to defense 
protections are particularly important in cases where the foreign government agency (e.g., the 
defense ministry) which is partnering with the U.S. assistance provider would not typically be 
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capable of legally binding (or perhaps even have much policy leverage over), for example, the 
host country government’s tax authorities (e.g., finance ministry) to not tax CTR assistance or its 
law enforcement authorities to respect CTR providers’ personal freedoms.  
 
In cases where the host country’s recipient agency is also going to be the end user of equipment 
provided to it by the United States, government to government assurances of audit and 
examination rights and of end uses are relatively less important. Yet it is still much better to have 
them, as they enhance DOD’s ability to escalate to a dispute with a recalcitrant partner agency. 
 
At least in theory, host country practical concerns about providing access to U.S. officials should 
be less in countries, such as several in the MENA region, that do not have nuclear or other 
highly-sensitive WMD programs as did Russia. To the extent the concern about providing access 
is political and exacerbated by the involvement of the U.S. Defense Department, it may make 
sense to consider whether another federal agency – such as DOE or HHS – should take the lead 
in having the right to audit and examine or otherwise engage in end use verification activity with 
the host country. 
 
 
5. Right to Award Contracts Pursuant to U.S. Government Contracting Laws  
 
The DOD CTR program needs to be able to ensure that contracts are awarded pursuant to U.S. 
federal contracting laws and not on the basis of host country laws and procedures which might 
select on bases other than merit. The program has assessed that it could ensure this right by 
refusing to award contracts other than pursuant to U.S. federal contracting laws. This seems like 
a reasonable assessment, so long as the program retains direct control over subcontracts. 
 
In assessing its ability to ensure that contracts are not awarded other than pursuant to U.S. federal 
contracting laws, the DOD CTR program should study, and draw prophylactic recommendations 
from, the USAID Inspector General and GAO investigations which in July 2016 revealed 
extensive fraud in USAID’s Syria aid programs. The “most common fraud involved… staff of 
USAID’s local partners who accepted bribes or kickbacks in exchange for help in winning a 
contract.”118 
An investigation by the USAID Inspector General found that “some of USAID’s implementers 
used less than full and open competition to carry out large-scale procurements.”119 For example, 
the Inspector General’s “investigations in Turkey identified a network of implementer staff 
colluding with vendors who provide food and non-food items for Syria cross-border 
programming.”120 The Inspector General found that “procurement staff accepted vendor bribes or 
kickbacks to provide competitive bidding data or manipulate the bid evaluation process, giving 
vendors an unfair advantage.”121 
Some of the contract steering was facilitated by the particular difficulty of operating in Syria. 
Nevertheless, the Inspector General said its findings “raised serious concerns” about the 
contracting and oversight mechanisms relied upon by USAID.122 This included a contracting 
practice which the DOD CTR program might also be tempted to engage in while addressing 
security threats in the MENA region: “the extended use of emergency waivers to bypass 
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established procurement policies and procedures—including full and open competition—in an 
effort to expedite procurements.”123 
The identified “internal control deficiencies and potentially illegal acts committed by 
implementer staff and commercial vendors… have had a large-scale effect on the Syria 
assistance program.”124 In addition to fraud-related losses of taxpayer dollars, USAID has had to 
take drastic action. For example, “in December 2015, USAID imposed programmatic 
suspensions on activities under six Syrian humanitarian response awards valued at $305.8 
million.”125 According to the Inspector General, “with investigations ongoing, there is the 
potential for further referrals, show cause letters, employee terminations, and vendor suspensions 
and debarments.” 126 
A Government Accountability Office investigation of the Syria aid program found that its 
problems stemmed in significant part from a failure to assess “the risk of fraud” adequately (or in 
some cases at all).127 “Without documented risk assessments,” said GAO, program implementing 
agencies and their partners “may not have all of the information needed to design appropriate” 
protections.128 
The Inspector General concluded as follows her testimony on the Syria program fraud: 
Providing aid in war-ravaged regions frequently calls for flexible 
contracting… to expedite the delivery of goods and services… However, as 
our investigations demonstrate, flexibility cannot eclipse rigor. [Insufficient 
rigor] put taxpayer dollars at risk and, in the case of Syria, have delayed the 
delivery of millions of dollars of assistance.129 
The DOD CTR program should heed the lessons of the USAID Syria program and develop and 
implement a rigorous and systematic methodology, consistent with this chapter’s specific 
recommendations, for analyzing and mitigating each of the host country domestic legal risks. 
Such a rigorous and systematic methodology would enable the program to more effectively 
balance such host country domestic law risks against the risks of delaying CTR projects designed 
to counter WMD and related threats to U.S. and allied security. 
 
The program could thus operate more efficiently and effectively, and be better protected from 
potentially severe legal consequences resulting from unanticipated incidents and accidents. Such 
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Chapter Two: Options for Increasing MENA Implementation of 
International Nonproliferation Law 
 
Many governments in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region have a weak record of 
implementing their legally binding nonproliferation obligations. These include obligations 
pursuant to UN Security Council Resolution 1540, which are binding on all UN member states. 
They also include obligations pursuant to the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) and the 
Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), which are binding on all states which have chosen to 
adhere to those treaties. In addition, a significant number of MENA countries have thus far failed 
to adhere to key nonproliferation agreements which are not obligatory but nevertheless 
foundational elements of the international nonproliferation system. These include the BWC, the 
CWC, the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials (CPPNM), the 
Amendment to the CPPNM, the Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism 
(CSANT), and the Additional Protocol of the International Atomic Energy Agency. 
 
The most comprehensive source of international nonproliferation obligations is UN Security 
Council Resolution 1540, which imposes binding obligations on all UN member states to adopt 
legislation to prevent the proliferation of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons, and their 
means of delivery, and establish appropriate domestic controls over related materials to prevent 
their illicit trafficking. Only three (Iraq, Jordan, and the UAE) of the seventeen Arab League 
member states studied have implemented even 40 percent of the measures required by UN 
Security Council Resolution 1540 (see chart below). Amongst all Arab League member states, 
only the UAE (and nearly Jordan) have comprehensive strategic trade control laws, despite the 
fact that such a law is both a fundamental part of an effective export control system and essential 
to compliance with Resolution 1540. 
 
Implementation	  of	  1540	  Measures	  
 
This chart was provided to the author by Michael Rosenthal, the U.S. member of the Group of Experts 
for the UN Security Council Resolution 1540 Committee. 
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Three MENA countries (Egypt, Israel, and Syria) are not parties to the BWC. Amongst those 
MENA countries which are parties to the BWC, relatively few have complied with the 
requirement that each State Party submit an annual Confidence-Building Measures (CBMs) 
report. For example, according to the most recent annual report of the BWC Implementation 
Support Unit, dated November 3, 2015, the following MENA States Parties had not submitted a 
CBMs report covering the calendar year 2014: Bahrain, Iran, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Oman, 
Saudi Arabia, Tunisia, United Arab Emirates, and Yemen.130  
 
Two MENA countries (Egypt and Israel) are not parties to the CWC. Amongst those MENA 
countries which are parties to the CWC, several have a poor record of implementation of it. For 
example, according to the most recent report of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical 
Weapons, the following MENA states parties have not yet adopted the national laws necessary to 
implement their CWC obligations: Bahrain, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, and Syria.131 In 
other cases, such as that of Iraq and the UAE, the basic national laws were in place but the 
necessary implementing regulations were still in “draft” form or “under development.”132 
 
The following MENA countries have not yet chosen to become party to the CPPNM: Egypt, 
Iran, and Syria. The following MENA countries have not yet chosen to become party to the 
CPPNM Amendment: Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Lebanon, Oman, Syria, and Yemen. The following 
MENA countries have not yet chosen to become party to the Convention for the Suppression of 
Acts of Nuclear Terrorism: Egypt, Iran, Israel, Oman, and Syria. In addition, the following 
countries which are NPT member states have not yet chosen to become party to the IAEA 
Additional Protocol: Algeria, Egypt, Lebanon, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Tunisia, and 
Yemen.  
 
International obligations are, at least in some cases, a powerful tool for encouraging host country 
governments to upgrade their nonproliferation laws and policies. UN members are required, as a 
function of their membership, to implement all legally binding Security Council resolutions, 
which have included not only Resolution 1540 but also Security Council resolutions prohibiting 
transfer of WMD-related items to Iran and North Korea. Any state which has ratified an 
international treaty such as the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC), the CWC, and the 
Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) is legally bound to implement its obligations under the 
treaty. A government may be more likely to join a nonproliferation agreement if many of its 
neighbors have already chosen to join that agreement.  
  
In the context of U.S. DOD Cooperative Threat Reduction programs, achieving host country 
implementation of an international legal instrument to which the country is a party should be 
easier than, for example, achieving implementation of a request by the U.S. government to take 
an action which is not already an internationally binding obligation on the host country 
government. Similarly, persuading a host country to join a nonproliferation agreement which its 
neighbors have already joined should be easier than, for example, achieving host country 
commitment to take an action which is not already an internationally binding obligation on its 
neighbors. U.S. government officials involved with CTR who participated in a workshop 
convened as part of this project confirmed that Security Council Resolution 1540 and other 
international obligations provide significant traction with at least some countries in the MENA 
region. Similarly, a retired U.S. government official who participated in the workshop 
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emphasized that “we can often do things through international organizations that we can’t do 
ourselves – the international organizations have convening power and legitimacy and their 
mandates can make it easier for the target countries politically.” 
 
This chapter will examine how the United States and the international community can more 
effectively encourage and assist MENA governments to meet and implement their international 
legal obligations relating to nonproliferation. 
 
I. Enhanced Implementation by MENA States of Resolution 1540 and Strategic Trade 
Controls 
 
MENA governments have a remarkably poor record of implementation of UN Security Council 
Resolution 1540, passed in 2004, which imposes various binding obligations on UN member 
states with regard to biological, chemical, and nuclear weapons. The required reports on 
implementation of the resolution which have been submitted to the UN’s 1540 Committee by 
MENA governments “vary dramatically in terms of quality and comprehensiveness. . . many 
reports were merely diplomatic statements supporting the spirit of the resolution, and did not 
serve to build any confidence that implementation and enforcement were taking place.”133 
Writing in 2008, Lars Olberg of Sandia Laboratories assessed:  
 
Middle Eastern countries have had a poor start when it comes to the implementation of UNSC 
Resolution 1540. Their general reporting behavior is significantly behind that of countries in 
other regions.134 
 
Of course, states’ engagement with the reporting process does not necessarily correlate with 
timely and effective implementation of the resolution’s substantive obligations. Even those states 
which have submitted relatively detailed reports may not be enacting effective legislation, let 
alone implementing it with rigor. 
 
Eight years after Olberg’s negative assessment of MENA implementation of Resolution 1540, 
both implementation reporting and substantive implementation of the resolution remains lacking 
in the MENA region. As indicated by the chart on page 39, only three (Iraq, Jordan, and the 
UAE) of the seventeen Arab League member states studied have implemented even 40 percent of 
the measures required by UN Security Council Resolution 1540.  
 
One of the most important elements of compliance with Resolution 1540 is enactment of a 
comprehensive strategic trade control law. Such a law is essential to meeting the Resolution 
1540 requirement that all UN member states shall – with regard to materials related to “the 
proliferation of nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons and their means of delivery” – establish 
and maintain “appropriate laws and regulations to control export, transit, transshipment and 
reexport” as well as establish and enforce “appropriate criminal or civil penalties for violations 
of such export control laws and regulations.” Unfortunately, only one Arab League member state 
(the United Arab Emirates) has a comprehensive strategic trade control law. Jordan is the only 
other Arab League member state that has a major portion of the elements in place, although 
Jordanian law still has some important gaps.  
 
42 Expanding Cooperative Threat Reduction in the Middle East & North Africa 
 
Based on this author’s discussions with officials and experts, it appears that several factors could, 
if harnessed effectively, provide an impetus for enhanced strategic trade controls, 
implementation of other Resolution 1540 obligations, and other law-related efforts to deter and 
hinder the illicit acquisition of WMD by Iran, ISIL, and other Middle East actors.  
 
 
A. Fear of Islamic State  
 
Several officials and experts from the MENA region told the author it was possible that fear of 
the Islamic State, and news of its use of chemical weapons and pursuit of biological and nuclear 
weapons, may lead Arab governments to be more willing than in the past to implement 
Resolution 1540, which includes specific legal obligations designed to prevent non-state actors 
from acquiring WMD and their means of delivery. To these interlocutors, the Islamic State threat 
seemed particularly resonant with regard to both the CWC and also the need for a comprehensive 
strategic trade control law, as such a law could help MENA governments prevent Islamic State 
WMD and its precursors from crossing their borders.  
 
The U.S. government clearly needs to place increased, results-oriented emphasis on encouraging 
and assisting MENA governments to implement Resolution 1540. According to a U.S. official 
the author interviewed, there are signs that Jordan in particular has been motivated by the Islamic 
State threat to enhance both its CWC implementation and also its implementation of Resolution 
1540. The rise of the Islamic State appears to provide an opportunity to increase MENA 
governments’ political will to implement Resolution 1540.  
 
 
B. Increased Antipathy Towards Iran 
 
Another factor that could help inspire MENA governments to implement Resolution 1540, and 
especially enhanced strategic trade controls, is increased antipathy towards Iran. Increased 
tensions between the Gulf states and Iran (as a result of Iran stirring up trouble in the region) 
may lead their governments to be more willing than in the past to crack down on diversions to 
Iran that could strengthen its nuclear or other military programs. Gulf Arab governments are now 
more afraid of Iran and more determined to keep it from acquiring nuclear weapons. This could 
provide incentive for these governments to adopt and implement controls on dual-use exports to 
Iran more vigorously than they have in the past. 
 
Since efforts to combat nuclear trafficking to Iran were relatively ineffective at the height of UN 
sanctions on Iran, there is reason for concern that in the absence of enhanced MENA 
implementation of strategic trade controls, it will be even harder in the wake of the nuclear deal 
with Iran (the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action or JCPOA) to prevent illicit Iranian 
procurement. As a result of the JCPOA, most international sanctions on Iran have been lifted, 
overall international trade with Iran is increasing dramatically, and it has become legal for Iran to 
procure some items for its known nuclear facilities. This danger is heightened by the fact that, 
based on this author’s discussions with officials and experts from the region, there is tremendous 
confusion as to the content of the JCPOA and little to no understanding of the procurement 
channel and other fine points of how it is meant to impact trade with Iran. The regional officials 
43 Expanding Cooperative Threat Reduction in the Middle East & North Africa 
 
and experts with whom this author spoke emphasized the importance of the U.S. and 
international community undertaking a systematic campaign to help the region understand the 
very complicated and confusing JCPOA and especially its remaining restrictions on trade with 
Iran. Several noted that it tends to be very easy for traders to evade trade controls on dual-use 
goods which are authorized for export to some end uses but not others. Businessmen find it very 
easy and tempting to look the other way. 
 
In light of confusion about the JCPOA and its procurement channel, and the increase in overall 
trade with Iran, a U.S. campaign to help the region understand the remaining restrictions on trade 
with Iran should be at least as vigorous as was the U.S. initiative to explain and evangelize Iran 
sanctions at their peak. 
 
 
C. Examine and Address Why MENA Governments Have Poor Implementation 
 
Separately, and as part of any initiative to encourage MENA implementation of Resolution 
1540, the U.S. and international community need to examine and address head-on the reasons 
why MENA governments have a relatively poor record of implementing their strategic trade 
control and other 1540 obligations. For example, some Gulf Arab diplomats have expressed 
concern to this author that rigorous strategic trade controls would slow overall trade, thus 
hindering their economies. The website of the U.S.-Saudi Arabian Business Council makes this 
point explicitly, stating: “The Saudi Arabian Government places great importance on the 
promotion of national exports, so very few export controls have been imposed.”135  
 
U.S. and international policymakers need to develop and effectively present the case that 
rigorous implementation of strategic trade controls will in fact strengthen their countries, 
including by making Western companies more comfortable exporting dual-use technologies to 
them. This case could be developed with input from experts and practitioners, such as:  
 
• Economists who can empirically demonstrate that countries which have adopted strategic 
trade controls have not harmed but rather boosted their economies. A U.S. government 
nonproliferation official who participated in a workshop convened as part of this project 
asserted that with several MENA countries, in particular the trading states of the GCC, 
“you need to be able to explain to them what is in it for them from a business point of 
view. . . if you can make the business case to them, and they can see it through that lens, 
you will be more persuasive.” 
 
• Leading high technology manufacturers explaining why and how they are more 
comfortable exporting dual-use technologies to countries with comprehensive strategic 
trade controls and security and safety standards. A retired U.S. government official who 
participated in a workshop convened as part of this project emphasized that major 
companies such as Dow in the chemical arena have sufficient leverage to significantly 
influence the establishment of more robust standards for the chemical industry in 
countries where they operate. 
 
• Economic development experts who can explain the importance of such dual-use imports 
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to the economic development of countries in the MENA region.  
 
In addition, consideration should be given as to whether regional concerns that rigorous strategic 
trade controls would be economically costly could be countered by the U.S. and others in the 
international community adopting trade incentives or other rewards for countries that effectively 
implement their strategic trade control and other nonproliferation obligations.  
However, it is important to note that the reasons why MENA governments have a relatively poor 
record of implementing their strategic trade control and other 1540 obligations do not begin and 
end with senior level MENA policymakers having concerns that rigorous strategic trade controls 
would slow overall trade, thus hindering their economies. It appears that even when the political 
decisions have been made by senior government officials, the mid-level and junior-level 
government officials charged with carrying out such measures are simply unwilling to change 
the way they do things. In many cases, this is because they lack the incentives and the resources 
to draft and implement such controls effectively.  
 U.S. policymakers should consider whether it may be possible to experiment with a new 
cooperative assistance project that would involve the placement to work side by side with local 
officials of Western officials and experts experienced with drafting and implementing strategic 
trade control laws. Such an approach reportedly worked well in the case of the cooperative 
Sanctions Assistance Mission (SAM) teams which administered United Nations sanctions on 
Serbia during the Bosnia War. 136 Seasoned customs and border control officers were recruited 
from participating member countries of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe 
and stationed alongside local officials at key border crossings in Romania, Bulgaria, Macedonia, 
Albania, Hungary, Ukraine, and Croatia.137 The SAM teams were “charged with monitoring 
commercial traffic and identifying and stopping contraband moving in and out of Serbia.” 138 
Such an approach reportedly also worked well with regard to Malaysia’s adoption and 
implementation of a comprehensive strategic trade control law, a process which is said to have 
been greatly facilitated by the U.S. government loaning an expert to the Malaysian government 
for an extended period. 
In the case of MENA enactment and implementation of strategic trade control laws, Western 
legal experts could be loaned to relevant MENA government ministries or parliamentary bodies. 
Consideration should also be given to the possibility of arranging for licensing, customs, and 
border control experts -- recruited and financed by international organizations or Western 
governments – to work alongside local licensing, customs and border authorities to advise 
concerning proliferation related concerns. Local officials on the front lines of strategic trade 
controls might be tempted to resist such an approach, particularly if it would complicate their 
ability to solicit bribes from traders, but perhaps a way could be found to incentivize their 
cooperation.  
In addition, the United States should consider joining with other NSG countries to establish a 
program of financial or other personal incentives to motivate local officials to themselves engage 
in effective implementation of WMD-related export and border controls.  
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D. Harness Bankers’ Fears of U.S. Penalties  
 
MENA bankers with whom this author spoke have emphasized that they remain very spooked by 
the magnitude of the fines that the U.S. government imposed on major banks for processing 
proscribed transactions with Iran, and their relatively sophisticated compliance experts 
understand that many U.S. financial sanctions on Iran remain in place. The fines included 
hundreds of millions of dollars each in penalties against Lloyds TSB, Credit Suisse, Barclays 
PLC, ING, and Standard Chartered banks, and billions of dollars each in penalties against HSBC 
and BNP Paribas.139 The single largest penalty was against BNP Paribas, the world’s fourth 
biggest bank, which agreed to plead guilty and pay $8.9736 billion in fines for helping Iran, 
Sudan, and Cuba gain illegal access to the U.S. financial system.140 In addition to the financial 
penalty, BNP Paribas agreed with the New York State Department of Financial Services to 
“terminate or separate from the bank” thirteen senior employees and “suspend U.S. dollar 
clearing operations… for one year for business lines on which the misconduct centered.”141 
 
MENA bankers are also spooked by the U.S. federal court judgment in 2014 which held Arab 
Bank PLC liable for damages suffered by victims killed or injured in terrorist attacks by Hamas. 
Arab Bank PLC is a major global bank, with over six hundred branches in thirty countries and 
$35 billion in deposits.142 In September 2014, a federal jury in the case of Linde v. Arab Bank, 
applying the Anti-Terrorism Act, found Arab Bank PLC liable for damages suffered by victims 
and family members of victims killed or injured in twenty-four terrorist attacks by Hamas and 
similar terrorist organizations.143 The Linde jury found Arab Bank liable principally on the 
grounds that the Bank had knowingly provided Hamas with material support in the form of 
financial services.144 In April 2015, U.S. federal district court judge Brian Cogan dismissed 
claims against Arab Bank PLC arising from two of the attacks, but found “ample” evidence 
to support the rest of the verdict.145 In his Linde case Memorandum and Order of April 8, 
2015, Judge Cogan rejected “defendant’s argument that plaintiffs were required to trade 
specific dollars to specific terrorist attacks.”146 
 
The attacks for which Arab Bank PLC was found liable had occurred in Israel, Gaza, and the 
West Bank from 2001 to 2004. Those attacks included a March 2002 suicide attack on a 
Passover seder celebration at the Park Hotel in Netanya, Israel, which killed thirty people and 
wounded one hundred more.147 They also included the August 9, 2001 suicide bombing of the 
Sbarro pizzeria in Jerusalem, Israel, which killed or injured 130 people.148  
In August 2015, Arab Bank PLC settled the case for an estimated $1 billion.149  
 
The Linde case judgment holding Arab Bank PLC liable for terrorist attacks conducted with 
conventional munitions sets a precedent that could be used by victims of WMD attacks to sue 
banks that knowingly provided financial services to the national governments or terrorist groups 
that engaged in the WMD attacks. The Linde verdict and settlement are expected to have a 
powerful impact on other banks, causing them to more scrupulously avoid providing 
financial services to terrorist groups and their state sponsors.  
 
Major U.S. and foreign banks have become so cognizant of the risks posed to them by the 
infiltration of illicit money that they have hired large numbers of staff dedicated to protecting 
against such infiltration. For example, HSBC reportedly had seven thousand people, about ten 
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percent of its employees worldwide, working on risk and compliance issues at the end of 2014 (a 
fourfold increase from before its $1.9 billion settlement with Treasury in 2012 for illicit 
transactions with Iranian and other proscribed entities).150 Citigroup, which had also been 
penalized for illicit transactions with Iran, had nearly 30,000 employees working on regulatory 
and compliance issues at the end of 2014, 13 percent of the bank’s total 244,000 employees.151 
Meanwhile, J.P. Morgan Chase & Co. said that it would hire 13,000 new staff in compliance, 
audit and other areas from 2012 to 2014, after being the subject of fines for various non-Iran-
related compliance problems.152 
 
Because the U.S. dollar is the preferred currency of international trade, and most significant 
dollar transactions transit the United States, the U.S. government has enormous leverage over 
foreign banks. The international financial sector as a whole has strong incentives to avoid 
involvement in illicit transactions, vast amounts of data that can be analyzed to detect and 
understand such transactions, and significant influence over those foreign governments which are 
interested in economic development. Policymakers and legislators should carefully analyze 
whether and how the international financial sector can and should be harnessed to encourage 
MENA governments to implement strategic trade control and other obligations that would reduce 
illicit proliferation-related transactions and thus the international financial sector’s exposure to 
them. 
 
Another set of multinational companies with a large stake in avoiding lawsuits and with 
considerable leverage over industry are risk insurers and reinsurers. One expert who participated 
in a workshop convened as part of this project suggested that with regard to large scale nuclear, 
chemical, and biological projects funded by governments in the MENA region, it might make 
sense for the U.S. government to reach out to relevant insurers and reinsurers as they could use 
the incentive of lower risk premiums to build compliance and other security and safety 
requirements into loan applications at the beginning of the process. 
 
 
E. Strengthening Mandate and Procedures of Security Council’s 1540 Committee 
During the first dozen years since the Security Council passed Resolution 1540 in 2004, the 1540 
Committee created by the Security Council to oversee implementation of the resolution has 
lacked a mandate that would permit it to meaningfully establish norms and assess compliance, let 
alone impose sanctions for noncompliance.153 For example, in contrast with the UN Security 
Council’s Iran, DPRK, and Al Qaeda and Taliban Committees, the 1540 Committee lacks any 
power to identify and designate those individuals and entities engaged in illicit WMD 
proliferation activities, and thus has refrained from doing so. 
During 2016, the 1540 Committee has been conducting a “comprehensive review on the status of 
implementation of resolution 1540… including, if necessary, recommendations on adjustments 
to the mandate.”154 The outcome of the Comprehensive Review may result in adjustments to the 
1540 Committee’s mandate which will provide the Committee and other actors with new tools to 
encourage and assist countries with implementation of their Resolution 1540 obligations. 
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According to a modalities paper prepared by the 1540 Committee, “the 2016 Comprehensive 
Review… should draw on an analysis of implementation of resolution 1540 (2004) since the 
2009 Review, with a view to improving the implementation of the resolution by Member States, 
by identifying and recommending specific, practical, and appropriate actions to this end, and to 
analyze the operation of the Committee in the conduct of its tasks and recommend any changes 
considered necessary.”155 
  
The first draft of the report on the Comprehensive Review is due to the Committee by September 
1, 2016 for its consideration.156 The report is due to be ready for submission to the Security 
Council by October 31, 2016.157 Since this study will be published late in the process of the 
Comprehensive Review, the author has decided it would not make sense to develop and include 
specific recommendations aimed at influencing the Review.  
 
However, from a broad brush perspective, it is hoped that the Comprehensive Review will result 
in a process for assessing 1540 compliance that is much closer to the rigorous and systematic 
processes of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF). FATF regularly undertakes so-called 
“mutual evaluations” of a country’s compliance with FATF anti-money-laundering and counter-
terrorism financing norms. These mutual evaluations, while voluntary, engage both FATF and 
local country experts in a very rigorous and systematic evaluation of local laws, regulations and 
procedures.  
 
Egypt provides one illustrative example of the vast difference in rigor between the 1540 and 
FATF processes. Egypt’s three reports to the 1540 committee have totaled ten pages, in which 
the Egyptian government has itself briefly listed laws it has enacted and other steps it has taken 
to implement Resolution 1540.158 In contrast, Egypt’s 2009 “Mutual Evaluation Report” for the 
Financial Action Task Force contains 220 pages of detailed facts about the Egyptian financial 
system; includes detailed analysis of the system, its laws, and their implementation; sets out 
Egypt’s levels of compliance with FATF recommendations; and provides specific 
recommendations for improvement.159 Egypt’s FATF “Mutual Evaluation Report” was prepared 
by an assessment team composed of staff of the World Bank and two experts acting under the 
supervision of the World Bank.160 The assessment team reviewed various documents and spent 
two weeks in Egypt, during which it “met with officials and representatives of all relevant 
government agencies and the private sector.”161 
 
 
II. Enhanced Implementation of Biological Weapons Convention and Related 
Obligations by MENA Member States 
 
The Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) bans the development, production, stockpiling, or 
other acquisition or retention of microbial or other biological agents, or toxins… “of types and in 
quantities that have no justification for prophylactic, protective or other peaceful purposes.”162 It 
also bans “equipment or means of delivery designed to use such agents or toxins for hostile 
purposes or in armed conflict.”163 Each State Party is obligated to destroy, or to divert to peaceful 
purposes, all covered agents, toxins, weapons, equipment, and means of delivery, which are in its 
possession or under its jurisdiction or control.164 Each State Party is also obligated to take any 
necessary measures to prohibit and prevent the development, production, stockpiling, or other 
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acquisition or retention of covered items, within its territory, or under its jurisdiction or control 
anywhere.165  
 
Through successive review conferences, BWC States Parties have reached a series of additional 
agreements on how they will meet their obligations under the BWC.166 According to the BWC’s 
Implementation Support Unit, “these agreements are binding and each and every State Party has 
committed themselves to complying with them.”167 In addition, “through Meetings of States 
Parties… the BWC has added a number of common understandings on the tools and approaches 
that might be useful” in implementing the BWC.168 
 
The BWC was opened for signature in 1972 and entered into force in March 1975.169 Also in 
March 1975, the U.S. deposited its instrument of ratification for the BWC.170 The BWC currently 
has 174 States Parties.171 Only three MENA states are not parties to the BWC – Egypt, Israel, 
and Syria. The United States should urge Egypt, Israel, and Syria to join the BWC. 
 
Unlike the Chemical Weapons Convention and the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, the BWC 
does not contain or otherwise provide for verification or enforcement measures. In addition, the 
BWC does not have an associated major implementing body such as the IAEA or the OPCW. 
The BWC’s Implementation Support Unit has a total of three staff members, located within the 
Geneva Branch of the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs.172 In comparison, the 
OPCW has a staff of approximately 500 persons,173 and the IAEA has a staff of some 2,560 
persons.174 
 
The U.S. government, under both the George W. Bush and Barack Obama administrations, has 
opposed efforts by other States Parties to develop a verification protocol.175 For example, Under 
Secretary for Arms Control and International Security Ellen Tauscher announced in 2009 that the 
Obama Administration had “determined that a legally binding protocol would not achieve 
meaningful verification or greater security,” explaining: 
The ease with which a biological weapons program could be disguised within legitimate 
activities and the rapid advances in biological research make it very difficult to detect violations. 
We believe that a protocol would not be able to keep pace with the rapidly changing nature of the 
biological weapons threat.176  
Instead, Tauscher stated, the United States believes that confidence in BWC compliance should 
be promoted by “increasing transparency, improving confidence building measures and engaging 
in more robust bilateral compliance discussions.”177 
 
As a result of the BWC’s lack of verification and enforcement measures, and tiny infrastructure, 
it is particularly difficult to assess parties’ level of implementation of their BWC obligations. 
One basic indicator of commitment is whether or not a State Party has complied with the request, 
issued by the Sixth BWC Review Conference, to “designate a national focal point for 
coordinating national implementation of the Convention and communicating with other States 
Parties and relevant international organizations.”178 According to the most recent annual report 
of the BWC Implementation Support Unit, dated November 3, 2015, three MENA States Parties 
had not yet designated a national point of contact: Saudi Arabia, Tunisia, and the UAE.179 
The United States should urge Saudi Arabia, Tunisia, and the UAE to designate a national point 
of contact for the BWC. 
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Another basic indicator of BWC commitment is whether or not a State Party has complied with 
the requirement that each State Party submit an annual Confidence-Building Measures (CBMs) 
report.180 According to the United Nations Office of Disarmament Affairs: 
 
Although the CBMs are not derived directly from the text of the Convention itself, the Second 
Review Conference decided by consensus that “the States Parties are to implement, on the basis 
of mutual co-operation, the following measures.” This means that participation in the CBMs is a 
requirement for all States Parties to the Convention.181 
 
The annual CBMs report is to include a declaration of legislation, regulations, and other 
measures relevant to the BWC’s requirements and to additional requirements imposed by the 
BWC Review Conferences.182 The annual CBMs report is also to include: data on relevant 
research centers and laboratories; information on national biological defense research and 
development programmes; information on outbreaks of infectious diseases and similar 
occurrences caused by toxins; declaration of vaccine production facilities; and declaration of past 
activities in offensive and/or defensive biological research development programs.183 With 
regard to legislation, regulations, or other measures implementing the BWC, each State Party is 
to indicate in their annual CBMs report any amendment to those laws.184 The CBMs report is to 
be provided to the BWC Implementation Support Unit in the United Nations Office of 
Disarmament Affairs no later than April 15 each year and is to cover the previous calendar 
year.185 
 
The annual declaration of relevant legislation, regulations, and other measures is crucial for 
several reasons. As the United Nations Office of Disarmament Affairs explained in its guide to 
the CBMs requirement, “improving information sharing on BWC legal implementation increases 
confidence and transparency” as well as allowing comparison of existing tools “in a spirit of 
sharing best practices.”186 
 
MENA States Parties have an exceptionally poor record of submitting CBMs to the BWC. 
According to the most recent annual report of the BWC Implementation Support Unit, dated 
November 3, 2015, the following MENA States Parties had not submitted a CBMs report 
covering the calendar year 2014: Bahrain, Iran, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Oman, Saudi Arabia, 
Tunisia, United Arab Emirates, Yemen.187 According to the prior annual report of the BWC 
Implementation Support Unit, dated November 28, 2014, the following MENA States Parties 
had not submitted a CBMs report covering the calendar year 2013: Algeria, Bahrain, Jordan, 
Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Oman, Saudi Arabia, UAE, Yemen.188  
 
The United States should urge these MENA States Parties to submit CBMs reports to the BWC. 
Biological threat reduction accounted for nearly 60 percent of the DOD CTR program’s budget 
request for fiscal year 2016.189 The program has evolved from a focus on dismantling Russia’s 
vast biological weapons complex into a tool used to promote “best practices” at biological 
laboratories with dangerous pathogens and to develop disease surveillance systems.190 The 
mandatory content of the required CBMs reports is potentially very supportive of existing 
biological threat reduction program objectives. This is particularly the case with regard to the 
required submission of: a declaration of legislation, regulations, and other measures relevant to 
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the BWC’s requirements and to additional requirements imposed by the BWC Review 
Conferences; data on relevant research centers and laboratories; information on outbreaks of 
infectious diseases and similar occurrences caused by toxins; and declaration of vaccine 
production facilities. The DOD CTR program should look for ways in which encouraging these 
MENA States Parties to submit CBMs reports can specifically be used to support existing 
biological threat reduction program objectives and vice versa. 
 
Two recent developments could be harnessed to build political will for enhanced implementation 
of the BWC and related requirements: increased regional interest in diversification into 
biotechnology and increased regional fear of biological weapons use by non-state actors. For 
example, according to NTI, “the UAE is taking a regional leadership role in biotechnology 
issues, and will therefore need to develop robust export controls, biosecurity, and biosafety 
standards in order to mitigate the dual-use risks inherent to a large-scale biotechnology 
sector.”191 The Dubai Biotechnology & Research Park, construction of which was completed in 
2010, has attracted dozens of major Western biotechnology companies, including Pfizer, Amgen, 
Genzyme, and Merck.192  
 
The governments of the U.S. and other key leading biotechnology industry hubs should take the 
opportunity to work with their industries to persuade UAE and other MENA country 
stakeholders that their investments in projects such as the Dubai Biotechnology & Research Park 
are more likely to pay off if the UAE and other MENA governments with such projects more 
rigorously implement their biotechnology-related Resolution 1540 and BWC-connected 
obligations, including by developing robust export controls and biosecurity and biosafety 
standards and by submitting robust CBMs. For example, relevant Western companies can be 
encouraged to emphasize to the UAE and other MENA countries with such projects that they 
will be more comfortable exporting sensitive dual-use biotechnology items to them once they 
have further upgraded their controls and standards.  
 
Increased regional fear of biological weapons use by non-state actors, including especially the 
Islamic State, may lead Arab governments to be more willing than in the past to implement their 
biological weapons-related obligations. The director of NATO’s WMD Non-Proliferation Center 
recently published an article in which he warned that which he warned that “there is a very real - 
but not yet fully identified risk - of foreign fighters in ISIL’s ranks using chemical, biological, 
radiological or nuclear (CBRN) materials as ‘weapons of terror’ against the West.”193 In 
addition, a laptop recovered by moderate Syrian rebels during a 2014 raid on an Islamic State 
stronghold reportedly contained files on the preparation and use of biological weapons.194 Some 
analysts doubt the Islamic State’s capacity to successfully deploy biological weapons as a mass 
casualty tool.195 However, according to Stephen Rademaker, who previously served as Assistant 
Secretary of State for International Security and Nonproliferation, “if a single scientist acting 
alone could perpetrate the 2001 anthrax attack in the United States, as FBI tells us was the case, 
then it is certainly plausible that a terrorist group could launch a biological attack without the 
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III. Enhanced Implementation of Chemical Weapons Convention by MENA Member 
States 
 
The Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) is a multilateral international agreement which 
prohibits the development, production, acquisition, stockpiling, retention, transfer and use of 
chemical weapons by States Parties. States Parties are, in turn, obligated to enforce those 
prohibitions with regard to persons (natural or legal) within their jurisdiction. The CWC requires 
all States Parties to destroy any stockpiles of chemical weapons they may hold and any facilities 
which produced them. States Parties are also required to create a verification regime for certain 
toxic chemicals and their precursors in order to ensure that such chemicals are only used for 
purposes not prohibited.  
 
The CWC was opened for signature in 1993, and entered into force in April 1997. Also in April 
1997, the U.S. deposited its instrument of ratification to the CWC. As of the most recent 
(October 2015) participation status report of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical 
Weapons, the CWC had 192 States Parties.197  
 
Only two MENA states, Egypt and Israel, are not yet parties to the CWC. The question of how to 
encourage their accession is addressed in section IV below.  
 
Article VII of the CWC requires that each State Party “adopt the necessary measures to 
implement its obligations” under the CWC. Key State Party obligations under the CWC which 
may require implementing legislation include, inter alia, the following: 
 
• prohibit any natural and legal person anywhere under its jurisdiction from acquiring or 
retaining chemical weapons, and acquiring or retaining specified chemicals except for 
specified purposes;  
• report various chemical transfers, chemicals, and facilities; and 
• provide access to enable and facilitate the conduct of international inspections.  
 
According to the most recent report of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical 
Weapons, the following MENA states parties have not yet adopted the basic national laws 
necessary to implement their CWC obligations: Bahrain, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, and 
Syria.198 In other cases, such as that of Iraq and the UAE, the basic national laws were in place 
but the necessary implementing regulations were still in “draft” form or “under development.”199 
 
The officials and experts from the MENA region with whom the author has spoken as part of 
research on this project are all unnerved by the Islamic State. Several of them told the author it 
was possible that fear of the Islamic State, and news of its use of chemical weapons, may lead 
Arab governments to be more willing than in the past to implement the CWC. According to a 
U.S. official the author interviewed, there are signs that this is already occurring, particularly 
with, for example, Jordan. The U.S. government clearly needs to place increased, results-oriented 
emphasis on encouraging and assisting MENA governments to adopt and enforce comprehensive 
CWC implementing legislation. The rise of the Islamic State appears to provide an opportunity 
to increase the political will to do so.  
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A growing regional interest in economic diversification,200 including into the chemical sector, is 
another factor that will increase the importance of, and could increase the political will for, 
adoption and rigorous enforcement of CWC and other nonproliferation-related implementing 
legislation. For example, the UAE has plans to invest $20 billion in developing a new Chemicals 
Industrial City in Abu Dhabi.201 The plans envision the Chemicals Industrial City becoming the 
largest chemical industry complex in the world.202 According to NTI, this development will 
confront the UAE with “increasing dual-use challenges” requiring the development of more 
robust export controls, chemical safety, and chemical security standards.203  
 
The governments of the U.S. and other key leading chemical industry hubs such as Germany 
should take the opportunity to work with their industries to persuade UAE stakeholders that their 
investment in the Chemicals Industrial City is more likely to pay off if the UAE more rigorously 
implements its CWC and related obligations, including by promulgating the necessary 
regulations. For example, relevant Western companies can be encouraged to emphasize to the 
UAE that they will be more comfortable exporting dual-use items to it once it has further 
upgraded its controls.  
 
 
IV. Encouraging Chemical Weapons Convention Accession by Egypt and Israel 
 
As noted above, only two Middle Eastern states, Egypt and Israel, are not yet parties to the 
CWC. Egypt has long refused to join the CWC on the grounds that Israel has a nuclear weapons 
program and refuses to join the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty.204 There are currently several 
factors giving rise to optimism that the situation could change. First, the current Egyptian 
government has, under President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi, been notably warmer towards Israel than 
was its predecessor Muslim Brotherhood government and, at least in some ways, warmer 
towards Israel than had been the Egyptian government presided over by President Hosni 
Mubarak from 1981 to 2011.205 For example, Sisi has cooperated with Israel in fighting 
Hamas.206 Second, following Syria’s accession to the CWC, Egypt’s boycott of the CWC in an 
effort to gain leverage vis a vis Israel’s nuclear arsenal arguably seems petty. Third, Egypt is 
increasingly incentivized to protect itself against chemical weapons, and render them taboo, in 
the wake of their use by the Islamic State. The most active insurgent group in Egypt is Sinai 
Province, which pledged allegiance to the Islamic State and is thought to be aiming to take 
control of the Sinai in order to turn it into a province of the Islamic State.207  
 
Fourth, Israel has repeatedly expressed its intention to ratify the CWC provided its Arab 
counterparts do the same (Israel signed the CWC in 1993 but has not ratified it).208 Israel’s 
President, Shimon Peres, stated in September 2013 that Israel’s government would seriously 
consider joining the CWC in the wake of developments in Syria.209 In addition, two of Israel’s 
leading nonproliferation experts suggested in October 2013 that “once Syria’s chemical 
weapons have been verifiably destroyed,” Israel should consider initiating “a regional dialogue 
with the goal of creating a Chemical-Weapons-Free-Zone in the Middle East.”210 They 
explained that “the Syrian chemical crisis presents an opportunity for launching a process which 
otherwise would not have been conceivable.”211 Fifth, the collapse of the effort, generated by the 
2010 NPT review conference, to establish the Middle East as a zone free of all WMDs at least 
arguably creates a vacuum that could be filled by a Chemical Weapons Free Zone.212 
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Egypt has for so many years refused to participate in the CWC until Israel joins the NPT that 
any change from that position will likely be gradual. Rather than addressing the issue through 
formal channels, it makes sense to first explore it in the Track II channels where Egyptian and 
Israeli diplomats sometimes meet to informally discuss new ideas for cooperation. In light of 
the several factors giving rise to optimism that Egypt and Israel could decide to join the CWC, 
the U.S. government should invest in such Track II exploration of the idea. 
 
 
V. Encourage Accession to and Implementation of Key Nuclear Legal Instruments 
While most MENA countries, until recently, have eschewed nuclear power,213 there have been 
four major clandestine nuclear-weapons related programs uncovered in the MENA region during 
the past 20 years – in Iran, Iraq, Libya, and Syria.214 Iran has been the most active in seeking and 
developing nuclear power and is, at present, the only MENA country with an operating nuclear 
power reactor.215 Iran has also been very active in developing and pursuing uranium enrichment. 
However, these activities are now subject to the restrictions contained in the Joint 
Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA).216 Several other MENA countries have announced 
plans to construct nuclear power reactors over the next several years.217 For example, Saudi 
officials have announced plans to develop as many as 16 nuclear power plants by 2040 and Saudi 
Arabia has since January 2015 entered into separate nuclear cooperation agreements with 
Argentina, China, Russia, and South Korea.218 This has made it all the more imperative that steps 
are taken urgently to better secure and protect nuclear and other WMD-related material, 
precursors, equipment and technology in the MENA region.  
A. Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials 
The Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials and Nuclear Facilities 
(CPPNM), adopted in 1987, imposes an obligation on its 153 member states to meet defined 
standards of physical protection during international transport of nuclear material used for 
peaceful purposes. It also establishes a general framework for cooperation among states in the 
protection, recovery, and return of stolen nuclear material. The CPPNM also requires states to 
impose prohibitions, and prosecute or extradite offenders. The United States deposited its 
instrument of ratification to the CPPNM in December 1982. Acceding to the CPPNM is not a 
requirement of international law. Nevertheless, all MENA countries except Egypt, Iran, and 
Syria are parties to this convention.219 Egypt, Iran, and Syria should be strongly encouraged to 
join the CPPNM given their current and past nuclear programs.220 
B. Amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials 
The United States advocated strengthening the CPPNM by extending its requirements regarding 
domestic security of nuclear material.221 In 2005, States Parties convened to extend the 
CPPNM’s scope in an amendment requiring states to physically protect nuclear material in 
domestic use, storage, and transport.222 The CPPNM Amendment entered into force in May 
2016, following the deposit of the instrument of ratification by 102 States Parties.223 The United 
States deposited its instrument of ratification of the CPPNM Amendment in July 2015.224  
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UN Security Council Resolution 1887, adopted unanimously in 2009, included a non-binding 
call for universal adherence to the CPPNM and CPPNM Amendment. However, international 
law does not require states to accede to either the CPPNM or the CPPNM Amendment. All 
MENA countries except Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Lebanon, Oman, Syria, and Yemen are parties to the 
Amendment to the CPPNM.225 The U.S. should strongly encourage each of these countries – and 
especially Egypt, Iran, Iraq, and Syria in light of their current and past nuclear programs – to 
adhere to the CPPNM Amendment (as well as the CPPNM itself in the case of Egypt, Iran, and 
Syria). It was difficult for the U.S. to make a compelling case for ratification of the CPPNM 
Amendment until the U.S. deposited its own instrument of ratification in July 2015. Now that the 
U.S. is itself a party to the Amendment, it can and should mount a vigorous campaign to 
encourage additional ratifications. 
C. Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism 
Another important nuclear-related legal instrument to which several MENA states are not parties 
is the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism (CSANT), 
which was adopted by the UN General Assembly in 2005 and entered into force in 2007. The 
CSANT commits each party to adopt measures in its national law related to criminalizing and 
punishing the unlawful possession and use of nuclear or radioactive material or devices, and 
damage to nuclear facilities.226 It also commits each party to exchange information and cooperate 
to “detect, prevent, suppress, and investigate” those suspected of committing nuclear 
terrorism.227 
The United States deposited its instrument of ratification in September 2015.228 International law 
does not require states to accede to the CSANT. Nevertheless, all MENA states except Egypt, 
Iran, Israel, Oman, and Syria are parties to the CSANT.229 The U.S. should strongly encourage 
each of these countries to adhere to the CSANT. It was difficult for the U.S. to make a 
compelling case for ratification of the CSANT until the U.S. deposited its own instrument of 
ratification in September 2015. Now that the U.S. is itself a party to the CSANT, it can and 
should mount a vigorous campaign to encourage additional ratifications. 
D. IAEA Additional Protocol  
Another important nuclear-related legal instrument to which relatively few MENA countries 
have adhered is the “Additional Protocol” of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).230 
While countries are not obligated to adhere to the Additional Protocol, it is nevertheless 
important to encourage such adherence. The NPT’s principal tool for detecting cheating by 
member states on their nonproliferation obligations is the safeguards agreement, which Article 
III requires each non-nuclear-weapons-state to conclude with the IAEA for the purpose of 
“verification of the fulfillment of its obligations assumed under this Treaty with a view to 
preventing diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons.” The IAEA’s 
model for this safeguards agreement is contained in an IAEA document usually referred to as 
INFCIRC/153.231 The safeguards agreements for individual states, commonly known as 
“INFCIRC/153 safeguards agreements,” have rarely deviated from the model. 
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Under INFCIRC/153 safeguards agreements, parties must report to the IAEA on their nuclear 
facilities and the nuclear material that moves through them.232 The INFCIRC/153 agreements are 
significantly flawed, however, in that they contain no effective mechanism for the IAEA to 
assess whether the reports are complete.233 The verification shortcomings prompted the IAEA to 
issue a model protocol in 1997 to be appended to the INFCIRC/153 agreements (the Additional 
Protocol).234 The Additional Protocol expands the IAEA’s access rights and requires parties to 
submit a broader range of information to the IAEA about their nuclear programs.235 As the IAEA 
explained: “While the chief object of safeguards under INFCIRC/153 is to verify that declared 
nuclear material was not diverted, the chief object of the new measures… is to obtain assurance 
that the State has no undeclared activities.”236 The IAEA did not make adherence to the 
Additional Protocol mandatory for NPT members, however.  
The following MENA countries which are NPT member states did not have the Additional 
Protocol in force as of February 2016: Algeria, Egypt, Lebanon, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, 
Syria, Tunisia, and Yemen.237 With regard to Iran, the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action 
(JCPOA) states that effective on Implementation Day: “Consistent with the respective roles of 
the President and Majlis (Parliament), Iran will provisionally apply the Additional Protocol to its 
Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement in accordance with Article 17(b) of the Additional 
Protocol [and] proceed with its ratification within the timeframe as detailed in Annex V.”238 
Annex V states that “Iran will seek, consistent with the Constitutional roles of the President and 
Parliament, ratification of the Additional Protocol” on “Transition Day,” which “will occur 8 
years from Adoption Day or upon a report from the Director General of the IAEA to the IAEA 
Board of Governors and in parallel to the UN Security Council stating that the IAEA has reached 
the Broader Conclusion that all nuclear material in Iran remains in peaceful activities, whichever 
is earlier.”239	   
Iran’s commitment to provisionally apply, and eventually seek ratification of, the Additional 
Protocol could be useful in encouraging other MENA countries to accede to the Protocol. An 
even more important inducement to encourage other MENA countries -- and especially those 
with burgeoning nuclear programs -- to accede to the Protocol could be achieved by member 
states of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) deciding to permit the export of controlled items 
only to those countries that have applied the Additional Protocol. President Bush in 2004 called 
upon fellow NSG member states to impose such a restriction. However, this restriction has still 
not been widely adopted. The United States deposited its instrument of ratification for the 
Additional Protocol in January 2009.240  
The United States should use its influence and leverage to encourage all MENA countries which 
are NPT members, and particularly those which have burgeoning nuclear programs, to apply the 
Additional Protocol to their safeguards agreement with the IAEA. The United States should also 
continue to press NSG members to export only to states that have applied the Additional 
Protocol to their safeguards agreement with the IAEA. 
E. IAEA Code of Conduct, Guidance on Import and Export, and Self-Assessment 
Another important IAEA tool for enhancing national legal controls over nuclear-related items is 
the IAEA’s “Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources”241 and its 
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related “Guidance on The Import and Export of Radioactive Sources,”242 which provides, inter 
alia, recommended assessment tools regarding the evaluation of transactions and the adequacy of 
the controls in place. Neither the Code of Conduct nor the Guidance is legally binding on IAEA 
member states. Nevertheless, the Code of Conduct and Guidance provide a valuable standard by 
which to judge the adequacy of current MENA country laws and regulations relating to 
radioactive sources.  
For example, paragraphs 18 and 19 of the Code of Conduct recommend that “Every State should 
have in place legislation and regulations that” provide for the effective control of radioactive 
sources and specify requirements for the safety and security of radioactive sources and of the 
devices in which sources are incorporated.243 Paragraphs 20-22 of the Code of Conduct 
recommend that every state ensure that a nuclear “regulatory body established by its legislation” 
has various specified authorities, systems, and procedures.244 Paragraphs 23-29 recommend that 
every State regulate in specified ways the import and export of radioactive sources.245 The 
Guidance provides more detailed recommendations as to how each State should regulate the 
import and export of radioactive sources.246 
Accompanying the Code and Guidance is an IAEA agreed self-assessment questionnaire that is 
designed to help each country evaluate, and receive IAEA feedback on, its implementation of the 
Guidance. The following MENA countries have not submitted responses to the questionnaire: 
Algeria, Bahrain, Iran, Israel, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Tunisia, 
United Arab Emirates, and Yemen.247 The United States should encourage all MENA countries 
to implement the IAEA Code of Conduct and Guidance, and should strongly encourage the 
remaining MENA countries -- including especially those with existing or burgeoning nuclear 
programs-- to submit responses to the IAEA Self-Assessment Questionnaire. 
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Chapter Three: Addressing International Law Obstacles to WMD 
Disposition 
 
International law restrictions have posed in the Iraq and Syria chemical weapons destruction 
cases, and could potentially pose in other cases, significant hurdles to initiatives by the 
international community to dispose of newly discovered weapons of mass destruction (WMD) 
stocks and programs. For example, transfers of biological and chemical weapons to third parties, 
and acquisition of such weapons by States Parties -- whether for elimination, secure storage or 
any other purpose -- are prohibited, in all circumstances, by the Biological Weapons Convention 
(BWC) and the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) respectively.  
 
Article I of the BWC provides that “each State Party to this Convention undertakes never in any 
circumstances to… acquire or retain” specified biological agents, toxins, weapons, equipment 
and means of delivery.248 Article III of the BWC provides:  
 
Each State Party to this Convention undertakes not to transfer to any recipient 
whatsoever, directly or indirectly, and not in any way to assist, encourage or 
induce any State, group of States or international organizations to manufacture or 
otherwise acquire any of the agents, toxins, weapons, equipment or means of 
delivery specified in article I of this Convention.249 
 
Similarly, Article I of the CWC provides:  
 
Each State Party to this Convention undertakes never under any circumstances: 
(a) To develop, produce, otherwise acquire, stockpile or retain chemical weapons 
or transfer, directly or indirectly, chemical weapons to anyone;…  
(d) To assist, encourage or induce, in any way, anyone to engage in any activity 
prohibited to a State Party under this Convention.250 
 
In addition, the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) contains narrower restrictions on 
transfers of nuclear weapons. Article I commits each of the five nuclear-weapon State Parties to 
the NPT “not to transfer to any recipient whatsoever nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive 
devices or control over such weapons or explosive devices directly, or indirectly.”251 Article II 
commits each of the non-nuclear-weapon State Parties to the Treaty “not to receive the transfer 
from any transferor whatsoever of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or of 
control over such weapons or explosive devices directly, or indirectly.”252 Thus, the only nuclear 
weapon transfers consistent with the NPT are transfers from non-nuclear-weapon State Parties to 
nuclear-weapon State Parties. 
 
Furthermore, international law can restrict the party’s options for eliminating WMD. For 
example, the CWC provides that chemical weapons may only be destroyed consistent with 
procedures specified in the CWC and its Verification Annex.253 
  
As discussed below, the CWC transfer prohibition and CWC elimination restrictions posed 
significant hurdles in the Iraq and Syria chemical weapons destruction cases. Similar hurdles 
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could occur with regard to elimination of one or more other MENA WMD arsenals. For 
example, Algeria, Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, and Sudan are other potentially unstable 
MENA countries which reportedly are suspected or known to have some CW capability.  
 
In addition, the Islamic State is known to possess chemical weapons. Director of National 
Intelligence James Clapper said in February 2016 that Islamic State had already used chemical 
weapons, including sulphur mustard, “numerous times” in Iraq and Syria.254 Clapper added that: 
“Aspirationally, they would like to do more. It’s a concern for us in the U.S., because the 
indications are they would like to use chemical weapons against us.”255 CIA Director John 
Brennan has said that Islamic State is believed to have access to the necessary precursor 
chemicals and the capability to “manufacture small quantities of chlorine and mustard gas.”256 It 
also seems possible that the Islamic State could develop biological weapons and perhaps even 
acquire a Pakistani nuclear weapon.257 
 
There are several options available to exempt WMD disposition operations from international 
law restrictions. This chapter analyzes the various options, and provides recommendations as to 
when each is most useful and appropriate. 
 
I. Security Council Resolution Overriding Treaty Commitment 
 
In the Syria chemical weapons case, the CWC prohibition on transfer was overridden by 
adoption of a resolution of the Security Council. On 27 September 2013, the OPCW Executive 
Council adopted an implementation plan on the destruction of the Syrian chemical weapons 
program,258 which was endorsed by the Security Council’s unanimous adoption of UN Security 
Council Resolution 2118 (2013) on the same day.259 
  
Article 103 of the UN Charter empowers the Security Council to override UN member states’ 
obligations under any other international agreement. Article 103 provides that: “In the event of a 
conflict between the obligations of the Members of the United Nations under the present Charter 
and their obligations under any other international agreement, their obligations under the present 
Charter shall prevail.” Further, Article 25 of the Charter provides that: 
“The Members of the United Nations agree to accept and carry out the decisions of the Security 
Council in accordance with the present Charter.” The duties placed on Members in accordance 
with the Charter by binding decisions of the Security Council are also obligations under the 
Charter for the purposes of Article 103.260 
 
The CWC’s transfer prohibition was overridden by paragraph 10 of Security Council Resolution 
2118, which specifies in relevant part as follows: “[The Security Council] decides to authorize 
Member States to acquire, control, transport, transfer and destroy chemical weapons identified 
by the Director-General of the OPCW, consistent with the objective of the Chemical Weapons 
Convention, to ensure the elimination of the Syrian Arab Republic’s chemical weapons program 
in the soonest and safest manner.” Resolution 2118 thus overrode the CWC’s transfer and 
acquisition prohibitions with a categorical authorization to acquire, control, transport, 
transfer and destroy the specified Syrian chemical weapons. Such a categorical 
authorization might, in theory, be subject to abuse by a Member State that had its own 
ideas as to appropriate implementation.  
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Another option for overriding such transfer and acquisition prohibitions, which would maintain 
more control over implementation, would be to establish a committee of the UN Security 
Council that would approve specific transfers and acquisitions on a case-by-case basis. An 
example of the type of language that could be adapted for such a purpose is contained paragraph 
23 of UN Security Council Resolution 2231 (2015), which endorsed the Joint Comprehensive 
Plan of Action on Iran’s nuclear program. The relevant portion of paragraph 23 provides as 
follows: 
 
Decides, acting under Article 41 of the Charter of the United Nations, also that the 
measures imposed in [various Security Council] resolutions … shall not apply to 
the extent necessary to carry out transfers and activities, as approved on a case-
by-case basis in advance by the Committee established pursuant to 
resolution 1737 (2006), that are [consistent with various specified criteria 
including the flexibility-providing “c) determined by the Committee to be 
consistent with the objectives of this resolution].261 
 
A Security Council resolution – whether containing a categorical or a case by case override -- is, 
for the following reasons, the optimal means of overriding international law obstacles to WMD 
disposition: 
• Article 103 of the UN Charter clearly empowers the Security Council to override UN 
member states’ obligations under any other international agreement. 
  
• The use of Security Council resolutions to override international law sets a relatively 
unproblematic precedent because the U.S. has the power under the UN Charter to veto 
any Security Council resolution of which it disapproves.  
 
However, the use of a Security Council resolution to override international law is likely to be 
unavailable in many circumstances because other permanent members of the Security Council, 
including China and Russia, also have the power under the UN Charter to veto any Security 
Council resolution of which they disapprove. Russia’s ability and willingness to play the role of 
spoiler is exemplified by its blocking a French draft that would have included Syria’s biological 
weapons program within the scope of Resolution 2118.262 
  
II. Force Majeure 
 
As mentioned above, the CWC provides that chemical weapons may only be destroyed 
consistent with procedures specified in the CWC and its Verification Annex.263 Part IV(A) of the 
Annex on Implementation and Verification provides, for example, that “Each State Party shall 
determine how it shall destroy chemical weapons, except that the following processes may not be 
used: dumping in any body of water, land burial or open pit burning.”  
 
Jeffrey Lewis, a leading nonproliferation expert, criticized the U.S. destruction of Iraqi chemical 
weapons as follows: “The thing I take away from this is, ‘God, they blew all of this up in open 
pits? ‘There is a reason that is arguably incompatible with our treaty obligations. There is no 
universe where this is a safe and ecologically appropriate way to dispose of chemical 
weapons.”264 
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The U.S. argued that the exigencies of war required that the weapons be destroyed hastily and in 
the open, and that it “acted in the spirit of the Convention.”265 The U.S. was actively engaged in 
combat operations or potentially under attack by terrorist groups that made it impossible to notify 
the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) and protect OPCW 
inspectors who would, as required by the CWC, have to physically inspect and document the 
destruction. Likewise, there was no practical way to physically secure the chemical weapons 
once U.S. forces left the area. In this situation the U.S. could plausibly justify its failure to 
conform to CWC obligations by asserting force majeure; specifically, an occurrence of an 
“unforeseen event, beyond the control of the State, making it materially impossible in the 
circumstances to perform the obligation” of compliance with the CWC during this 
destruction operation.266 
 
The principle of force majeure is well recognized in international law and by international 
courts. “Force Majeure” is defined by the UN International Law Commission as follows:  
 
1. The wrongfulness of an act of a State not in conformity with an international 
obligation of that State is precluded if the act is due to force majeure, that is the 
occurrence of an irresistible force or of an unforeseen event, beyond the control of 
the State, making it materially impossible in the circumstances to perform the 
obligation.  
 
Paragraph 1 does not apply if:  
 
(a) the situation of force majeure is due, either alone or in combination with 
other factors, to the conduct of the State invoking it; or  
 
(b) the State has assumed the risk of that situation occurring.267 
 
The "defense" or "exception" of force majeure is recognized as a legally valid "justification" for 
not fully complying with one’s contractual or international legal obligations. For example, the 
Permanent Court of Arbitration, in a 1912 judgment against a claim of force majeure by Turkey 
recognized that "the exception of force majeure ... may be raised in public international law" and 
the defense or exception of force majeure is frequently referred to as a "general principle of 
law.”268 Numerous subsequent cases have reaffirmed the principle in both municipal and 
international law.269 
 
There is a strong argument that the force majeure exception is applicable to the U.S. destruction 
of Iraqi chemical weapons. As discussed in the attached essay by Guy Roberts, the force majeure 
exception might even arguably apply to a U.S. destruction of chemical weapons via aerial 
bombardment, in a manner inconsistent with CWC requirements, in a situation such as Libya’s in 
which chemical weapons otherwise ended up in the hands of Libyan militiamen.270 As Roberts 
puts it, “while obviously not the best of choices in cases where all other legal and practical steps 
are unavailable this option is available and legally justifiable under force majeure as a last 
resort.” According to Roberts, the case for force majeure in this circumstance could be 
strengthened by arguing that its use would be consistent with the emerging norm of 
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“responsibility to protect” populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes 
against humanity.271 
 
However, it is important to use the force majeure exception sparingly, as it is relatively 
ambiguous and thus particularly subject to abuse by foreign governments who might try to argue 
force majeure when it is in fact not “materially impossible in the circumstances” for them to 
comply with the relevant international legal obligation. It is thus far preferable to, if possible, 
override the relevant international legal obligation with a Security Council resolution. 
 
III. Exceptions in Treaty Law 
 
The right of a nation to suspend its treaty obligations under certain conditions is well established 
and codified in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (Vienna Convention).272 The 
Vienna Convention generally codified the preexisting customary law of treaties that existed 
between state actors.273 As established by the Vienna Convention there are a number of ways and 
reasons a state can suspend its obligations under a treaty while maintaining the continued 
viability of the treaty and thus recognizing the explicit fundamental international law principle of 
pacta sunt servanda (“every treaty in force is binding upon the parties to it and must be 
performed by them in good faith.”)274 
 
During the suspension period, a treaty relationship continues to exist between the parties.275 
Moreover, the suspending party must “refrain from acts tending to obstruct the resumption of the 
operation of the treaty.”276 The Vienna Convention states that a party may suspend a treaty only 
through applying either the relevant provisions of the treaty itself or of the Vienna 
Convention.277 
 
Article XVI of the CWC, which allows for withdrawal from the Convention, does not expressly 
address whether or not a state party can suspend its obligations.278 The CWC’s drafters may have 
intentionally excluded the right for a State Party to suspend its obligations if they viewed it as an 
invitation to a “temporally opportunistic exit.”279 In this case, however, the intent of suspending 
the transfer prohibition would be to effectuate the object and primary purpose of the CWC; i.e., 
to ensure the elimination of a CW program and the safe and secure destruction of all weapons, 
precursors and infrastructure related to the CW program.280 
  
Absent a specific option to suspend under the CWC, we must look to the Vienna Convention for 
the reasons and justification for suspension. The Vienna Convention provides as follows in 
Article 57: 
 
The operation of a treaty in regard to all the parties or to a particular party may be 
suspended:  
(a) In conformity with the provisions of the treaty; or  
(b) At any time by consent of all the parties after consultation with the other 
contracting States. 
 
If a State Party is justified in suspending a treaty’s operation, Articles 57 and 65 provide the 
procedure to be employed. The State must first notify all of the other parties of the treaty of its 
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claim for suspension and wait three months.281 However, in cases of “special urgency” the three-
month notice requirement is waived.282 Finally, if an objection is raised the parties are directed to 
resolve the dispute via Article 33 of the UN Charter.283 
 
The Vienna Convention allows for five potential alternative reasons or justifications, one of 
which (“temporary impossibility”) is particularly relevant here, to credibly and legally justify 
one or more State Parties to suspend the obligations of the CWC, employing the procedures set 
forth in Articles 57 and 65 of the Vienna Convention, and temporarily act in a manner 
inconsistent with one or more of their legal obligations under the CWC. During the course of the 
retrieval and disposition operations, facts on the ground in Syria--particularly the use of CW by 
Syrian government and rebel forces--adequately demonstrated the “special urgency” for the need 
to transfer these weapons and materials, under expedient procedures that were clearly 
inconsistent with the CWC in order to eliminate the Syrian CW threat. 
 
As mentioned above, the most relevant potential justification is temporary impossibility. Vienna 
Convention Article 61, titled “Supervening Impossibility of Performance,” provides in relevant 
part as follows: “A party may invoke the impossibility of performing a treaty as a ground for 
terminating or withdrawing from it. . . If the impossibility is temporary, it may be invoked only 
as a ground for suspending the operation of the treaty.”284 
 
Here one could plausibly argue that the civil war and the danger of terrorist groups acquiring 
these weapons makes it impossible for the Syrian government, other governments involved in the 
disposition, and the OPCW to follow the requirements of the CWC. Since this is a temporary 
condition, it may be invoked as a ground for suspending the operation of the CWC. In this 
context temporary impossibility of performance resembles force majeure, which if applicable 
would exonerate a state from liability for non-performance of its treaty obligations. 
 
The moral justification for breaching the CWC on the ground of temporary impossibility is 
strengthened by the fact that the acts of non-compliance are nevertheless fully consistent with the 
object and purpose of the CWC, the elimination of chemical weapons. Once the weapons have 
been destroyed and the program eliminated, the justification for suspending obligations under the 
CWC cease and the affected states parties can return to full compliance with their CWC 
obligations. 
 
As with the force majeure exception, it is important to use the temporary impossibility grounds 
for breach sparingly, as it is relatively ambiguous and thus particularly subject to abuse by 
foreign governments who might try to argue temporary impossibility when it is in fact not 
“temporarily impossible” for them to comply with the relevant international legal obligation. It is 
thus far preferable to, if possible, override the relevant international legal obligation with a 
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The purpose of this paper is to explore MENA regional countries’ compliance with non-
proliferation norms and the steps the United States and the international community can take to 
more effectively encourage and assist these governments to meet, respect and carry out these 
international obligations.2  This includes strengthening their commitment and their ability to 
impede the illicit acquisition and transfer of WMD proliferation-related technology, 
commodities, equipment, and components.  Emphasis is placed on the international conventions, 
UN resolutions, and other international agreements, and the tools they provide, to support such 
an endeavor.   Particular attention is focused on those high risk MENA countries in which the 
DOD Cooperative Threat Reduction Program is currently, or hopes to be soon, working.  
 
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
The turmoil now prevalent in large parts of the Middle East, and the lax export and financial 
controls being exercised by many of these countries, pose grave risks that rogue states and non-
state actors will gain access to nuclear materials, dirty bombs and /or chemical or biological 
weapons.  Many of these countries lack the resources and/or political will to tighten controls, and 
fear the consequences of their relationship with Iran and other predator countries that have taken 
advantage of these control lacunae.   Fortunately, there may now be special opportunities to 
convince these countries to tighten controls in their own security interest.  Likewise, the desire of 
several of these countries to pursue peaceful nuclear power programs and to develop their own 
bio-chemical industries provides new leverage to convince these governments to act.   
Most MENA countries are already parties to conventions that ban the proliferation of nuclear and 
other weapons of mass destructions.  And, all UN member states are obligated under UN 
Security Council Resolution 1540 (2004) to institute controls to prevent the acquisition of such 
items by non state actors.  There are also some very valuable other international organization 
tools that can be used to help these countries strengthen their control programs.  Examples of 
such tools include the IAEA’s Code of Conduct guidelines and self assessment questionnaire; the 
Chemical Weapons Convention Technical Secretariat support programs; and the World Health 
Organization programs in support of the International Health Regulations.  These international 
organization resources can be used alongside our own, and in conjunction with those of our 
allies, to assist MENA countries with their own WMD proliferation prevention programs.  
The Financial Action Task Force (FATF) Working Group on Terrorist Financing and Money 
Laundering (WGTM) has also published a very useful typologies report and policy options for 
combating proliferation financing.  This includes a number of recommendations to improve local 
banking oversight and compliance, and to increase public and private awareness of proliferation 
costs and risks.  
There are also a number of steps that the United States and other like-minded countries can take 
to enhance the prevention of spread of weapons of mass destruction in the MENA region.  For 
example, the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) can strengthen its own export guidelines, expand 
the use of end-user checks, and improve information sharing regarding problematic transactions. 
                                                
2 Recommendations contained herein are marked in bold.  
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The United States and other like-minded countries should also use the upcoming 
“Comprehensive 1540 Review,” scheduled to be completed in late 2016, to strengthen the 
mandate and procedures of the Security Council’s 1540 Committee charged with overseeing the 
implementation of the control measures contained in UN Security Council Resolution 1540.  
This includes expanding the committee’s mandate to allow its experts to conduct “mutual 
evaluations” with member states and to publish a list of entities and individuals known to engage 
in illicit proliferation transactions.   
Below are some of this report’s key recommendations for strengthening US programs and 
strategies for enhancing non-proliferation control norms throughout the MENA region.  
Additional recommendations (in bold) are also contained throughout the body of this paper.      
• The international non-proliferation conventions provide useful tools and resources 
that should be more effectively used for assisting and strengthening WMD 
proliferation prevention programs, and their use should be better incorporated in 
the U.S. approach to improving MENA country WMD controls. 
• The United States should press for the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) to adopt 
expanded end-user checks and establish a central data base where export denials, 
reports of past diversions, and risky companies and entities, along with denial 
justifications, can be viewed by all participating members.    
• Sensitive dual use exports should be permitted only for countries that have signed 
the IAEA “Additional Protocol” for expanded safeguards.  MENA countries that 
have not yet done so should be encouraged to sign an IAEA Additional Protocol. 
• The NSG should consider the adoption of direct export requirements for highly 
sensitive dual use items which would reduce the risks of diversion by eliminating the 
use of off-shore brokers and middlemen.  
• The United States should incorporate in its WMD proliferation prevention strategy 
the option of invoking the Chemical Weapons Convention’s “challenge inspection” 
procedure in cases where it believes stockpiles of chemical weapons exist in violation 
of the convention.  
• MENA countries should be more energetically encouraged to take advantage of the 
World Health Organization (WHO) programs of assistance in carrying out their 
International Health Regulations (IHR) obligations.  
• The United States should work closely with MENA country financial regulatory 
authorities to ensure their understanding, adoption and implementation of the 
FATF recommendations for addressing proliferation financing. 
• The United States should take advantage of the upcoming UN Security Council’s 
“Comprehensive 1540 Review” to press for authorizing the 1540 Committee to 
identify, list and publish the names of entities and individuals known to engage in 
illicit proliferation transactions.  The 1540 Committee Group of Experts should also 
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be authorized to undertake a series of “mutual evaluations” of state compliance with 
Resolution 1540 norms. 
• Where possible the United States should encourage the use of private consultants in 
helping MENA countries draft new laws and implementing regulations.   
Consideration should also be given to sponsoring business to business workshops on 
the importance of adequate export controls and the risks and costs of diversions.  
• U.S. authorities should consider the adoption of financial rewards and other 
incentives for effective local monitoring, reporting, enforcement and prosecution of 
WMD-related export and border control violations.  
• The GCC countries should be encouraged to align their export, transit, and border 
and financial controls to assure against diversions.   Their export and border control 
authorities, and their financial regulators, should be encouraged to cooperate more 
closely and to share information particularly with regard to suspect transactions.   
• The United States should focus attention on, and provide technical support for, 
strengthening the UAE’s capacity to provide chemical security standards necessary 
to assure against the diversion of sector-related material, equipment and technology.      
• The United States should apply increased military assistance leverage to press Qatar 
to crack down on private sector financial support for terrorist groups -- including 
ISIL, Al Qaeda, Hamas and Hezbollah – that pose WMD risks.  
• The United States should re-engage Jordan on concluding a 123 Agreement as a 
pre-condition to realizing its nuclear ambitions.  This agreement should include 
provisions postponing possible uranium enrichment in Jordan until such time as 
such activity is commercially viable and subject to strict limitations and oversights.   
• The United States should continue to engage in depth, and seek increased 
international support, for Iraq’s efforts to establish and administer effective 
domestic and export controls, and financial regulations to protect against the 
diversion of WMD sensitive material, equipment and technology, and to keep WMD 
items out of the hands of ISIL and other terrorist groups.  
• The United States should continue to press Lebanon to strengthen its regulation and 
oversight over financial institutions and exchange houses, increase its investigation 
and prosecution of violations of financial regulation, and strengthen the penalties 
attached to such violations.  The United States should also encourage international 
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BACKGROUND 
Unrest, instability, and sectarian violence have plagued much of the Middle East and North 
Africa (MENA) region for the past decade.  This turmoil has been marked by growing tensions 
between Sunni and Shiite factions across the region, civil war in Syria and Yemen, and the 
virulent spread of international terrorism tied largely to ISIL, Al Qaeda, Hezbollah, Hamas, and 
other extremist jihadist groups.  Several MENA countries have knowingly or unwittingly 
engaged in, or tolerated, illicit funding for terrorism.  Lax controls over financial transactions 
and the transfer of sensitive dual use items have also raised the specter that rogue states and non-
state actors will gain access to nuclear materials, dirty bombs and /or chemical or biological 
weapons.    
The region is also torn by new competition and conflict between the Shi’ite and Sunni wings of 
Islam.   Iran has played a major role in fermenting and exacerbating this conflict.  And, this is 
having an important impact on the geo-political calculations of several of the MENA countries’ 
political leaders.  Some have been eager to placate Iran while others have sought to align 
themselves more closely with those, like Saudi Arabia, that have sought to oppose Iran’s 
growing influence in the region.  
At the same time, regional fears have been exacerbated by Iran’s advanced nuclear and ballistic 
missile programs and risks that the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) limiting Iran’s 
quest for nuclear weapons will lack effectiveness or come undone.  This has given new impetus 
for some MENA government leaders to consider, commence or enhance their own nuclear-
related development projects which could pose serious challenges to well established 
international non-proliferation norms and legal obligations.  It has also given MENA states, in 
the interest of their own security, further motivation to tighten up on the use of their territory for 
illicit transactions that could spread weapons of mass destruction to those countries or non-state 
actors that might threaten them.   
It has been estimated that nearly one-third of the countries in the MENA region have developed 
chemical or biological weapons capabilities or are undertaking related research programs.3  The 
recent use of chemical weapons by the Syrian government and the chaos surrounding the Syrian 
civil war underscore the risk that such chemical weapon agents have fallen or might well fall into 
the hands of ISIL and other terrorist organizations operating in the region.  Of these groups, Al 
Qaeda and ISIL are most often cited as attempting to obtain and use chemical, biological, 
radiological, and nuclear weapons.4 
While most MENA countries, until recently, have eschewed nuclear power,5 there have been at 
least four major clandestine nuclear-weapons related programs uncovered in the MENA region 
                                                
3 See NTI, “Middle East and North Africa 1540 Reporting Regional Overview” at  
http://www.nti.org/analysis/reports/mid.dle-east-and-north-africa-1540-reporting/  
4 See Richelson, Jeffrey, “Nuclear Terrorism: Threat and Response,” George Washington University National 
Security Archive,  Sept 12, 2012, at http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/nukevault/ebb388/ 
5 See Renewable Energy Potential of the Middle East, North Africa vs. 
The Nuclear Development Option, Global Energy Network Institute, Oct 2007 at 
http://www.geni.org/globalenergy/research/mid.dle-east-energy-alternatives/MENA-renewable-vs-nuclear.pdf  
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during the past 20 years.6   Iran has been the most active in seeking and developing nuclear 
power and is, at present, the only MENA country with an operating nuclear power reactor.7 Iran 
has also been very active in developing and pursuing uranium enrichment.  However, these 
activities are now subject to the restrictions contained in the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action 
(JCPOA).8  Several other MENA countries have now announced plans to construct nuclear 
power reactors over the next several years.9   This has made it all the more imperative that steps 
are taken urgently to better secure and protect nuclear and other WMD-related material, 
precursors, equipment and technology.   
Most MENA countries are parties to the conventions that ban the proliferation of nuclear, 
chemical and biological weapons of mass destruction, and are obliged by these conventions to 
institute adequate controls to prevent their spread.   All countries are obligated under UN 
Security Council Resolution 1540 (2004) 10  to institute such controls to prevent the acquisition 
of such items by non state actors.  Yet, a majority of these countries continue to lack the 
framework and resources, and some continue to lack the political will, to mount an effective anti-
WMD proliferation program.  
THE OBLIGATIONS 
The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) 
International efforts have been underway since the beginning of the atomic age to stem the 
proliferation of nuclear weapons and to limit access to other weapons of mass destruction.  The 
keystone of this effort has been the 1968 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT)11 which was 
intended to ban all states except the United Kingdom, China, France, Russia and the United 
States12 (the so-called Nuclear Weapons States (NWS)) from acquiring nuclear weapons.  The 
trade-off for non-Nuclear Weapons States complying with its provisions is the possibility of 
obtaining equipment, technology and assistance for safeguarded peaceful nuclear energy 
purposes.  The NPT now has some 191 member countries.  Only India, Israel, Pakistan, and 
South Sudan remain outside the treaty. 13     
                                                
6 Clandestine nuclear weapons programs were uncovered in Iran, Iraq, Libya, and Syria. See Proliferation: Threat 
and Response Report- Middle East and North Africa, Dept of Defense, 1997 at  
http://fas.org/irp/threat/prolif97/meafrica.html#mid.dle  
7 The Bushehr 1 reactor became commercially operational in September 2013. 
8 The text of the JCPOA can be found at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/245317.pdf 
9 The United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and Egypt all have contracted for nuclear power reactors to be 
built in their countries over the next decade.  Yemen, Tunisia, Libya, Algeria, Morocco, and Sudan have also stated 
intentions to acquire nuclear power plants during the next two decades.  Kuwait, which had originally planned to 
acquire nuclear power reactors, made a strategic decision in 2010 to forswear nuclear power production.    
10 The text of UN Security Council Resolution 1540 (2004) can be found at 
http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/1540(2004) 
11 The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Weapons (NPT) entered into force on 5 March 1970. See text at 
https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/publications/documents/infcircs/1970/infcirc140.pdf 
12 The So-called Nuclear Weapons States (NWS). 
13 North Korea (DPRK), which adhered to the NPT in 1985, but which has never been in compliance, announced its 
withdrawal from the treaty in 2003. However, the NPT contains no withdrawal provisions and the DPRK’s 
withdrawal has been widly disputed.  
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Since the NPT’s adoption, India, Pakistan, and North Korea have acquired and openly tested 
nuclear weapons.   Israel, which is also believed to possess nuclear weapons, has adopted an 
opaque policy of neither announcing nor acknowledging such possession.  All MENA countries 
except Israel are NPT parties.   
Article I of the NPT places a clear obligation on the designated Nuclear Weapons States (NWS) 
“not to transfer to any recipient whatsoever nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices 
… (nor) to assist, encourage or induce any non- nuclear weapons state (NNWS) to manufacture 
or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, or control over such 
weapons or explosive devices.”14  Article 2 obligates all NNWS “not to receive the transfer from 
any transferor whatsoever of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or of control 
over such weapons or explosive devices… (Nor) to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear 
weapons or other nuclear explosive devices; and not to seek or receive any assistance in the 
manufacture of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.”15  
Article III of the NPT empowers the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to administer 
safeguard and verification procedures to prevent “diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses 
to nuclear weapons.”16  Article III (2) specifies that “Each State Party to the Treaty undertakes 
not to provide: (a) source or special fissionable material, or (b) equipment or material especially 
designed or prepared for the processing, use or production of special fissionable material, to any 
non-nuclear-weapon State for peaceful purposes, unless the source or special fissionable material 
shall be subject to the safeguards required by this article.”17 
In order to carry out these obligations, some 48 countries came together in the Nuclear Suppliers 
Group (NSG) to adopt uniform principles for controlling the export or other transfer of nuclear 
and nuclear-related dual use equipment and technology.18  This includes two specific sets of 
guidelines covering: (1) a special trigger list of sensitive exports related to enrichment, facilities 
or material usable for nuclear weapons or in support of the use or development of such items;19 
and (2) other nuclear-related dual-use equipment, materials, software, and related technology.20  
These lists represent an informal agreement about what items need to be subject to national 
controls.  The NSG Guidelines are implemented by each Participating Government (PG) in 
accordance with its national laws and practices.   And, decisions on export applications are taken 
at the national level in accordance with national export licensing requirements.   Participating 
countries are also called upon to take all necessary steps to assure that the items will not be used 
or diverted for research or development of nuclear explosives.   





18 Another smaller group, the so-called Zangger Committee composed of supplier countries of nuclear materials, 
maintains a trigger list of materials subject to IAEA safeguards. The Zangger Committee requirements for exports of 
trigger list items are that they 1) not be used for nuclear explosives 2) are subject to IAEA safeguards in the recipient 
non-nuclear weapon state, and 3) not be re-exported unless they are subject to safeguards in the new recipient state.   
19 The NSG Guidelines are published by the IAEA in its Information Circular series. INFCIRC/254 Part 1 contains 
the Guidelines for Nuclear Transfers, and INFCIRC/254 Part 2 contains the Guidelines for Transfers of Nuclear-
Related Dual-Use Equipment, Material and Related Technology. 
20 id. 
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The NSG can and must play a primary role in controlling sensitive nuclear-related dual use items 
to countries and entities posing serious risks of diversion.  However, the NSG has been slow to 
adopt new procedures to strengthen its export control requirements.   In 2004, President 
Bush called upon fellow NSG countries only to permit controlled items to be exported to 
countries that can secure such items and that have put in force an “Additional Protocol”21 to their 
safeguards agreement with the IAEA.  This principle has not yet been widely adopted.  
The United States should continue to press the NSG to expand its guidelines and to export 
only to states that have signed an Additional Protocol to their safeguards agreement with 
the IAEA. 
The current NSG guidelines call on participating national authorities to undertake end user 
checks to reduce the risk that sensitive dual-use items will be diverted from their authorized end-
use or end-user after transfer. This includes obtaining from the acquiring entity an end-user 
statement specifying the uses and location of the items. It also requires an explicit assurance that 
the items will not be used in ways inconsistent with the announced purpose. The dual-use 
guidelines also require the supplier to obtain assurances from the recipient that the items will not 
be re-transferred to a third country without prior consent from the responsible national 
authorities of the original supplier.  However, this paper process is frequently subject to fraud 
and misuse.  In the absence of secure sources of information concerning the prior conduct or 
risks posed by importing entities, and the lack of systematic end-use verification checks, 
licensing officers are often blind to the true risks involved. Sharing of information between NSG 
participating states with regard to prior export approvals and denials, and the maintenance of a 
central data base where information about potential problem companies or entities can be viewed 
by all participants would go far to tightening up this process.22   
The United States should press for a NSG central data base where export denials, reports 
of past diversions, and risky companies and entities, along with denial justifications, can be 
viewed by all participating members.   NSG member states should also be encouraged to 
establish regular post-shipment end user verification procedures.   
After the 1991 Gulf War and the discovery of an advanced Iraqi clandestine nuclear weapons 
program, it became clear that the existing IAEA safeguard regime needed more teeth.  Although 
the IAEA had been granted authority to conduct “special inspections” if undeclared nuclear 
facilities were suspected, it had never conducted such probes.23 So, an “Additional Protocol” was 
negotiated and put in place in 1997, designed to strengthen the IAEA’s ability to “investigate” 
potential non-compliance with IAEA obligations.  This Additional Protocol expands the 
declaration a State must make to the IAEA and broadens the agency’s right of access to any 
facility to verify that declaration.24  As of June 2015, some 127 “Additional Protocols” were in 
                                                
21 The “Additional Protocol” expands the declaration a State must make to the IAEA and broadens the agency’s 
right of access to any facility to verify that declaration. See infra. 
22 See Anthony, Ian, “Reforming Nuclear Export Controls: The Future of the Nuclear Suppliers Group,” SIPRI 
Research Report No. 22 at http://books.sipri.org/files/RR/SIPRIRR22.pdf  
23 See Hirsch, Theodore, “The IAEA Additional Protocol, What It Is and Why It Matters,” The Nonproliferation 
Review, Fall-Winter 2004, pp 142-43. 
24 Id.  
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force covering 126 States and EURATOM.25  Another 20 States have signed an Additional 
Protocol with the IAEA but have not yet brought it into force.26  Unfortunately, Additional 
Protocols are only in force so far with 8 MENA countries - Bahrain, Djibouti, Iraq, Jordan, 
Kuwait, Libya, Morocco, and the United Arab Emirates.27  
The United States should use its influence and leverage to encourage all MENA countries, 
and particularly Saudi Arabia, Tunisia and Egypt, all of which have expressed interest in 
developing a nuclear energy option, to negotiate and sign an “Additional Protocol.”       
Another important IAEA tool for improving controls over sensitive nuclear-related items is the 
IAEA’s “Code of Conduct”28 and its “Guidance on The Import and Export of Radioactive 
Sources,”29 which provides, inter alia, recommended assessment tools regarding the evaluation 
of transactions and the adequacy of the safeguard controls in place.  The Code of Conduct and 
Guidelines can serve as useful aids in the drafting and establishment of operational export 
control manuals for MENA and other countries.  They also provide a standard by which to judge 
the adequacy of current MENA country export control laws, regulations and implementation.   
Accompanying the Code and Guidance is an IAEA agreed self assessment questionnaire that can 
help each country evaluate, and receive IAEA feedback on, its current safeguard and control 
programs.   In the MENA region only Egypt, Iraq, Libya, and Morocco have responded to the 
questionnaire.30  
The United States should encourage all MENA countries to adopt and circulate the IAEA 
Code of Conduct and Guidance, and should press the remaining MENA countries 
including Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Tunisia, UAE, and 
Yemen to respond to the IAEA Self Assessment Questionnaire. 
Revelations about the activities of the A.Q. Khan Network, as well as increasing evidence that 
non-state actors were seeking to acquire nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction, 
underscored the need for firmer international measures to combat the risks of further 
proliferation.   In response, the United Nations Security Council adopted Resolution 1540 
(2004).31  Declaring that “the proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, as well 
as their means of delivery, constitutes a threat to international peace and security,”32  UN 
Security Resolution 1540 places an internationally binding legal obligation on all countries to 
“take and enforce effective… domestic controls to prevent the proliferation of nuclear, chemical, 
                                                
25 The status of the “Additional Protocol” as of 3 July 2015 can be found at 
https://www.iaea.org/safeguards/safeguards-legal-framework/additional-protocol/status-of-additional-protocol  
26 id. 
27 id.  
28 Code of Conduct on The Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources, IAEA Publication at http://www-
pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/code-2004_web.pdf 
29 Guidance on the Import and Export of Radioactive Sources, IAEA Publication at http://www-
pub.iaea.org/books/IAEABooks/8901/Guid.ance-on-the-Import-and-Export-of-Radioactive-Sources 
30 Status of State Responses to IAEA Questionnaire can be found at http://www-ns.iaea.org/downloads/rw/imp-
export/status-list.pdf 
31 The full text of  UNSCR 1540 (2004) can be found at 
http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/1540%20(2004) 
32 id. 
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or biological weapons and their means of delivery, including by establishing appropriate controls 
over related materials.”33  To this end all states are required to:  
• Develop and maintain appropriate effective measures to account for and secure such 
items in production, use, storage or transport; 
• Develop and maintain appropriate effective physical protection measures; 
• Develop and maintain appropriate effective border controls and law enforcement efforts 
to detect, deter, prevent and combat, including through international cooperation when 
necessary, the illicit trafficking and brokering in such items;  
• Establish, develop, review and maintain appropriate effective national export and trans-
shipment and end use controls over such items;  
• Establish appropriate laws, regulations and controls on providing funds for transactions 
that would contribute to proliferation; and  
• Establish appropriate criminal or civil penalties for violations.34 
The Security Council has also established a special committee to oversee the implementation of 
these measures and required all states to report to the committee within six month on the steps 
taken to implement the resolution.35  This has been followed up with additional Security Council 
resolutions establishing a group of experts to monitor compliance36 and calling for a 
comprehensive review of compliance.37 
The key findings and recommendations of the first comprehensive review were published by the 
1540 Committee on January 29, 2010.38 While that report noted serious deficiencies in the 
aggregate in the implementation of resolution 1540, it provided little insight into what specific 
states were doing, or failing to do, in carry out their 1540 obligations.   A second 
“comprehensive review” has been scheduled to be completed by late 2016.39   
The United States should take advantage of the upcoming “comprehensive review” to push 
for much greater specificity concerning deficiencies in the implementation of Resolution 
1540 and failures of compliance.  
 A series of other international legal instruments have also come into force to inhibit the illicit 
acquisition, transfer, or smuggling of commodities, equipment and technology related to nuclear, 
chemical and biological weapons or their agents.  This includes, inter alia, the Convention on the 
                                                
33 UNSCR 1540 (2004) para. 3.  
34 id. 
35 UNSCR 1540 (2004) para. 4 
36 UNSCR 1810 (2008) at http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/1810%20(2008) 
37 Id.   
38 The 2009 Comprehensive Review findings and recommendations can be found at 
http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/2010/52 
39 The agree modalities for the second comprehensive review can be found at 
http://www.un.org/en/sc/1540/comprehensive-review/pdf/2016%20CR%20Modalities%20Paper.pdf  
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Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and Nuclear Facilities;40 the Biological Weapons 
Convention;41 the International Health Regulations;42 and the Chemical Weapons Convention.43  
Several other regional and international agreements also impose obligations on various MENA 
countries to prohibit and prevent the acquisition or transfer of items and materials related to the 
production of nuclear, biological or chemical weapons.44  
The Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials and Nuclear Facilities imposes a 
duty on its 157 member states to provide physical protection during international transport of 
nuclear material.   It also establishes a general framework for cooperation among states in the 
protection, recovery, and return of stolen nuclear material.   The Convention also requires states 
to impose prohibitions, and prosecute or extradite offenders.   Most MENA countries, with the 
notable exception of Egypt, Iran, and Syria, are parties to this convention.45  
Egypt should be especially encouraged to join this convention given its stated desire to 
expand its own nascent nuclear program.46 
Other international conventions such as the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) and the 
Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) ban the production, transfer, acquisition and retention 
of chemical weapons and biological  agents and toxins "of types and in quantities that have no 
justification for prophylactic, protective or other peaceful purposes."47  Specific monitoring, 
reporting, and control responsibilities over these items are also imposed by the International 
Health Regulations (IHR).48  
The tools provided for in the Chemical Weapons Convention have been notably underused for 
improving overall compliance with the Convention’s provisions.  
Article VIII (D) of the Convention provides for a Technical Secretariat charged by paragraph 38 
(e) to “provide technical assistance and technical evaluation to States Parties in the 
implementation of the provisions of this Convention, including evaluation of scheduled and 
unscheduled chemicals.”  And, paragraph 40 directs that “the Technical Secretariat shall inform 
                                                
40 The full text of the Convention can be found at https://www.iaea.org/publications/documents/infcircs/convention-
physical-protection-nuclear-material 
41 The full text of the Convention can be found at 
http://www.un.org/disarmament/WMD/Bio/pdf/Text_of_the_Convention.pdf 
42 See Gostin, Lawrence, “The International Health Regulations 10 Years On: The Governing Framework for Global 
Health Security,” 2015 at http://scholarship.law.georgetown.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2544&context=facpub   
43 The full text of the Convention can be found at https://www.opcw.org/chemical-weapons-convention/ 
44 For a more in depth view of the status of international WMD-related conventions vis a vis the MENA countries 
see Santoro, David., “Status of  Non-Proliferation Treaties, Agreements and Other Related Instruments in the 
Middle East,  July 2011 at http://www.nonproliferation.eu/web/documents/backgroundpapers/santoro.pdf   
45 A list of parties to the Physical Protection Convention can be found at 
https://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Conventions/cppnm_status.pdf 
46 According to a Reuters Nov. 19, 2015 report Moscow and Cairo have signed an agreement for Russia to build a 
nuclear power plant in Dabaa, Egypt, with construction to be completed by 2022.  Egyptian President al-Sisi also 
announced that the project would involve four reactors. 
47 The CWC and the BWC provide a list of legal and control measures member states are required to enact to 
comply with the conventions’ obligations.  
48 An explanation of the International Health Regulations and guidance on their implementation can be found at  
http://www.who.int/ihr/en/  
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the Executive Council of any problem that has arisen with regard to the discharge of its 
functions, including doubts, ambiguities or uncertainties about compliance with this Convention 
that have come to its notice in the performance of its verification activities and that it has been 
unable to resolve or clarify through its consultations with the State Party concerned.”   
Another unique feature of the CWC is its incorporation of procedures to inquire concerning the 
possibility of the presence of chemical weapons and to ask for a “challenge inspection”, whereby 
any State Party in doubt about another State Party's compliance can request the Director General 
to send an inspection team.  Under the CWC's challenge inspection procedure, States Parties are 
committed to the principle of “any time, anywhere” inspections with no right of refusal.49  
However, these provisions have remained dormant since the Convention came into force.   
The United States should incorporate the possibility of invoking challenge inspections and 
other underutilized provisions of the Chemical Weapons Convention as part of its non-
proliferation strategy to address the challenge of WMD-related proliferation in the MENA 
region.  
The International Health Regulations (2005) (IHR) require State Parties to meet specific core 
capacity requirements for surveillance and response in order to detect, investigate and respond to 
all public health risks including those raised by radiation and toxic chemical and biological 
agents.  This mechanism, known as Early Warning and Response (EWAR), requires the 
collection, dissemination and sharing of pertinent information with competent authorities.  The 
first step in this process is monitoring and collecting pertinent information at points of entry 
including ports, airports and ground crossings.  Likewise points of entry should receive all 
pertinent information generated elsewhere.  
The World Health Organization (WHO) has developed a number of programs to assist countries 
in the implementation of the International Health Regulations, and many of these same measures 
are directly applicable to monitoring and preventing the spread of weapons of mass destruction.  
This includes guidance and training modules, and facilitating collaboration among early warning 
surveillance systems, laboratory-based surveillance systems, and points of entry.50 
The United States should encourage a more active engagement between MENA countries 
and the WHO to ensure they are taking full advantage of the assistance offered by the 
WHO in carrying out their IHR obligations.  
The Financial Action Task Force (FATF) Working Group on Terrorist Financing and Money 
Laundering (WGTM) began in October 2008 to develop policy options for combating 
proliferation financing.  Working with the private sector, export control experts, and other 
relevant stakeholders, the group prepared a very useful typologies report and set of policy 
options related to preventive measures, investigations, and prosecutions.  The group also 
                                                
49 The procedures for a “challenge inspection” are outlined in Article IX of the Convention. 
50 The IHR handbook and guidelines are at  http://www.who.int/ihr/en/ 
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developed a number of recommendations to increase public and private awareness of 
proliferation costs and risks.51 
The working group on proliferation financing concluded that proliferators were finding it easy to 
exploit the uneven implementation of international obligations by locating themselves or routing 
funds through jurisdictions with weak export and financial controls and/or insufficient resources 
to launch successful investigations and prosecutions.52  
Among the key recommendations in their report are:  
• Proliferation financing should be treated as a serious criminal offence and  supported by 
adequate resources to investigate and prosecute;  
• Jurisdictions should consider confiscation of the proceeds and instrumentalities of 
proliferation financing acts; 
• To avoid safe havens for proliferators, it is essential to ensure that jurisdictions render 
mutual legal assistance in support of relevant investigation and prosecution and, where 
possible, extradite individuals charged with such offences;  
• Jurisdictions should encourage financial institutions to incorporate the risk of 
proliferation financing as part of their established preventive measures and internal 
controls; 
• Jurisdictions should consider establishing regimes for applying preventative targeted 
financial sanctions to individuals and entities involved in proliferation and proliferation 
financing; 
• FATF members should also apply such targeted financial sanctions against those 
individuals and entities involved in proliferation and proliferation financing.53   
These and the other FATF recommendations for addressing proliferation financing should 
be incorporated in the U.S. strategy to evaluate and improve MENA compliance with UN 
resolution 1540 norms    
A number of private consulting and non-governmental organizations, such as VERTIC,54 have 
also developed Resolution 1540 implementation kits which include model draft laws and 
regulations, as well as organizational and operational material to improve implementation and 
                                                
51 See FATF, Combating Proliferation Financing: A Status Report on Policy Development and Consultation, 
February 2010 at http://www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/reports/Status-report-proliferation-financing.pdf 
52 id. 
53 id. 
54 VERTIC’s home page can be found at http://www.vertic.org/pages/homepage/programmes/national-
implementation-measures/un-security-council-resolution-1540/legislation-drafting-tools.php  
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enforcement.  Iraq, for example, has relied heavily on VERTIC to put in place its 1540 
implementation measures.55  
Given national sovereignty sensibilities it often proves less onerous for government officials 
to work with private consultants when drafting new laws and implementing regulations 
than with officials representing other governments.    
MENA COUNTRY LAX PROLIFERATION CONTROLS 
The Middle East and North African area is a relatively poor region plagued with corruption and 
government, economic, and technical inefficiency.  There is a great disparity of income between 
senior government and business leadership and normal working cadre.  This has long hampered 
the efficient administration of the government’s regulatory authority and has long been a very 
serious problem throughout the region in the administration of trade controls.    These problems 
have been further exacerbated by the chaos that has accompanied the so-called “Arab Spring.”   
While none of the MENA countries except for Iran are considered to be potential producers and 
direct suppliers of controlled nuclear-related material, equipment or technology, illicit trafficking 
in these items remains a significant issue.56 Several MENA countries are also known to have the 
capability to produce, and some may now even possess chemical and biological weapons.57  In 
addition, many of the MENA countries serve as important storage and transit points for both licit 
and illicit international cargos.58 Many of these countries lack the physical and human resources 
necessary to closely monitor and control this trade.  The task is further complicated by the 
absence of meaningful regional cooperation and the existence of numerous lengthy and porous 
shared borders.  “Terrorist organizations and other transnational criminal networks regularly take 
advantage of these porous borders and poorly regulated financial institutions across the Middle 
East to engage in activities such as illicit financing, drug trafficking, and transport of dual-use 
items.”59 
Regulatory authorities in the United States and in other principal nuclear-related and dual use 
equipment supplier countries have long been aware of the trafficking risks posed by several 
MENA countries.  They are already taking steps to closely monitor the movement of sensitive 
nuclear and dual use items goods to the region.  Still, they must rely heavily on the capabilities 
and cooperation of countries in the region to seize trafficked goods and hold those responsible 
accountable.  The United States and several other supplier countries have undertaken a variety of 
programs to encourage and assist the control efforts of these governments.  Much of this effort is 
now conducted within the context of bilateral or multilateral arrangements.  Nevertheless, 
                                                
55 See Iraq’s Submission to the 1540 Committee dated February 4, 2014 at 
http://www.un.org/en/sc/1540/pdf/Iraq%20Letter%20re%20effective%20practices%202014.pdf 
56 See Nikitin, Mary Beth, The Evolution of Cooperative Threat Reduction: Issues for Congress 
CRS Report , June 13, 2014, p 9 at https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/nuke/R43143.pdf  
57 See Mills, Pamela, “Preventing Chemical Warfare and Terrorism: The CWC and the Middle East,” in 
Disarmament Diplomacy Issue No. 65, July - August 2002 at http://www.acronym.org.uk/dd/dd65/65op3.htm 
58 The MENA region is home to 7 of the top 50 maritime container terminals, with Dubai serving as one of the 
world’s busiest transit maritime ports. 
59 See See NTI, “Middle East and North Africa 1540 Reporting Regional Overview” at  
http://www.nti.org/analysis/reports/mid.dle-east-and-north-africa-1540-reporting/ 
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progress has been slow.  The basic assessment is that, perhaps with the exception of the UAE 
and Jordan, there still remains little evidence that effective control measures are in place.60  
 The U.S. Senate Armed Services Committee Report accompanying the National Defense 
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2014 called special attention to the severe WMD proliferation 
risks still existing in the MENA region, noting that: 
“The Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region represents a new generation  of immediate 
and growing WMD-related proliferation challenges. Factors lending  urgency to regional 
threat dynamics in this region include Syria’s chemical  weapons program, Iran’s nuclear 
program and the influence of terrorist groups  operating in the region.  The Committee 
believes that it is critical that the United  States develop a comprehensive, effective and 
efficient cooperative threat  reduction (CTR) and nonproliferation strategy to address the 
challenge of WMD- related proliferation in the MENA region.”61   
While such a strategy has been submitted to Congress, it has not been made public.  However, 
one can surmise that the steps posited by such a plan would include the broader application of 
the measures contained in UN Security Council Resolution 1540 and the increased provision of 
legal and technical assistance to the governments concerned, particularly within the context of 
existing counter-terrorism cooperation with these countries.  It should also include the adoption 
of a more intense “carrot and stick” approach in the approving of dual use equipment and 
military assistance and sales to these countries; and the threat of more stringent application of 
Sections 311, 312, and 313 of the USA Patriot Act62 to scrutinize their international financial 
transactions to evaluate their susceptibility to money laundering, terrorism financing, or other 
illicit financial purposes.  In addition, it should build leverage on the increased desire by several 
countries in the region to acquire nuclear power plants.63    
The first step in this process is to work with MENA countries to put in place improved control 
legislation and mechanisms.   UN Security Council Resolution 1540 (2004), and the Chapter VII 
obligations64 the resolution imposes on all countries,65 could, if fortified, provide new 
                                                
60 See NTI, “Middle East and North Africa 1540 Reporting Regional Overview” at  
http://www.nti.org/analysis/reports/mid.dle-east-and-north-africa-1540-reporting/ 
61 Senate Armed Services Committee Report 113-44, June 20, 2013, p 201  at  
https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CRPT-113srpt44/pdf/CRPT-113srpt44.pdf 
62 The Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct 
Terrorism (USA PATRIOT) Act, Public Law 107-56. 
63 As noted above, the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, Jordan and Egypt all have contracted for nuclear power 
reactors to be built in their countries over the next decade. 
64 Resolutions adopted by the Security Council acting under Chapter VII of the Charter that direct or decide,  that 
measures are to be taken, as opposed to “recommends” or “calls upon member countries,” are considered binding on 
all states pursuant to Articles 39, 41 and 25 of the Charter.  
65  UNSCR 1540 paragraph 3 directs that “all States shall …establish domestic controls to prevent the proliferation 
of nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons and their means of delivery, including by establishing appropriate 
controls over related materials and to this end shall… (d) Establish, develop, review and maintain appropriate 
effective national export and trans-shipment controls over such items, including appropriate laws and regulations to 
control export, transit, trans-shipment and re-export and controls on providing funds and services related to such 
export and trans-shipment such as financing, and transporting that would contribute to proliferation, as well as 
establishing end-user controls; and establishing and enforcing appropriate criminal or civil penalties for violations of 
such export control laws and regulations.”  
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opportunities to press for expanded and strengthened controls throughout the MENA region.  
Unfortunately, the resolution, as currently administered by the 1540 Committee, lacks any real 
teeth.  The 1540 Committee continues to lack a mandate that would permit it to establish norms, 
assess compliance, or impose sanctions.  Its reports to the Security Council avoid evaluation. 
Rather, it provides data only in aggregate terms.  No mention is made of individual states or even 
regions.  Unlike the UN Security Council’s Iran, DPRK, and Al Qaeda and Taliban Committees, 
the 1540 Committee lacks any power to identify and designate those individuals and entities 
engaged in illicit WMD proliferation activities. 
Many of the MENA countries, as is true with many other countries around the world, appear to 
comply with the 1540 resolution merely by submitting written reports to the 1540 Committee.  
These reports vary considerably in terms of their quality and comprehensiveness.  Many lack any 
real substance and contain little more than statements of support for the objectives of the UN 
resolution and/or intentions to enact new control measures.66  And, even where specific 
legislation is noted, the 1540 Committee has provided no real feedback on the quality of the 
measures adopted. 67   
The United States should use the opportunity of the 1540 Committee’s second 
“comprehensive review,” scheduled to be held no later than 30 November 2016, to press for 
1540 Committee reforms aimed at correcting these deficiencies. 
In assessing compliance with the various provisions of resolution 1540, the 1540 Committee and 
its experts should take a lesson from the practices of FATF which regularly undertakes so-called 
“mutual evaluations” of a country’s compliance with FATF anti money laundering and counter-
terrorism financing norms.  These mutual evaluations, while voluntary, engage both FATF and 
local country experts in an in-depth evaluation of local laws, regulations and procedures.  It is 
precisely this type of evaluation that the US and the other members of the Security Council 
should seek from the 1540 Committee and its experts.   
The United States should press for an expanded mandate for the 1540 Committee to 
maintain and publish a list of entities and individuals known to engage in illicit 
proliferation transactions. 
                                                
66 "Middle Eastern countries have had a poor start when it comes to the implementation of UNSC Resolution 1540. 
Their general reporting behavior is significantly behind that of countries in other regions." See Lars Olberg, "The 
Implementation of Resolution 1540 in the Middle East," Sandia Report SAND2007-7938, Sandia National 
Laboratories, February 2008, p. 28. 
67 “In June 2005, the congressionally mandated bipartisan Task Force on the United Nations concluded that the UN 
Security Council, in adopting Resolution 1540, ‘created a potentially powerful tool for countering the non-state 
proliferation threat’….In particular, the task force wondered what standards the 1540 Committee, as it is known, 
would use to evaluate how well states were implementing the resolution; how much the committee would press 
states to comply with the legally binding obligations of the resolution; and whether the work could be done with 
only seven committee experts. By 2012, the answers to those questions are none, very little, and no, respectively.  
The committee does not evaluate states; it uses the lightest of touches to encourage them to comply with the 
resolution, and it has far too few resources to do the work envisioned by the task force.” See Cupitt, Richard, 
“Nearly at the Brink: The Tasks and Capacity of the 1540 Committee,” Arms Control Association, August 30, 2012 
at https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2012_09/Nearly-at-the-Brink-The-Tasks-and-Capacity-Of-the-1540-Committee  
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The United States should also press for an expanded mandate directing the 1540 
Committee and its Group of Experts to undertake a series of “mutual evaluations” of state 
compliance with Resolution 1540 norms.   
There are also a number of programs and initiatives underway under the auspices of the 1540 
Committee and/or bilateral arrangements to assist MENA countries in strengthening their control 
and monitoring of WMD-related items.  These include programs supporting the drafting of new 
laws and regulations, as well as training sessions for government officials charged with 
administering the export control laws or protecting the borders.  There has also been the 
provision of control equipment and technology. Yet, it is still proving difficult to motivate local 
officials to provide the impetus, authority and priority necessary to make things work.  Even 
when the political decisions have been made by senior government officials, the mid-level and 
junior-level government officials charged with carrying out such measures are simply unwilling 
to change the way they do things.  In many cases, this is because they lack the incentives and the 
resources to administer such controls effectively.   
It may prove more effective to adopt a new cooperative assistance approach teaming 
experienced export control and customs officials from donor countries working side by side 
with local officials.68 
The United States should also consider joining with other NSG countries to establish a 
program of incentives for local officials to engage in effective implementation of WMD-
related export and border controls.  This should include, inter alia, the provision of 
financial reward incentives, and the provision of state-of-the-art resources to carry out 
their functions. 
*****     
Many of the programs sponsored by the 1540 committee involve inter-governmental workshops 
and set-piece presentations on best practices.  Unfortunately, and as many of the participants 
already know, most of these sessions provide little return in terms of improved control 
implementation.   
A much better return for such resources would be achieved by targeting workshops to the 
private sector entities actually engaged in doing business involving controlled items, 
materials and technology. Such entities should be apprised directly of the consequences 
attached to engaging in illicit financing or trade with regard to such items, including 
possible designation cutting them off from suppliers and other financial and other 
penalties.  Consideration should also be given to sponsoring business to business workshops 
which engage supplier country business entities in the exchange.   
                                                
68 Perhaps the best model of this approach to-date was the cooperative international and local customs and border 
control teams developed to administer United Nations sanctions on Serbia during the Bosnia War. Former western 
licensing, customs, and border control officials could be recruited and financed by  donor organizations or countries 
who would work along side local licensing, customs and border authorities to advise concerning proliferation related 
concerns.  This would enhance local capability and provide a degree of transparency to such activities.   The author 
believes that such assistance would be more effective than providing training or best practices conferences alone.  
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MENA COUNTRY EVALUATIONS 
This section provides more specific evaluation of the prevailing situation in certain MENA 
countries targeted for possible U.S. non-proliferation-related assistance. 
The Cooperation Council for the Arab States of the Gulf (GCC)  
The GCC consists of six independent Arab states – Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, 
and the United Arab Emirates – that cooperate together on economic and political issues of joint 
concern.  The GCC also operates as a customs union. There are no tariffs between the six states 
and citizens can move freely across borders.  While goods come in at the same tariffs and can 
move freely between the six countries, common export controls are lacking.  This poses 
additional risks for diversion of sensitive items. 
The GCC countries individually also have mixed records when it comes to the establishment of 
effective export, transit and border controls, and with respect to identifying, preventing or 
prosecuting illicit financial transactions.   
Both the United Arab Emirates and Qatar have served as important transactional and transit 
points for the diversion of sensitive nuclear and dual use technology -- including to Iran, Libya, 
India, Pakistan and North Korea.  Saudi Arabia, on the other hand, is challenged by its loosely 
regulated financial and business sectors, and a latent public sympathy for certain radical Sunni 
groups.   
All of the GCC countries are parties to the NPT, the Chemical Weapons Convention, the 
Biological and Toxic Weapons Convention, the Convention for the Physical Protection of 
Nuclear Material, and, except for Oman, the International Convention on the Suppression of Acts 
of Nuclear Terrorism (NTC).69   All six countries are also participants in NATO’s Istanbul 
Cooperation Initiative (ICI),70  and the U.S.-sponsored Proliferation Security Initiative.71   
 So far, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Saudi Arabia have the most advanced nuclear 
power production plans, with Abu Dhabi having begun construction of the Barakah-1 reactor in 
2012 with plans to follow with three further reactors by 2020.  Saudi Arabia has posited plans to 
become the Middle East’s largest nuclear power producer over the next 20 years.  In addition, all 
six GCC countries have active chemical and petro-chemical industries with the potential to 
produce chemical weapon precursors.  
                                                
69 Article 7 of the NTC requires that States Parties take all practical measures to “prohibit illegal activities of 
persons, groups and organizations that encourage, instigate, organize, knowingly finance or knowingly provide 
technical assistance or information or engage in the perpetration of acts” of nuclear terrorism. (emphasis added) 
70 The Istanbul Cooperation Initiative, launched in June 2004, provides assistance – including to Bahrain, Kuwait, 
Qatar and the UAE -- in areas such as border security, counter-terrorism and counter-WMD proliferation.  See The 
NATO ICI Fact Sheet,  April 2014  at http://www.nato.int/nato_static/assets/pdf/pdf_2014_04/20140331_140401-
factsheet-ICI_en.pdf    
71 The Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) is a multinational response to the threat of WMD proliferation. It serves 
to coordinate participating states’ efforts, consistent with UNSCR 1540 and other international measures to stop 
proliferation related trade in WMDs, related materials and delivery systems. See http://www.psi-
online.info/Vertretung/psi/en/01-about-psi/0-about-us.html 
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The GCC countries should be encouraged to align their export, transit, and border and 
financial controls to assure against diversions.   Their export and border control 
authorities, and their financial regulators, should be encouraged to cooperate more closely 
and to share information particularly with regard to suspect transactions.   
The United Arab Emirates  
The United Arab Emirates (UAE) had a long history of serving as one of the most active transit 
points for illicit nuclear and other WMD –related transactions.  The UAE, for example, had 
served as the principal transfer hub for A.Q. Khan’s acquisition and shipment of nuclear 
components to Iran, North Korea and Libya.72   
The UAE has one of the most diversified economies in the Gulf Cooperation Council, with 
Dubai emerging as a major international aviation and maritime transshipment hub.  The Dubai 
port of Jebel Ali is by far the busiest port in the Middle East.  Over its history, and perhaps until 
very recently, UAE ports have served as major transit points for Iran’s and other Middle Eastern 
countries’ illicit acquisition of sensitive nuclear and dual use items.73 
Under strong pressure and threatened sanctions from the United States,74 the UAE began, in 
September 2007, to strengthen its export and transit controls.  The UAE Federal Council passed 
the emirate's first ever export control statute and created a control body known as the National  
Commission for Commodities Subject to Import, Export, and Re-export Controls.75 The UAE 
also shut down 40 foreign and UAE firms allegedly involved in dual use exports to Iran and 
other countries.  In September 2012, the UAE (and Bahrain) acted to impound shipments to Iran 
of items that Iran purportedly sought for use in its nuclear program.  The United States has also 
stationed two export control officers at its embassy in Abu Dhabi to cooperate with local 
officials, to conduct end-use and post-shipment checks, and to investigate possible violations. 
This crackdown may be due, in part, to the UAE’s growing concerns over the threats posed by 
Iran and the spread of terrorism throughout the region, as well as its expanding defense 
relationship with the United States.  Also, as part of its negotiations with the United States for a 
                                                
72 See Katzman, Kenneth, CRS Report “The United Arab Emirates (UAE): Issues for U.S. Policy, Sept 14, 2015 at 
https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/mid.east/RS21852.pdf  
73 See “Nukes ‘R’ Us – Twenty Five Years of Transshipments Through the United Arab Emirates, “Wisconsin 
Project on Nuclear Arms Control, June 2009 at  
http://www.wisconsinproject.org/countries/dubai/uaedangerousretransfers-060209.html 
74 “In February 2007 the Administration threatened to create a new category of countries called “Destinations of 
Diversion Control”—countries for which there is determined to be re-exportation of controlled technology to Iran 
and other countries forbidden from receiving such U.S. goods. A June 2010 Iran sanctions law, the Comprehensive 
Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act (CISADA, P.L. 111-195) formally authorizes countries to be 
designated as Destinations of Diversion Control and subjected to sanctions. That law appear[ed to be] directed 
against the UAE, but it has to date avoided that designation because of some of its actions to strengthen its export 
control regime.”  See Katzman, Kenneth, CRS Report “The United Arab Emirates (UAE): Issues for U.S. Policy, 
Sept 14, 2015 at https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/mid.east/RS21852.pdf 
75 Reportedly, the law's structure and control lists were modeled after the export control regime of Singapore. See 
Katzman, Kenneth, United Arab Emirates: Political Background and Export Control Issues. CRS Memorandum For 
Senate Homeland Security Committee,  April 21, 2008 
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“123 Nuclear Cooperation Agreement”76 allowing it to receive nuclear related equipment from 
the United States, the UAE reassured the United States that it would implement enhanced export 
and import control rules for nuclear and nuclear-related equipment and technology in strict 
accordance with the Nuclear Suppliers Group Guidelines for nuclear transfers.77 Nevertheless, 
there are lingering doubts as to the extent UAE export control laws will actually be administered 
and enforced. 78  
The UAE has been a party to the NPT since 1995, concluded a safeguards agreement with the 
International Atomic Agency (IAEA) in 2003, and acceded to the IAEA Additional Protocol in 
2010.  The UAE has also committed to permanently renouncing the acquisition of uranium 
enrichment and plutonium reprocessing capabilities.79 The UAE is also a signatory to the 
Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) aimed at stopping shipments of weapons of mass 
destruction, their delivery systems and related materials worldwide and is now receiving help 
from the U.S. State Department’s Export Control and Related Border Security Assistance 
program to improve its enforcement and licensing capabilities aimed at curbing the 
transshipment of illicit materials.80  
The UAE is also a party to both the Chemical Weapons Convention and the Biological and Toxic 
Weapons Convention.81 Recently, the UAE stated its intention to develop and expand its 
commercial activities in both the chemical and biological sectors.   This includes maintaining a 
free-trade zone dedicated to biotechnology, with the intention of becoming the Middle East's 
regional biotechnology hub and a venue for international collaboration.82  In addition, the Abu 
Dhabi Investment Council is working with two major chemical companies to establish “the 
largest and most integrated chemical industry complex in the world.”83 The danger here is that 
the UAE continues to lack the robust export controls, chemical safety, and chemical security 
standards necessary to assure against the diversion of sector-related material, equipment and 
technology.84   
The United States should focus attention on, and provide technical support for, 
strengthening the UAE’s capacity to provide chemical security standards necessary to 
assure against the diversion of sector-related material, equipment and technology.     
Despite the pledged improvements in the UAE’s export control program, the UAE remains 
deficient in the monitoring and prevention of money laundering and illicit financial transactions 
which could support proliferation-related diversions. The 2015 U.S. Department of State 
International Narcotics Control Strategy Report (INCSR) deemed the UAE a “Jurisdiction of 
                                                
76 Agreement for Cooperation Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the 
United Arab Emirates Concerning Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy which entered into force in December 2009. 
77 See Testimony of Ellen Tauscher, Under Secretary for Arms Control and International Security,  before the House 
Foreign Affairs Committee,  July 8, 2009 at http://www.state.gov/t/us/125782.htm 
78 id. 
79 See NTI Country Profiles, United Arab Emirates at  http://www.nti.org/country-profiles/united-arab-emirates/  
80 id. 
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Primary Concern.” 85 The most recent FATF evaluation of the UAE noted that while the UAE 
has recognized, and was responding to, the continuing challenges posed by increasingly well-
resourced and well-organized transnational crime networks, “the extent to which its systems, 
processes, and legislation can keep pace with criminal exploitation of a financial sector 
experiencing exponential growth remains a challenge at both strategic and implementation 
levels.” 86  Also problematic is the degree to which money launderers continue to be able to take 
advantage of bulk cash transactions, local hawaladars, and cash couriers.87  
The United States should place a high priority on its assistance and support aimed at 
improving the UAE’s ability to comply fully with FATF’s AML/CTF and counter 
proliferation financial standards.    
Qatar 
Qatar has long been a party to the NPT, Chemical Weapons Convention, Biological and Toxic 
Weapons Convention and International Convention on the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear 
Terrorism (NTC). However, it has been slow to put in place specific export and transit control 
legislation.  
Following the adoption of UNSC Resolution 1540, Qatar acted quickly to establish a National 
Arms Control Committee charged with proposing export control and related legislation, but there 
was little movement towards putting the laws and control institutions in place.  In July 2013, 
Qatar reported to the UN General Assembly that it was acting to strengthen its 2007 chemical 
weapons control law,88 and that it had prepared new laws related to the control and monitoring of 
nuclear and biological weapons.  However, there is no indication that these laws have yet been 
adopted.  Qatar did, however, in 2010 adopt laws to combat money-laundering and the financing 
of terrorism.  These rules are ostensibly being enforced by a new National Committee on 
Combating Money Laundering and the Financing of Terrorism.89  
                                                
85 “There are some indications that trade-based money laundering occurs in the UAE - including through 
commodities used as counter-valuation in hawala transactions or through trading companies - and that such activity 
might support sanctions evasion networks and terrorist groups in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Somalia. Money 
laundering associated with terrorist and extremist groups includes both fund-raising and transferring funds. Bulk 
cash smuggling is also a significant problem.”  2015 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report (INCSR) at 
http://www.state.gov/j/inl/rls/nrcrpt/2015/vol2/239111.htm 
86 “The UAE authorities have not undertaken a structured assessment of the vulnerability to, and risks of, money 
laundering and terrorist financing through the financial system in the country. Consequently, they do not apply a 
risk-based approach to the application of the preventive measures, and no sectors have been specifically exempted 
from the provisions under the AML/CFT legislation and regulations. In addition, the central bank regulations have 
not been structured so as to recognize the possibility of a risk-based approach to the implementation of the 
preventive measures at institutional level.”  See FATF-MENA Mutual Evaluation Report, Anti-Money Laundering 
and Combating the Financing of Terrorism, United Arab Emirates, 9 April 2008 at http://www.fatf-
gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/reports/mer/MER%20UAE%20full.pdf 
87 id. 
88 Law No. (16) or 2013 on Chemical Weapons at http://www.almeezan.qa/LawPage.aspx?id.=5151&language=en 
89 Law No. (4) of Year 2010 on Combating Money Laundering and Terrorism Financing at 
https://www.unodc.org/tldb/pdf/Qatar/QAT_AML_2004_EN.pdf 
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While FATF in its latest (2012) report found Qatar now largely compliant with core FATF 
recommendations and removed Qatar from its annual review list,90 the report noted that “no 
judgments were passed with regard to the financing of terrorism….(T) the Secretariat could not 
fully judge the effectiveness with regard to the adequate  implementation of preventive 
measures.”91 In March and October 2014, David Cohen, U.S. Treasury Under Secretary for 
Terrorism and Financial Intelligence, referred to Qatar as a “permissive” terrorist financing 
jurisdiction.92  
Qatar is a listed participant in the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) and in March 2015, 
hosted the annual NATO Conference on Proliferation Challenges.  PSI participants commit 
themselves to “undertake effective measures, either alone or in concert with other states, for 
interdicting the transfer or transport of WMD, their delivery systems, and related materials to and 
from states and non-state actors of proliferation concern.”93 However, little is known as to any 
steps Qatar has taken to act on this commitment.   
While trade with Qatar in sensitive WMD-related precursors, materials and equipment by 
Western supplier countries continues to be closely monitored, the greatest risk posed appears to 
be Qatar’s ambivalence with regard to local support for Hamas and other Jihad related groups. 
The U.S. government has refrained from designating Qatar for providing material support to 
terrorist organizations, but recent U.S. government statements allege that private Qatari citizens 
and individuals based in Qatar are providing support to several designated terrorist organizations 
including ISIL and the Taliban.94   
Amongst the GCC partners, Qatar maintains the closest trading relations with Iran.  And, since 
the promulgation of the JCPOA, Qatar has further broadened this relationship, giving rise to 
concerns on the part of some that Qatar may replace UAE as Iran’s backdoor to obtaining illicit 
dual use equipment and technology.95     
Under the reign of Qatar’s new Emir, Tamim bin Hamad, the Emirate has increasingly become 
dependent on U.S. military assistance and force presence for its defense and security.  A massive 
$11 billion U.S. – Qatar arms deal was announced in July 2014 including the sale of Patriot 
Missile Batteries, Apache Attack Helicopters and Javelin Anti-Tank Missiles.96  Transactions 
such as these should serve to increase U.S. and international leverage on Qatar to crack down on 
any illicit trade with Iran and on those continuing to fund ISIL terrorist organizations.   
                                                
90FATF placed Qatar in a regular follow-up process pursuant to FATF’s mutual 
evaluation procedures following its 2008 assessment that Qatar was non-compliant or only partially compliant with 
37 core FATF recommendations.  
91 See FATF, Mutual Evaluation Report, Fourth Follow-up, Qatar, 28 April 2012 at 
http://www.menafatf.org/images/UploadFiles/4th_FYR_of_Qatar_Removal.pdf 
92 See Blanchard, Christopher, CRS Report “Qatar: Background and U.S. Relations at 
https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/mid.east/RL31718.pdf 
93 Statement of PSI Interdiction Principles at http://www.state.gov/t/isn/c27726.htm  
94 Boghardt, Lori, “Qatar and ISIS Funding,” Washington Institute, Aug 2014 at 
http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/qatar-and-isis-funding-the-u.s.-approach  
95 See “Iran, Qatar Trade  ‘Posed to Grow’” Trade Arabia News Agency, July 30, 2015 at 
http://www.tradearabia.com/news/IND_287318.html 
96  See Blanchard, Christopher, CRS Report “Qatar: Background and U.S. Relations, p 6 at 
https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/mid.east/RL31718.pdf 
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The United States should apply increased military assistance leverage to press Qatar to 
crack down on private sector financial support for terrorist groups, including ISIL, Al 
Qaeda, Hamas and Hezbollah. 
Saudi Arabia 
As noted above, Saudi Arabia is a party to the NPT, CWC, and BWC Conventions.  While in the 
past Saudi Arabia had largely eschewed nuclear energy, this is evidently about to change.  Saudi 
officials at the King Abdullah City for Atomic and Renewable Energy (KA CARE) have 
announced plans to develop as many as 16 nuclear power plants by 2040.97   In early 2014, Saudi 
Arabia signed agreements with two French companies, Areva and EDF, to help develop nuclear 
expertise, including a nuclear safety training program at the National Institute of Technology in 
Jeddah.   In May 2014, Finland agreed to train personnel and help establish a Saudi nuclear 
regulatory framework.  In addition, in March 2015, an Argentine-Saudi state joint venture was 
established to develop suitable technology for the kingdom’s nuclear energy program.  Later that 
month, King Salman and South Korean President Park Geun-hye signed bilateral agreements on 
“mutual nuclear co-operation for peaceful uses.” This included a memorandum of understanding 
on the construction of two small South Korean SMART reactors to power Saudi water 
desalination plants.98  Former Saudi Director of General Intelligence Prince Turki al-Faisal also 
warned, in May 2015, that Saudi Arabia intended to match Iran’s nuclear program, stating that: 
“Whatever the Iranians have, we will have too.”99  There has been speculation that in the wake of 
the Iran nuclear deal Saudi Arabia has begun to explore possible future Saudi – Pakistani nuclear 
cooperation.100  This is consistent with earlier unconfirmed reports that Saudi Arabia played an 
important role in financing, and perhaps assisted in the acquisition of controlled dual use items in 
support of Pakistan’s own nuclear weapons program.101  However, there have been no published 
reports that Saudi Arabia is engaged in such conduct today.   
Following the adoption of UN Security Council Resolution 1540, the Saudi government took a 
number of steps, at least on paper, to comply with the resolution’s operative provisions.  This 
included measures to strengthen the government’s ability to “monitor the transport and 
smuggling of radioactive, nuclear and other hazardous materials across its borders (and) to 
combat the illegal trade in such materials.102 Advanced radiological detection systems were also 
installed in Saudi ports nationwide. 
                                                
97 Blanchard, Christopher, Saudi Arabia Background and U.S. Relations,  CRS Report February 5, 2016 at 
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/mid.east/RL33533.pdf 
98 Sukin, Lauren,  “In Saudi Arabia, Nuclear Energy For Nuclear Energy’s Sake,” 28 July 2015, at 
http://thebulletin.org/saudi-arabia-nuclear-energy-nuclear-energy%E2%80%99s-sake8570 
99 See Sanger, David.,  “Saudi Arabia Promises to Match Iran in Nuclear Capability” NY Times,  May 13, 2015 at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/05/14/world/mid.dleeast/saudi-arabia-promises-to-match-iran-in-nuclear-
capability.html?_r=0 
100  Heinonen, Olli, “Nuclear Kingdom: Saudi Arabia's Atomic Ambitions,” Washington Institute, March 27, 2014 at 
http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/nuclear-kingdom-saudi-arabias-atomic-ambitions 
101 id. 
102 See Note verbale dated 24 March 2011 from the Permanent Mission of Saudi Arabia to the United Nations 
addressed to the Chair of the Committee  S/AC.44/2007/29 at  https://documents-dds-
ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N11/631/35/PDF/N1163135.pdf?OpenElement 
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While not yet in conformity with Resolution 1540 norms, the Saudi government has been 
particularly active in lending its support to the work of the 1540 Committee.  This has included 
sponsoring several workshops and expert gatherings to promote compliance with the resolution’s 
norms.103 
The Saudi government has informed the 1540 Committee that it has assigned responsibility to 
the Ministry of the Interior, liaising with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, to regulate and license 
material, equipment and technology covered by the various counter-proliferation conventions.  
However, there are no concrete provisions yet in place describing the actual items to be 
controlled.104  
Concerns also remain with Saudi Arabia’s lax financial transaction controls.  This is particularly 
problematic given well-established sympathies many Saudi nationals hold for various radical 
Sunni groups.105   According to the June 2015 State Department Country Reports on Terrorism: 
“Bulk cash smuggling and money transfers from individual donors and Saudi-based charities 
have reportedly been a significant source of financing for extremist and terrorist groups over the 
past 25 years.  Despite serious and effective efforts to counter the funding of terrorism 
originating within the  Kingdom, a small number of individuals and entities in Saudi Arabia 
continue to serve as sources of financial support for Sunni-based extremist groups.”106  
Jordan 
Jordan is often cited as a model for countries moving to implement the provisions of UN 
Security Council Resolution 1540.   In its October 22, 2014 submission to the 1540 Committee 
the Jordanian government indicated that it had become a party to “numerous relevant 
international and regional instruments,” “worked to implement all of (resolution 1540’s) 
provisions,” and that “a range of pertinent laws have been enacted, and effective procedures have 
been introduced at the national level in order to prevent the proliferation of nuclear, chemical and 
biological weapons and their means of delivery.”107   
Jordan is not known to have engaged in any nuclear, chemical or biological weapons 
development program, and is not known to possess any of the precursors for such programs.108  
                                                
103 The Saudi government has also contributed $.5 million to support the Committee’s work. See  NTI, “Middle East 
and North Africa 1540 Reporting Regional Overview,” at  http://www.nti.org/analysis/reports/mid.dle-east-and-
north-africa-1540-reporting/  
104 See Saudi Export Regulations at http://www.us-sabc.org/i4a/pages/index.cfm?pageid.=3318%20 which declares 
“The Saudi Arabian Government places great importance on the promotion of national exports, so very few export 
controls have been imposed.” 
105 In May 2014, the Saudi Interior Ministry estimated that at least 1,200 Saudis had travelled to fight in Syria, and 
some independent estimates suggest the figure may be more than 2,500 Saudis. See Richard Barrett, Foreign 
Fighters in Syria, The Soufan Group, June 2014 at  http://soufangroup.com/foreign-fighters-in-syria/ 
106 See 2015 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report (INCSR) at 
http://www.state.gov/j/inl/rls/nrcrpt/2015/supplemental/239294.htm 
107 See National Report of Jordan to the 1540 Committee dated October 22, 2014 at 
http://www.un.org/en/sc/1540/pdf/JordanReport22Oct2014.pdf  
108 See NTI Country Profile: Jordan, July 2015 at http://www.nti.org/learn/countries/jordan/ 
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However, Jordan has expressed aspirations to develop peaceful nuclear and uranium enrichment 
programs.  It also has a nascent bio-chemical industry.109  
In January 2007, King Abdullah II announced Jordan's intention to develop a civilian nuclear 
power program, and in 2009 an agreement was reached with South Korea to build a 5MW 
research and training reactor at the Jordan University of Science and Technology. The reactor is 
expected to be operational in June 2016.  A full power reactor is also contemplated by 2030.   
Jordan has also concluded nuclear cooperation agreements with Argentina, Canada, China, 
France, Italy, Japan, Romania, Russia, Spain, South Korea, Turkey, and the United Kingdom.  
However, negotiations on a possible 123 agreement with the United States for nuclear 
cooperation were put on hold due to “regional instability.”110 A possible stumbling block is the 
fact that Jordan wishes to keep open the option of one day engaging in uranium mining and 
enrichment to supply regional nuclear energy development.111   Jordan is believed to have 
approximately 2% of the world’s uranium-ore deposits and has already signed an exploration 
agreement with the French company, AREVA, to determine if these deposits are “mineable.” 112 
Despite the strides that Jordan has made in tightening its export control laws and administration, 
some shortcomings remain.  For example, Jordan’s strategic trade control system still does not 
explicitly regulate transshipment, brokering, and financing of proliferation-sensitive materials 
and activities. In addition, while Jordanian law prescribes criminal penalties for the transport of 
WMD-related materials "in the execution of terrorist acts," the penal code does not impose such 
penalties for more general offenses involving the diversion of dual-use items.113  
Jordan’s 235-mile porous border with Syria also poses serious concerns of the potential diversion 
of sensitive nuclear and chemical-related items and that such items could fall into the hands of 
the Syrian government or of terrorist organizations operating in Syria. The U.S. has invested 
heavily in supporting Jordan’s border control and counter-terrorism efforts. In April 2013, the 
U.S. Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) awarded Raytheon a border security contract 
worth $35.9 million to establish a surveillance system and provide training along the Jordanian 
border.  Additionally, Jordan has asked the U.S. to supply surveillance aircraft and training for 
Jordanian Special Operations forces to defend against chemical weapons.114 
The United States should re-engage Jordan on concluding a 123 Agreement as a pre-
condition to realizing its nuclear ambitions.  This agreement should include provisions 
postponing possible uranium enrichment in Jordan until such time as such activity is 
commercially viable and subject to strict limitations and oversights.   
   
                                                
109 id. 
110 See Kerr, Paul, Nuclear Energy Cooperation with Foreign Countries: Issues for Congress, CRS Report, 
December 2014, p3 at https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/nuke/R41910.pdf   
111  See  Schenker, David., “The Middle East’s Next Nuclear Power?,” Politico Magazine, January 28, 2015, at 
http://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2015/01/jordan-nuclear-power-114712 
112 See “Areva granted uranium mining rights in Jordan,” World Nuclear News,  February 22, 2010 at 
http://www.world-nuclear-news.org/ENF-Areva_granted_uranium_mining_rights_in_Jordan-2202104.html 
113 See NTI Country Profile Jordan at http://www.nti.org/learn/countries/jordan/ 
114 id. 
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Iraq 
Iraq carries a harsh WMD legacy dating back to its use of chemical weapons in the Iraq-Iran war 
and its clandestine nuclear weapons program.  Its nuclear weapons program and most of its 
chemical weapons were destroyed or degraded during the first Gulf War.  Post-Saddam 
governments have worked assiduously with the United States and others to eliminate chemical 
weapons and put in place measures to keep these items out of the hands of ISIL and other 
terrorist organizations.  Nevertheless, ISIL is believed to have captured and used a portion of the 
pre-war chemical weapons.115 This remains a serious challenge for the current Iraqi government.  
Iraq has made a number of recent efforts to improve its lax controls over illicit trade and 
financial transactions that may be supporting WMD-related proliferation and diversions.  Iraq is 
now a party to most of the international counter-proliferation conventions including the NPT, 
CWC and BWC.  It is also a party to the International Convention on the Suppression of Acts of 
Nuclear Terrorism (NTC) and the Convention for the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material 
(CPPNM).  Iraq has also signed an “Additional Protocol” with the IAEA.116  But, while the 
current government has adopted a broad range of new strategic and WMD-related control 
measures it continues to rely heavily on international assistance to implement these measures.  
Despite these efforts there is still considerable leakage into areas controlled by ISIL and across 
the border into Iran.117  
Iraq admits that it lacks the capability on its own to control the movement of sensitive 
contraband or to comply fully with Security Council Resolution 1540.   It continues to seek 
international assistance in almost all aspects of its licensing and customs border control 
activities,118 and it has asked for help in updating and maintaining its national control list for 
dual-use items.  Both the United States and European Union have responded to some of these 
requests,119 but much still remains to be done.  
Another area of structural weakness is Iraq’s loose control over domestic banking and financial 
institutions.  Iraq was deemed a Jurisdiction of Primary Concern by the US Department of State 
2015 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report (INCSR).120 The November 2012 FATF 
mutual evaluation of Iraq also noted serious deficiencies in Iraq’s banking regulations and found 
it compliant or partially compliant with only six of FATF’s 40+9 recommendations.121  
                                                
115 Rudischhauser, Wolfgang, “Could ISIL Go Nuclear?,”  NATO Review Magazine, 2015 at 
http://www.nato.int/docu/Review/2015/ISIL/ISIL-Nuclear-Chemical-Threat-Iraq-Syria/EN/index.htm  
116 Iraq Ratifies Additional Protocol, IAEA Press Release, October 24, 2012 at 
https://www.iaea.org/newscenter/news/iraq-ratifies-additional-protocol   
117 Rudischhauser, Wolfgang, “Could ISIL Go Nuclear?,”  NATO Review Magazine, 2015 
118 This includes specific requests for border control equipment, container and cargo inspection equipment, 
radioactive materials detectors, and chemical testing and investigation equipment. 
119 See Iraq’s Submission to the 1540 Committee dated February 4, 2014 at 
http://www.un.org/en/sc/1540/pdf/Iraq%20Letter%20re%20effective%20practices%202014.pdf 
120 The 2015 INCSR report on Iraq can be seen at http://www.state.gov/j/inl/rls/nrcrpt/2015/vol2/239082.htm  
121 MENA/FATF Mutual Evaluation Report, Iraq, 28 November 2012 at 
http://www.menafatf.org/images/UploadFiles/Final_Iraq_MER_En_31_12.pdf 
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Iraq adopted a new anti-money laundering/terrorism financing law in 2015 and has pledged to 
work to address other deficiencies.  However, in a February 19, 2016 statement122FATF noted 
that several strategic deficiencies remained and called on Iraq to take further steps to: (1) 
adequately penalize money laundering and terrorist financing; (2) establish and implement an 
adequate legal framework and appropriate procedures for identifying and freezing terrorist 
assets; (3) ensure that all financial institutions are subject to adequate customer due diligence 
requirements; (4) ensure that all financial institutions are subject to adequate suspicious 
transaction reporting requirements; (5) ensure a fully operational and effectively functioning 
financial intelligence unit; and (6) establish and implement an adequate AML/CFT supervisory 
and oversight program for all financial sectors.  Iraq will also need serious help in making these 
improvements.   
The United States should continue to lend its own, and international support, to Iraq’s 
efforts to establish and administer effective domestic and export controls and financial 
regulations to protect against the diversion of WMD sensitive material, equipment and 
technology.  
Lebanon 
Lebanon’s strategic location, long-brewing internal conflicts, and weak legal authorities and 
institutions have drawn international attention to the risks that Lebanon poses as a key transit 
point for the diversion of weapons of mass destruction-related items to Hezbollah, ISIL and other 
terrorist organizations operating in the region.  Reports surfaced in 2009 that Hezbollah may 
have stockpiled chemical weapons coming from Syria in southern Lebanon.123  While these 
reports remain unconfirmed, they serve to highlight the risks involved, and the Lebanese 
government’s lack of control over large parts of the country.       
Lebanon became a party to the Chemical Weapons Convention in November 2008.124 As a State 
Party, Lebanon can obtain assistance from the CWC’s Organization for the Prevention of 
Chemical Weapons (OPCW) in the drafting and implementation of laws banning chemical 
weapons on its territory.  In addition, the OPCW provides support in the practical 
implementation of the Convention’s stipulations, in particular, establishing an effective national 
authority to facilitate annual declarations and OPCW inspections, as well as to monitor chemical 
transfers and to maintain relevant chemical transfer restrictions.  States Parties also receive 
training and may draw upon the OPCW’s expertise to enhance their national civil protection in 
the event of a chemical weapons attack or the threat of such an attack.125  
Lebanon has also become a party to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Biological Weapons 
Conventions. 
                                                
122 See FATF, Improving Global AML/CFT Compliance: on-going process – 19 February 2016 at http://www.fatf-
gafi.org/publications/high-riskandnon-cooperativejurisdictions/documents/fatf-compliance-february-2016.html#iraq 
123 See Blanford, Nicholar, “Does Hezbollah Have Chemical Weapons?” The Daily Star, December 14, 2012 at 
http://www.lebanonwire.com/1212MLN/12121407DS.asp 
124 See Lebanon Joins the Chemical Weapons Convention, OPCW Press Release, 28 November 2008 at 
https://www.opcw.org/news/article/lebanon-joins-the-chemical-weapons-convention/  
125 See OPCW homepage at https://www.opcw.org/ 
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In September 2015, the U.S. Congress approved a $150 million border security assistance 
program for the Lebanese army to counter Hezbollah and off-set an increased ISIL threat.126  The 
United States and the European Union have also provided radiation detection equipment for 
installation at the port of Beirut and along Lebanon’s border with Syria.  A joint force has also 
been established with German and Italian support to monitor and control the northern borders of 
Lebanon to combat illicit trafficking in nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons.127    
In its reports to the 1540 Committee, the government of Lebanon indicated strong support for the 
measures contained in the 1540 resolution.  It indicated that its territory was WMD-weapons-free 
and stated also that “the requisite legislation is in place, together with strict regulations and 
deterrents, for the monitoring and control of all suspect operations and for the monitoring, arrest 
and prosecution of those who finance such operations.”128  Nevertheless, it appears that Lebanon 
continues to lack the capability and resources to actually carry out these measures effectively.129   
Concerns also remain that the government of Lebanon lacks firm control over the financial 
institutions operating on its territory and that Lebanese institutions remain  vulnerable to 
financing transactions involving the illicit acquisition of WMD related items and precursors.   
Lebanon continues to be designated as a Jurisdiction of Primary Concern by the US Department 
of State 2015 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report (INCSR).130 That report indicates 
that Lebanese financial institutions are being used to launder proceeds from foreign criminal 
activity and organized crime, and from Hezbollah, and to support illicit black market operations. 
Lebanese exchange houses are also used to facilitate money laundering and terrorism 
financing.131  
The United States should encourage international assistance and support to Lebanon 
directed at strengthening its export and border controls.  
The United States should continue to press Lebanon to strengthen its regulation and 
oversight over financial institutions and exchange houses, increase its investigation and 
prosecution of violations of financial regulation violations, and strengthen the penalties 
attached to such violations.   
                                                
126 Pecquet, Julian, “Lebanon Reaps Windfall From Congress, “ US News Online Magazine, October 1, 2015,   
http://www.usnews.com/news/articles/2015/10/01/lebanon-reaps-windfall-from-congress 
127 See Lebanon Submission to the 1540 Committee dated  11 September 2007 at 
http://www.un.org/en/sc/1540/national-implementation/pdf/LebanonReport11Dec2007.pdf 
128 See Lebanon Submission to the 1540 Committee dated 19 June 2006 at https://documents-dds-
ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N06/406/23/PDF/N0640623.pdf?OpenElement 
129 “The Lebanese government does not exercise complete control over all regions in the country or its borders with 
Syria and Israel. Hezbollah militias controlled access to parts of the country, limiting access by Lebanon’s security 
services, including the police and army, which allowed terrorists to operate in these areas with relative impunity…. 
The primary concern regarding weapons of mass destruction is that Lebanon’s porous borders will make the country 
vulnerable for use as a transit and transshipment hub for proliferation-sensitive transfers. The conflict in Syria 
increases the risk of illicit transfers of items of proliferation concern across the Lebanese border.” See State 
Department Country Reports on Terrorism, Chapter V Safe-Havens, 2013 at 
http://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/crt/2013/224828.htm 
130 The 2015 INCSR report on Lebanon  can be seen at http://www.state.gov/j/inl/rls/nrcrpt/2015/vol2/239090.htm 
131 id. 
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Yemen 
Yemen is a country in crisis.  Intense fighting between Houthi rebels and government forces has 
brought a halt to almost all regular government functions.  At the same time, Al Qaeda (AQAP) 
has taken control of large swaths of territory in the central provinces of Al Bayda and 
Hadhramaut.132  Under such circumstances, it is highly unlikely that any meaningful action can 
be taken internally to strengthen protections against the diversion of weapons of mass destruction 
and related material, equipment and technology. Rather, it has become imperative that external 
actions be strengthened to halt the flow of sensitive items to Yemen.  Yemen’s implementation 
of 1540-related controls is also in suspension.  
If, and when, stability is re-established in Yemen, special efforts will be necessary to strengthen 
the central government’s resolve and capacity to establish and implement the necessary strategic 
controls.  
Yemen is a party to several non-proliferation conventions including the Nuclear Nonproliferation 
Treaty (NPT), the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC), the Chemical Weapons 
Convention (CWC), the Convention for the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM), 
the Convention for the Suppression of Terrorism Financing (TFC), and the International 
Convention on the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism (NTC).133  Once stability is 
restored, Yemen should turn to the various institutions and secretariats to take advantage of the 
assistance they offer in support of nonproliferation laws, measures, equipment and resources.  
Yemen will also have to start from scratch with regard to its implementation of Resolution 1540.  
Its only national report to the 1540 Committee was submitted on December 29, 2004 and states: 
“The Permanent Mission of the Republic of Yemen to the United Nations presents its 
compliments to the Chairman of the Committee and, in reference to the Committee’s letter dated 
9 December 2004, has the honour to inform the Committee that the Republic of Yemen does not 
possess nuclear, biological or chemical weapons.”134 
CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS 
International obligations are a powerful tool for encouraging host country governments to 
upgrade their nonproliferation laws and policies.  However, many of the most vulnerable 
countries lack the wherewithal and/or political will to implement effectively or carry out the 
functions necessary to prevent their territory from serving as transit points for items of 
proliferation concern.  One must, therefore, go beyond the conventions, resolutions and 
obligations to assist and hold accountable, those states that promote, or have failed to prevent 
such activities.  
                                                
132 See Zimmerman, Katherine, “AQAP: A Resurgent Threat,” Counter-Terrorism Center, West Point, September 
11, 2015, at https://www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/aqap-a-resurgent-threat  
133 NTI Analysis: Yemen 1540 Reporting at http://www.nti.org/analysis/articles/yemen-1540-reporting/   
134 See Yemen Submission to 1540 Committee dated 29 December 2004 at https://documents-dds-
ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N05/215/98/PDF/N0521598.pdf?OpenElement  
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The countries cited above offer among the most serious challenges and opportunities for 
strengthening controls on such sensitive nuclear, chemical and biological weapons related items.   
These countries deserve special attention - not only because of their history and proximity to Iran 
which used them so effectively in the past to build its own covert nuclear weapons program, but 
also because of the risks posed for the future.  Their strategic location makes them an obvious 
turntable for transit trade for the region and the world, and their economies rely heavily on these 
trading activities.  They have touted lax controls and easy transit procedures as incentives for 
others to use their ports, terminals and free-trade areas for such commerce.  
We must now draw upon their self-interest as much as possible to mitigate these factors by 
drawing attention to the security risks posed by such conduct.   This includes the dangers posed 
of ISIL acquiring access to nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction and more broadly of 
the spread of WMD so close to home.  We must also convince these countries that such lax 
controls will stand in the way of their own acquisition of key items and technology to modernize 
their own energy and industrial base.   
As demonstrated above, many of the applicable international conventions and U.N. Security 
Council resolutions provide tools that can be used by these countries to obtain assistance for 
strengthening their control programs.   But, the burden of actually implementing these tools will 
continue to reside also with the countries that are the original providers of sensitive items and 
who remain most concerned as to where such items remain and how they are used.  This means 
that the burden of strengthening compliance with international non-proliferation control norms 
must be shared.  The supplier countries must be willing to work with the MENA region countries 
to provide the knowledge, resources, and incentives to protect sensitive commodities.  They must 
also be willing to hold these transit countries accountable for their failures by cutting them off 
from such trade.  
The UN Security Council has proved weak in overseeing the implementation of the various 
international conventions and its own 1540 non-proliferation resolution.  It has rarely lived up to 
its potential to act as the ultimate authority to identify and attach consequences to serious acts of 
non compliance with international counter-proliferation norms.   This has led the United States 
and other like-minded governments to develop alternative bilateral and multi-lateral 
arrangements to deal with proliferation related non-compliance, and with the illicit trade in 
proliferation-related controlled items.  But, these measures must also be strengthened and 
countries of high proliferation risks should be made aware that such activities will incur serious 
consequences. The recommendations included in this paper are aimed at both assisting these 
countries and providing increased oversight and transparency to their proliferation control 
activities.     
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Abstract 
International law restrictions have posed, or could pose, significant hurdles to initiatives by the 
international community to dispose of newly discovered clandestine weapons of mass 
destruction (WMD) stocks and programs.  Treaties and WMD control regimes have established 
global norms against various aspects of WMD proliferation.  However, the legal and politically 
binding requirements and obligations of these agreements may pose constraints and restraints on 
effectively pursuing nonproliferation objectives in situations that weren’t contemplated when 
drafted.  Specifically, transfers of WMD to third parties for elimination or secure storage are 
prohibited by the three major treaties banning WMD proliferation (the Nuclear Nonproliferation 
Treaty, the Chemical Weapons Convention, and the Biological Weapons Convention).  In cases 
of failed and failing states which no longer are able to effectively protect or control WMD stocks 
or storage sites, operations to achieve retrieval and disposition, with or without the agreement of 
the possessor state, are fully consistent with the objectives and spirit of the international legal 
norms against proliferation.  There are a range of options available to render such operations 
consistent with the letter of international law, and vice versa.  These include first and foremost 
actions under a UN Security Council resolution directing the transfer of WMD for these purposes 
where, per Article 103 of the UN Charter, the obligations of the parties in complying with a UN 
Chapter VII Security Council resolution prevails over their obligations under any other 
international agreement.   
In the absence of UN actions, states could also undertake disposition actions supported or 
authorized by the treaty implementing organization; determine that a temporary suspension of 
legal obligations has occurred due to material breach, impossibility, force majeure or a 
fundamental change of circumstances, and, in imminent circumstances where WMD may fall 
into the hands of terrorist groups, deploy the use of force to eliminate the WMD.  The cases 
examined here (primarily the disposition of Syria’s chemical weapon stocks and program) 
illustrate the importance of modifying existing and future nonproliferation agreements to allow 
for any disposition or elimination actions fully consistent with our non-proliferation objectives 
and the spirit of international legal norms against proliferation.    
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I. Conflicting Legal Obligations Hindering Non-Proliferation Disposition 
Recent events have posed a surprising challenge to treaties banning the proliferation of weapons 
of mass destruction (WMD). Disposition or retrieval initiatives and operations seek to secure or 
destroy vulnerable WMD stocks when a possessor state for whatever reason cannot.  In doing so, 
however, such actions may run afoul of specific prohibitions contained within those 
conventions—including bans on transfers for destruction. As will be discussed, the prohibitions 
apply even in cases where such operations are undertaken to keep them out of the hands of 
extremist groups, terrorists or pose hazards to the general population. In such cases the possessor 
state is either unable or unwilling to undertake destroying WMD stocks and either acquiesces or 
agrees to one or more third parties undertaking the task of securing and disposing of such 
weapons.  
Due to the turmoil in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA), several nations in the region, 
some with admitted or undisclosed WMD programs, have collapsed to the point where they can 
best be characterized as “failed” or “failing” states; i.e., they are unable to provide government 
services, particularly law enforcement.  These situations raise the risk that WMD programs may 
be overrun by militant extremist groups, particularly those affiliated with al-Qaida or the so-
called Islamic State, who have made it quite clear their willingness to use these weapons if they 
should acquire them.  Indeed, while this paper was being prepared, the Islamic State (ISIS) 
launched two chemical attacks in Iraq killing or wounding over 600 people and causing hundreds 
more to flee.1   
All three of the norm-establishing non-proliferation treaties prohibit proliferation by, among 
other proscriptions, banning the transfer of WMD to any recipient.  The Nuclear Non-
Proliferation Treaty (NPT)2 bans any transfers “whatsoever” and all non-nuclear weapon states 
are prohibited from receiving any nuclear weapons from any source.   The Biological and Toxin 
Weapons Convention (BWC)3 and the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC)4 use similar 
language – “never in any circumstances” – in connection with banning the production, 
acquisition or transfer of weapons and materials with the intent to make such weapons.5  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Associated Press, “1 dead, 600 hurt in IS attack,” March 13, 2016, available at: 
http://www.journalgazette.net/news/world/1-dead--600-hurt-in-IS-attack-11998943. 
2 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, July 1, 1968, 21 U.S.T. 483, 729 U.N.T.S. 161. 
3 Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological and Toxin 
Weapons and on their Destruction, Apr. 10, 1972, 26 U.S.T. 583; 1015 U.N.T.S. 163.  
4 The Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling, and Use of Chemical Weapons 
and on Their Destruction (Chemical Weapons Convention or CWC), 32 I.L.M 800 (1993); 1974 U.N.T.S 45; 
available at:  http://www.state.gov/t/np/trty/16286.htm.  The CWC was adopted by the UN Conference on 
Disarmament in Geneva on September 3, 1992, opened for signature in Paris on January 13, 1993, and entered into 
force on April 29, 1997. 
5 See Art. 1 of the BWC and CWC where the prohibition language is almost identical and both use the “never in any 
circumstances” language. 
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These treaties and control regimes have established global norms against the proliferation of 
WMD precursors, weapons, their means of delivery, dual-use goods, and weapons 
manufacturing equipment. In support of these norms, the US and its like-minded partners and 
allies have developed and participate in a variety of legally nonbinding collaborative working 
groups and activities to reduce, secure, or eliminate the threat of WMD. The legal requirements 
and obligations of these treaties, however, sometimes pose constraints and restraints on our 
ability to effectively pursue our nonproliferation objectives in situations that weren’t 
contemplated by the drafters of these treaties.  
 
Most prominently and recently, the Chemical Weapons Convention prohibitions posed a 
challenge to the agreement, further discussed below, which provided a pathway for Syria to give 
up its chemical arsenal and join the Chemical Weapons Convention.  The agreement raised a 
number of issues with regard to failure to adhere to the CWC’s prohibitions on transfer and the 
specific procedures or process for elimination of Syria’s—or anyone else’s-- chemical warfare 
capability.   
 
This paper will examine the impact of potential “violations” of these WMD treaties with a focus 
on the CWC and the Syrian CW elimination program, briefly examine the relatively new 
phenomena of the international community engaging in disposition and/or retrieval operations of 
WMD, and the range of alternatives available to nations in these extraordinary circumstances 
where the legal obligations under a nonproliferation treaty need to be overcome in order to 
effectively achieve its primary object and purpose of eliminating a WMD proliferation or use 
threat.6  As will be seen, these potential legal hurdles have, thus far, been overcome more easily 
than might have been expected. 
II. The WMD Proliferation Challenge:  Loose Nukes and the Terrorist Threat 
After the end of the Cold War many states of the Former Soviet Union inherited significant 
quantities of WMD and/or their related materials.  Largely through what became known as the 
Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction Initiative,7 vast amounts of chemical weapons and 
their precursors, nuclear weapons and radiological materials, and other legacies from the Cold 
War were collected, inventoried, dismantled and eventually safely secured or destroyed.   
In many of these cases, the United States and its allies contributed money, material and experts 
to properly secure these weapons and materials.  To the extent practicable, dismantlement and 
destruction was carried out in situ.  Nuclear materials discovered and collected in these countries 
were shipped in most cases to Russia for dismantlement and storage.  More and more, however, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 As with all arms control or nonproliferation treaties, the CWC allows its parties to withdraw and escape its 
obligations by withdrawing from this Convention if it decides that extraordinary events, related to the subject-matter 
of this Convention, have jeopardized its supreme interests.  See CWC, Art. 16.3. 
7 Kennette Benedict, “Nunn-Lugar: 20 years of Cooperative Threat Reduction,” Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, 
Dec.19, 2011; available at: http://thebulletin.org/nunn-lugar-20-years-cooperative-threat-reduction.  
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in cases where states of the former Soviet Union (FSU) possessing these weapons were unable 
for a variety of reasons to properly store, secure or dispose of the materials -- resulting in a grave 
danger that such weapons might fall into the hands of terrorist groups -- the U.S. and its allies 
engaged with those states in a range of disposition and retrieval activities that were 
unprecedented and certainly not contemplated by the norm-establishing non-proliferation 
treaties.  On occasion, these retrieval and/or destruction operations failed to follow or acted 
contrary to the specific prohibitions or procedures contained in these nonproliferation treaties 
raising questions about the legality of such operations. 
Nuclear weapons and radiological materials have been the most concerning and have provided 
the most examples of retrieval and disposition operations.  The Obama Administration created a 
series of nuclear security summits where world leaders discussed and committed to measures to 
prevent the trade and spread of illicit nuclear materials.8 But the unexpected dissolution of the 
FSU, leaving thousands of nuclear weapons in the hands of successor states, was not 
contemplated when the transfer ban was agreed. Nevertheless, the U.S. and its allies and partners 
engaged in these nuclear retrieval operations arguing they are fully consistent with our non-
proliferation objectives and the spirit of the international legal norms against proliferation. 
1. Lisbon Protocol, Operation Sapphire and Project Olympus 
 In May 1992, Kazakhstan signed the Lisbon Protocol9 to the START Treaty.10 The Lisbon 
Protocol obligated Kazakhstan, along with Belarus and Ukraine, to eliminate all nuclear arms on 
their territory and accede to the NPT as a non-nuclear weapon state (NNWS), which Kazakhstan 
did in 1994.11  Thousands of nuclear weapons had been abandoned to the successor governments 
of the former Soviet Union (FSU), arguably in violation of Article 1 (transfer prohibition) of the 
NPT.  The U.S. and Russia conducted the first-of-its-kind retrieval operations moving these 
weapons from Ukraine, Kazakhstan and Belarus to Russia, thus reducing the number of “nuclear 
weapon states.”  Article I of the NPT provides that “Each nuclear-weapon State Party to the 
Treaty undertakes not to transfer to any recipient nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive 
devices or control over such weapons or explosive devices directly, or indirectly.”  While 
arguably not in compliance with the NPT’s transfer prohibition, the agreement to transfer all 
nuclear weapons out of these countries was fully consistent with the NPT’s non-proliferation 
goals and resulted in converting ostensible “nuclear weapon states” into non-nuclear weapon 
members of the NPT.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 The last such Nuclear Security Summit was held in late March, 2016.  See Nuclear Security Summit website at: 
http://www.nss2016.org. 
9 See Arms Control Association Website, “The Lisbon Protocol at a Glance,” available at: 
http://www.armscontrol.org/node/3289. 
10 Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on Strategic Offensive 
Reduction Treaty (1991), entered into force 1994, expired in 2009; Available at: 
http://www.acq.osd.mil/tc/treaties/start1/index.htm.  
11 The list of states parties can be found at 
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_parties_to_the_Treaty_on_the_Non-Proliferation_of_Nuclear_Weapons. 
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The Lisbon Protocol was followed by an agreement that allowed for the implementation of the 
Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) program for the elimination of nuclear 
weapons systems and dismantlement of nuclear weapons infrastructure, as well as other WMD 
programs, in Kazakhstan and other states of the FSU.   
Subsequently, U.S. officials learned that 600 kilograms of highly enriched uranium (HEU) was 
left essentially unguarded in a city in northern Kazakhstan.  The HEU—along with plutonium 
the essential ingredient for making nuclear weapons—could have been sufficient to fabricate 
dozens of nuclear weapons.12   
The Government of Kazakhstan had neither the resources nor the expertise to properly secure 
these materials and they were not allowed to do so in any event under the NPT as a non-nuclear 
weapon state.13  Consequently, the U.S. negotiated an agreement that paid Kazakhstan for the 
removal of the HEU as well as related equipment. In an operation code-named Project Sapphire, 
the materials were packed and flown to the U.S.’s Y-12 Nuclear Security facility in Oak Ridge, 
Tennessee for storage and eventual processing down to low grade uranium.14 
In 1998, the U.S. carried out a similar retrieval operation in Tbilisi, Georgia code-named Project 
Olympus. The project consisted of removing fuel from an unsecured Georgian research reactor 
which had been shut down.  It still housed spent fuel assemblies made of HEU along with fresh 
fuel rods. The radioactive material was sent to the UK for reprocessing.  The UK violated its 
own regulations prohibiting accepting nuclear weapon materials but decided to “make an 
exception” for a worthy non-proliferation purpose.  In both cases no objections to these 
disposition activities were registered either by the IAEA or other NPT states parties.15 
Based on the growing realization that there were thousands of unsecured radioactive sources, and 
as a result of the lessons learned from Projects Sapphire and Olympus, the Department of 
Energy’s National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), in collaboration with the 
Department of Defense and other U.S. agencies, established in 2004 the Global Threat Reduction 
Initiative (GTRI).16  GTRI’s mission is to prevent the acquisition of nuclear and radiological 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 Dena Sholk, “Project Sapphire:  20 years Later, and Still Relevant, November 17, 2014; available at 
http://thediplomat.com/2014/11/project-sapphire-20-years-later-and-still-relevant. 
13 As a newly minted member of the NPT Kazakhstan was prohibited under Art. 1 of the NPT from transferring 
nuclear weapons.  Arguably, NPT watchdog, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) should have been 
charged with dismantling and safeguarding/destroying these weapons and nuclear material. 
14 “From Project Sapphire to Today” Y-12 Report, Vol. 9, Issue 2, February 7, 2013; available at: 
http://www.y12.doe.gov/news/report/project-sapphire-today. 
15 T.A. Shelton, J.M. Viebrock, et.al. “Multilateral Nonproliferation Cooperation:  US-Led effort to 
Remove HEU/LEU Fresh and Spent Fuel From the Republic of Georgia to Dounreay, Scotland 
(Auburn Endeavor/Project Olympus,” J. Nuclear Materials Management, Vol. 27:4 (2004); available 
at: http://www.osti.gov/scitech/biblio/6457073. See also The Nuclear Threat Institute’s website on 
Georgia and Project Olympus; available at: http://www.nti.org/learn/countries/georgia/.  
16 Department of Energy NNSA, Global Threat Reduction Initiative Review (2015); available at: 
http://energy.gov/sites/prod/files/em/GlobalThreatReductionInitiative.pdf.  
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materials for use in weapons of mass destruction and other acts of terrorism, and reduce and 
protect vulnerable nuclear and radiological material located at civilian sites worldwide.  Under 
GTRI the NNSA has conducted removal operations in 21 additional countries, including Iraq, 
gaining valuable experience in conducting such operations in oftentimes less than benign 
environments.17  
2. The Iraqi Nuclear Weapons Program 
Most if not all of these retrieval operations were conducted under tight security and secrecy.  The 
U.S., for example, in 2008 secretly removed over 550 metric tons of uranium “yellow cake” 
from Iraq after Iraqi authorities admitted they could not safely secure the material and feared that 
terrorists or criminal groups would find and steal the material.  Yellow cake is of proliferation 
concern because it can be enriched for use both in nuclear reactors and, at higher levels, nuclear 
weapons. The Iraqi material was then shipped to Canada, via British territory, where a private 
firm processed it into fuel for primarily U.S. reactors.18  This was done with the full cooperation 
of the possessing, transfer and disposition nations, and fully consistent—therefore no sound of 
protest—with the object and purpose of the NPT to ensure that terrorists do not acquire these 
materials for use in a radiological weapon, and to stop the potential nuclear weapons 
proliferation.  Although there is no legal impediment in this case, it exemplifies the capabilities 
and willingness of the U.S., her allies and partners to undertake WMD retrieval and disposition 
operations in cases where the possessor state is unwilling or cannot properly secure such 
materials. 
III. The Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) Proliferation Legal Challenges 
The CWC commits States Parties to destroy all stockpiles of chemical weapons by 200719 with a 
five-year extension granted under compelling circumstances.20  Article 1 of the Convention 
requires each State Party to “never under any circumstances” develop, produce, otherwise acquire, 
stockpile, retain, transfer, or, of course, use chemical weapons. Created upon entry into force of 
the CWC in 1997, the raison d’etre of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons 
is the implementation and enforcement21 of the obligations and procedures under the Chemical 
Weapons Convention to monitor and ensure that all countries that join the Convention eliminate 
their chemical weapons stocks and related facilities as required under the Convention.22   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 Id. 
18 Associated Press, “Secret U.S. mission hauls uranium from Iraq,” July 5, 2008; available at: 
http://www.nbcnews.com/id/25546334/ns/world_news-mideast_n_africa/t/secret-us-mission-hauls-uranium-
iraq/#.VuYBzPkrLIU.  
19 CWC, supra note 4, Art. IV.6. 
20 Id., Verification Annex, Part IV(c) (26). 
21 The OPCW is independent of the UN, but, although it has powers to enforce compliance, it is authorized to bring 
grave violations of the treaty to the attention of the UN Security Council and the General Assembly. 
22 OPCW, Our Work: Demilitarization (Oct. 4, 2012), available at http://www.opcw.org/our-work/demilitarisation; 
see also OPCW, Conference of the States Parties, Report of the 2nd Special Session of the Conference of the States 
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OPCW inspectors verify treaty compliance at facilities identified by nations. Except in rare 
instances, they are not investigators. They don’t ferret out secret chemical weapons sites, or even 
actually destroy chemical weapons. They monitor and certify the CW program elimination 
process under the CWC’s Verification Annex, Part IV(A), and investigate alleged violations of 
the CWC under a robust “go anywhere, any place” challenge inspection regime,23 although no 
OPCW Member State has to date requested a challenge inspection.24 
 
As of the end of 2015, the CWC had 192 States Parties, including all of the states of the FSU and 
the former Yugoslavia. Only Egypt, North Korea, and South Sudan have not signed or ratified 
the Convention.25  Syria, as part of the agreement for disposing of its chemical warfare arsenal, 
became a party to the CWC in October 2013.  
 
Also of relevance in the Syrian case, the OPCW, although it is not a United Nations (UN) 
organization, has a working relationship with the UN and is authorized to bring grave violations 
of the Convention to the attention of the Security Council and/or the General Assembly. For 
instance, if requested to do so by the UN Secretary-General, the OPCW has a mandate in 
accordance with paragraph 27 of Part XI of the Verification Annex of the Convention to closely 
cooperate with the UN, by placing its resources at the disposal of the Secretary General in order 
to conduct an investigation of alleged use of chemical weapons in a State Not Party to the CWC 
or “in territory not controlled by a State Party.”   
 
1.  Iraqi Chemical Weapons Disposal – Force Majeure? 
	  
In order to ensure abandoned chemical weapons did not fall into the wrong hands, disposition 
activities (destruction) were carried out in Iraq.  This was done without following the 
disposal/destruction guidance in the CWC.  In 2014 the OPCW reported that the U.S. destroyed 
thousands of chemical weapons by open air burning and the use of high explosives.  The U.S. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Parties to Review the Operation of the CWC, ¶9.4 (2008); available at: http://www.opcw.org/ 
index.php?eIDdam_frontend_push&docID1837.   (Review Conference reaffirms that “complete de- struction of 
chemical weapons . . . is essential for the realisation of the object and purpose of the Convention”). 
23 See CWC, supra note 4.  While it is not as expansive as the mandate of the U.N. inspectors who oversaw the 
destruction of Iraq’s weapons after the first Gulf War, it is more intrusive and comprehensive than any other 
multilateral inspection regime. 
24 See OPCW Website on Challenge Inspections at https://www.opcw.org/special-sections/challenge-inspection-
exercise/. 
25 Israel has signed but not ratified.  A comprehensive listing of states parties to the CWC can be found at:  
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_parties_to_the_Chemical_Weapons_Convention. 
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asserted that it had “acted in the spirit of the Convention.”26   However, U.S. practices on Iraqi 
CW destruction were widely criticized.  For example, Jeffrey Lewis, a nonproliferation analyst at 
the Monterey Institute of International Studies, criticized American destruction operations as 
unsafe for American troops and Iraqis alike. “The thing I take away from this is, ‘God, they blew 
all of this up in open pits? ‘There is a reason that is arguably incompatible with our treaty 
obligations. There is no universe where this is a safe and ecologically appropriate way to dispose 
of chemical weapons.”27  
 
Indeed, the procedures used by the U.S. in destroying Iraq’s chemical weapon stockpiles 
arguably violated CWC Art III, paragraph 1 (a)(v) by not submitting a detailed plan for the 
destruction of Iraqi CW in its possession and taking into account safety and environmental 
concerns. Part IV (C) (13) of the CWC Verification Annex prohibits open air burning which 
arguably is what occurred when the chemicals were blown up in situ.  
 
The U.S. argued that the exigencies of war required that the weapons be destroyed hastily and in 
the open.  The U.S. was actively engaged in combat operations or potentially under attack by 
terrorist groups that made it impossible to notify the OPCW and protect OPCW inspectors who 
would, as required by the CWC, have to physically inspect and document the destruction.  
Likewise, there was no practical way to physically secure the chemical weapons once U.S. forces 
left the area.  In this situation the U.S. could plausibly justify its failure to conform to CWC 
obligations by asserting force majeure; specifically, an occurrence of an “unforeseen event, 
beyond the control of the State, making it materially impossible in the circumstances to perform 
the obligation” of compliance with CWC during this destruction operation.28 
 
The principle of force majeure is well recognized in international law and by international 
courts.  “Force Majeure” is defined by the UN International Law Commission as follows:  
 
“1. The wrongfulness of an act of a State not in conformity with an international obligation 
of that State is precluded if the act is due to force majeure, that is the occurrence of an 
irresistible force or of an unforeseen event, beyond the control of the State, making it 
materially impossible in the circumstances to perform the obligation.  
 
2. Paragraph 1 does not apply if:  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26 C.J. Chivers, “Thousands of Iraq Chemical Weapons Destroyed in Open Air, Watchdog Says,” NY Times, Nov. 
22, 2014 available at: http://www.nytimes.com/2014/11/23/world/middleeast/thousands-of-iraq-chemical-weapons-
destroyed-in-open-air-watchdog-says-.html; OPCW Technical Secretariat Report on Chemical Weapons Recovery 
in Iraq (details the recovery and destruction of 4,530 aging chemical weapons by American forces in Iraq from May 
2004 through February 2009) dated 14 November 2014 available at: 
http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2014/11/24/world/middleeast/iraq-chemical-opcw.html. 
27 Id. 
28 UN Yearbook of the International Law Commission 2001, “Articles on Responsibility of States for Wrongful 
Acts,” GAOR A/56/10, Art. 23; available at:  
http://legal.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/draft_articles/9_6_2001.pdf 
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(a) the situation of force majeure is due, either alone or in combination with other factors, to 
the conduct of the State invoking it; or  
 
(b) the State has assumed the risk of that situation occurring.”29 
 
The "defense" or "exception" of force majeure is recognized as a legally valid "justification" for 
not fully complying with one’s contractual or international legal obligations.  For example, the 
Permanent Court of Arbitration, in a 1912 judgment against a claim of force majeure by Turkey 
recognized that "the exception of force majeure ... may be raised in public international law" and 
the defense or exception of force majeure is frequently referred to as a "general principle of 
law".30  Numerous subsequent cases have reaffirmed the principle in both municipal and 
international law.31  
 
2. The United States and Russia Failure to Meet Chemical Weapon Destruction 
Deadline—Force Majeure? 
The United States and Russia promised, but failed, to destroy their chemical weapons stocks by 
2012, the deadline established in and agreed to in the CWC.  The earliest projected date for 
destruction and elimination of U.S. chemical weapons is 2023, some 11 years after the final 
deadline for destruction allowed under the CWC.32 By missing its deadlines, the U.S. and Russia 
have breached a founding principle of the CWC; i.e., destroying all chemical weapons within 10 
years of entry into force with a five-year subsequent grace period. 33 The U.S. has not admitted 
that it is in breach of its legal obligations but clearly there is no way to color it than as a material 
breach of the CWC.  Obviously, when the leading world powers fail to comply with a 
demonstrable legal obligation the entire fabric of the legal and moral norm banishing these 
weapons is called into question.  
The U.S. continues to strive to come into compliance utilizing “best efforts” to finish destroying 
its CW stocks.  The U.S. could claim force majeure but those opposing such a justification 
would point out that major reasons for noncompliance were due to internal factors involving the 
conduct of the U.S. and therefore such a justification would be inapplicable.34  Specifically, the 
delays in destroying U.S. stocks were due primarily to legal and regulatory issues arguably 
within the control of the U.S. and consequently wouldn’t fit the definition for asserting a force 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29 Id. 
30 UN Yearbook of the International Law Commission 1978, "Force majeure" and "Fortuitous event" as 
circumstances precluding wrongfulness: Survey of State practice, international judicial decisions and doctrine,” 
GAOR A/CN.4/315, p. 68: available at: http://legal.un.org/ilc/documentation/english/a_cn4_315.pdf.  
31 Id. 
32 David A. Koplow, “Train Wreck: The U.S. Violation of the Chemical Weapons Convention,” J. National Security 
L & Policy, Vol. VI, No. 2 (2013) 
33 CWC, Art. IV, supra, note 4. 
34 Supra, note 27. 
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majeure defense.  So far, there’s been only a muted and non-punitive response to U.S. non-
compliance. No state party has proposed to restrict or suspend any of the United States’ rights 
and privileges under the Convention or otherwise refer the issue to the United Nations.35 
Notwithstanding U.S. “best efforts,” non-compliance with this important non-proliferation legal 
norm challenges U.S. credibility as the leading advocate of the rule of law and advancing 
international law. 
3. The Libya WMD Possession Case—Force Majeure? 
The Libyan case parallels the WMD material security challenge in Iraq, discussed supra, and 
Syria, discussed infra.  Ensuring against theft or unauthorized transfer of chemical weapons and 
related materials during the lengthy disarmament process has been challenging in the Libyan 
case due to the ongoing civil war resulting in an ineffective government with no control over 
large parts of the country including locations where chemical weapons or chemicals for such 
weapons may be located. 
 Libya acceded to the CWC on 5 February 200436 and began destroying its chemical munitions 
later that year, but missed the deadlines for converting one chemical weapons production facility 
to peaceful use and for destroying its stockpile of mustard agent.37  The OPCW supervised the 
destruction of Libya's chemical weapons caches through February 2011, when it was forced to 
suspend its operations due to the uprising against Gaddafi and the resulting deterioration of the 
country's stability. In October 2014, Libya asked for assistance to transport its 850 ton stockpile 
of precursor chemicals for making nerve gas out of Libya for destruction.38  However, the chaos 
in Libya prevented the OPCW from launching a retrieval and destruction mission.  Subsequently, 
in February 2015, Libyan military sources told media that unidentified armed men had captured 
large amounts of Libya’s chemical weapons, including mustard gas and sarin.39 
 
Given the chaotic nature of the Libyan situation, it is unlikely that the OPCW or any nation could 
under CWC procedures either secure or destroy these chemical weapons and agents in situ or 
conduct a removal operation.  Given the obvious danger of extremist groups acquiring these 
weapons the U.S. could, using force majeure as the justification, use military force to destroy 
known CW sites. One weapon uniquely suited to this type of mission is the “thermobaric” 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
35 CWC, Art. XII, supra, note 4, CWC, Article XII. 
36  The Chemical Weapons Convention Entered Into Force in Libya, Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical 
Weapons, 2 February 2004; available at:  https://www.opcw.org/news/article/the-chemical-weapons-convention-
enters-into-force-in-libya/.  
37 Zanders, Jean Pascal (May 19, 2011). "Uprising in Libya: The False Specter of Chemical Warfare". James Martin 
Center for Nonproliferation Studies (CNS); available at: http://wmdjunction.com/110519_destroying_libya_cw.htm. 
38 Strategy Page, “NBC Weapons: Libya Needs Help To Be Gas Free,” Oct. 14, 2014, available at: 
http://www.strategypage.com/htmw/htchem/articles/20141030.aspx.  
39 Abdul Sattar Hatita, “Libya militias capture chemical weapons: army official” Asharq Al-Awsat, 21 February 
2015; available at:  http://english.aawsat.com/2015/02/article55341700/libya-militias-capture-chemical-weapons-
army-official.  
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bomb40 which uses intense heat to destroy a target.  While obviously not the best of choices in 
cases where all other legal and practical steps are unavailable this option is available and legally 
justifiable under force majeure as a last resort.   
 
IV.  The Legal Conundrum of Disposing of Syria’s Chemical Weapons Program 
 
1.  The Syria Case 
The Syria Case presented (and continues to present) legal challenges to a retrieval and 
destruction program that in important aspects was contrary to the legal requirements and 
obligations under the CWC.41   
The Syrian chemical disarmament mission stems from several attacks, using chemical weapons, 
which culminated in an August 2013 attack on rebel-held suburbs of Damascus in which over 
1400 people were killed.42  The U.S. and Western allies accused Syria's government of being 
responsible.43 Subsequently, the Obama administration threatened to launch punitive missile 
strikes against Syria, prompting frantic diplomatic efforts by Russia and the U.S. to forestall a 
U.S. kinetic response to these chemical attacks. Those efforts resulted in a “Framework 
Agreement” on the elimination of Syrian chemical weapons reached by Russia and the United 
States on 14 September 2013, which Syria agreed to.  The conditions of the agreement included 
that Syria ratify the CWC which it did on 14 October 2013.44  
Syria’s acceptance of the Framework Agreement and becoming a state party to the CWC meant 
that it had to cooperate in the removal and destruction of its chemical weapons.    The full 
chemical disarming of Syria is highly desirable for a number of obvious reasons.  It would:  
completely terminate a major WMD program in the Middle East, i.e., Syria’s CW capacities; 
prevent Syria from transferring CW to other states or non-state actors (particularly Hezbollah); 
and prevent the capture of CW by ISIS. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
40 Jonathon Marcus, “Analysis: How thermobaric bombs (BLU-118B) work,” BBC News, March 2, 2002; available 
at: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/1854371.stm. 
41 The CWC, supra note 4. The CWC combines a ban on the acquisition and possession of chemical weapons (CW) 
with a stringent verification regime.  
42 See United Nations Report “Report on the Alleged Use of Chemical Weapons in the Ghouta area of Damascus on 
21 August 2013,” (S/2013/553, dated 16 September 2013); available at: 
Secretary_General_Report_of_CW_Investigation.pdf. 
43 Dana Hughes, Byron Wolf, Mary Bruce, “US Confirms Syrian Government Used Chemical Weapons,” ABC 
News, June 13, 2013; available at: http://abcnews.go.com/Politics/us-confirms-syria-chemical-
weapons/story?id=19395909. 
44 State Dept. Media Note, September 14, 2013, “Framework for Elimination of Syrian Chemical Weapons”; 
available at: http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2013/09/214247.htm.  
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However, since Syria had agreed to ratify the CWC it could have resisted OPCW – UN attempts to 
remove the chemical weapons to another country--as it did prior to the Framework Agreement,45  -
-and make it difficult for OPCW personnel to monitor the removal and destruction by claiming to 
do so would be a violation of the transfer prohibition in Article I of the CWC.  Syrian agreement to 
the removal of these weapons obviated the need to articulate a rationale that arguably would not 
run afoul of the “transfer” prohibition. 
One “work around” could have simply been to define the movement of chemical weapons for 
purposes of destruction as something other than the “transfer” prohibited by the treaty. Another 
option would be to arrange to have the weapons removed by either the OPCW or the UN.  The 
OPCW is responsible for promoting the object and purpose of the CWC, and as a representative 
body of its members carry out through its Executive Council acts as directed by the Conference of 
State Parties.46  The UN Security Council, acting under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, as further 
discussed below, could direct the removal of these weapons as a threat to international peace and 
security.  Ultimately, in the end the UN and the OPCW acting in concert agreed to have the 
removal and destruction mission conducted under the auspices of a Joint UN—OPCW mission.  
Thus, on 27 September 2013, the OPCW Executive Council adopted an implementation plan on 
the destruction of the Syrian chemical weapons program,47 which was endorsed by the Security 
Council’s unanimous adoption of UN Security Council Resolution 2118 (2013) on the same 
day.48 
The Executive Council decision set out an accelerated program for achieving the elimination of 
Syrian chemical weapons by mid-2014. It required inspections in Syria to commence from 1 
October 2013 and called for ambitious milestones for the complete destruction of Syria’s CW 
capabilities by 30 June 2014.49 Pursuant to UNSCR 2118, the OPCW-UN Joint Mission in Syria 
was formally established50 and tasked to oversee the timely elimination of the Syrian chemical 
weapons program in the safest and most secure manner possible even if it did not strictly comply 
with the procedures set forth in the CWC. There were, however, important differences between 
what the Security Council Resolution directed and what the CWC required, which set the stage 
for a potential conflict between what the OPCW is authorized to do and what the UN wants it to 
do. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
45 Amy E. Smithson, "A Phony Farewell to Arms: Why Assad Won't Have to Part with Poison Gas," Foreign 
Affairs, October 1, 2013, www.foreignaffairs.com. 
46 CWC Article VIII(B) (19), Article VIII(C) (30), supra note 4.  
47 OPCW Executive Council Decision EC-M-33/DEC.1, available 
at: https://www.opcw.org/fileadmin/OPCW/EC/M-33/ecm33dec01_e_.pdf.  
48 UN Security Council Resolution 2118, S/RES/2118, dtd 27 September 2013; available at: 
http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/2118%282013%29. 
49 OPCW-UN Joint Mission Mandate and Timelines; available at:  
http://opcw.unmissions.org/AboutOPCWUNJointMission/MandateandTimelines.aspx 
50 Id. 
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For example, the Security Council Resolution obliged Syria to “accept personnel designated by 
the OPCW or the United Nations.”51 This suggests that Syria has no discretion to reject any of the 
persons slated to conduct inspections on its territory. But under the CWC the OPCW must inform 
Syria in advance which inspectors it will send and permits Syria an opportunity to object.52 This is 
an important safeguard allowing nations to exclude people who they suspect may not be 
completely independent. Unsurprisingly, the OPCW adhered to its own rules in its own Syria 
resolution.53 It authorizes emergency meetings of the OPCW’s governing body if Syria refused to 
accept inspectors. The Syrians chose not to make this an issue and arguably absent Syrian 
objection no other state party would have “standing” to raise the issue.  There remained, 
however, the larger issue of the disparity between the requirements of the CWC and the UN 
Security Council Resolution on how and where Syria’s weapons will be eliminated. 
Partly in order to bridge the gaps between UNSC Resolution 2118 and the OPCW 
implementation plan, The UN and OPCW Executive Council agreed to create a joint mission to 
undertake the removal and destruction of the Syrian chemical weapons.  This Joint OPCW—UN 
mission supervised the destruction or removal of Syria's chemical arms. Its Director-General was 
charged with notifying the Executive Council regarding any delay in implementation and the 
Executive Council would decide whether any non-compliance with the implementation plan 
should be reported to the Security Council, which designated itself responsible for making 
certain Syria fulfills its commitments under Resolution 2118.54  
Nations acting under the joint UN-OPCW agreement were authorized to “acquire, control, 
transport, transfer and destroy chemical weapons … to ensure the elimination of the Syrian Arab 
Republic’s chemical weapons program.”55 The transfer was to the OPCW-UN Joint Mission and 
not to any particular state.  Those national experts and resources engaged in the destruction mission 
arguably were only receiving the chemical weapons on behalf of the UN and OPCW mandated 
Joint Mission.  Likewise, Syria was “transferring” its chemical weapons to the UN-OPCW and not 
another country since to do so would be clearly in direct violation of the “never under any 
circumstances” transfer prohibition of Article I.  Since the treaty similarly bans countries from 
“acquiring” chemical weapons, any nation that received the weapons would also, absent 
Resolution 2118, violate Article I of the Convention.  While not without controversy, as discussed 
infra, and absent objection by states parties to the CWC, an authorization by the Security Council 
for the UN and the OPCW to undertake retrieval and disposition operations on behalf of Syria was 
politically palatable and consistent with the object and purpose of the Convention especially after, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
51 UNSC R 2118, Operative Paragraph 7, supra note 48; available at: 
http://www.un.org/press/en/2013/sc11135.doc.htm. 
52 Supra note 4, CWC Verification Annex, Part II, A (2). 
53 OPCW Executive Council Decision, supra note 47. 
54 UNSC R 2118 supra note 48.  Also see Michael Gordon, “U.N. Deal on Syrian Arms Is Milestone After Years of 
Inertia,” NY Times, Sep. 26, 2013; available at: http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/27/world/middleeast/security-
council-agrees-on-resolution-to-rid-syria-of-chemical-arms.html?pagewanted=all&_r=1.  
55 UNSC R 2118, Operative Paragraph 10, supra note 48. 
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despite UNSC encouragement,  no nation was willing to accept the “transfer” of Syrian chemical 
weapons for disposal on their territory.56  
No doubt the framers of the Chemical Weapons Convention did not foresee trying to acquire, 
secure, transport and destroy chemical weapons in the middle of a war, a situation which could 
provide a legal justification for temporarily “suspending” the CWC’s transfer prohibition as 
discussed infra. A certain amount of flexibility is woven into the Convention.  For example, the 
OPCW can develop—and has developed—special measures for nations with chemical weapons 
that join late.57 But can such special measures violate a foundational article of the treaty? Unlike 
the Security Council Resolution,58 the OPCW’s decision makes no mention of the possibility of 
transferring weapons out of Syria suggesting that the parameters of the “transfer” prohibition have 
not been settled. Indeed to the extent that disposition activities under the OPCW decision are 
carried out the decision clearly states it “does not create any precedent for the future.”59 
The mismatch between the UN’s plan and that of the OPCW reflects the two organizations’ 
differing priorities. The Security Council is concerned with solving the immediate problem of 
Syria’s chemical weapons, while the OPCW is mindful of preserving practices and procedures that 
have served it well since its inception and under which it must continue to operate long after the 
Syrian case is resolved.  Indeed, that is no doubt why the Executive Council decision on Syria 
states that “due to the extraordinary character of the situation posed by Syrian chemical 
weapons” actions undertaken to eliminate these weapons “does not create any precedent for the 
future.”60 
The differences between the two resolutions also highlight the important legal principle that the 
UN Security Council can obligate a country to violate its treaty obligations. Under the UN charter, 
the Security Council has broad authority to act to restore international peace and security. It has the 
greatest clout when it is acting under Chapter VII of the Charter which allows it to impose 
sanctions and other legally binding obligations on member states and authorize the use of military 
force. Given that Syria is embroiled in a civil war, it’s not surprising that the Security Council 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
56 Albania, Norway, Belgium and undisclosed others rejected requests by the UN and pressure from the U.S.  See 
“Albania Rejects Request to Host Syrian Chemical-Arms Destruction” Nuclear Threat Initiative, November 13, 
2013; available at: http://www.nti.org/gsn/article/albania-rejects-request-destroy-syrias-chemical-arms/; “Norway 
sees hurdles to helping destroy Syrian chemical arms,” Reuters, October 23, 2013; available at: 
http://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-syria-crisis-norway-idUKBRE99M0L520131023. 
57See e.g. CWC, Art. V (10), supra note 4. 
58 See UNSC R 2118, Operative Paragraph 7, supra note 48. 
59 OPCW Executive Council Decision on Destruction of Syrian Chemical Weapons, Operative Paragraph 3(d), EC-
M-33/DEC.1 dtd Sept. 27, 2013; available at:  https://www.opcw.org/fileadmin/OPCW/EC/M-
33/ecm33dec01_e_.pdf.  
60 Id. 
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called for and authorized “member states to acquire, control, transport, transfer and destroy” 
Syria’s chemical weapons “in the soonest and safest manner.”61 
Lessons from the Iraq and Libyan cases suggest that while verifying the correctness of a state's 
declarations is feasible, it is only possible for inspectors to have a limited degree of certainty in 
assessing the completeness of state declarations particularly when circumstances on the ground 
may prevent full access to potential or suspect storage sites. Inevitably, there was some risk, as 
occurred in the Libyan case, that the regime could successfully retain a secret CW capability.  
Consequently, the U.S. and its allies continued to express concerns about the completeness of 
Syria's disclosures, and argued that the OPCW mission should remain in place following the 
removal of all declared chemical weapons until verification tasks can be completed.   
 
Various parties, including Western governments and humanitarian organizations, have 
subsequently accused the Syrian government of conducting illegal chlorine attacks in 2014 and 
2015.62 A late disclosure in 2014 regarding Syria's ricin program raised further doubts about the 
completeness of the government's declaration of its chemical weapons stockpile, and in early 
May 2015, OPCW announced that inspectors had found traces of sarin and VX nerve agent at a 
military research site in Syria that had not been declared previously by the Syrians.63  
 
While completeness of declarations cannot be 100% confirmed, the OPCW verification regime 
could be strengthened to enable ongoing monitoring in cases where an unknown chemical 
weapon capability is uncovered.  Likewise, in light of similar risks of lost or secret stockpiles of 
chemical weapons remaining in Syria after its CW program supposedly has been destroyed, an 
increased role, with appropriate powers, should be given to the OPCW to enable it to assume a 
“detective” role, similar to the role UNSCOM played in Iraq.64  For example, at the conclusion 
of the civil war in Syria the Security Council could authorize the OPCW to conduct no or little 
notice “go anywhere, anytime challenge” inspections to confirm that Syria truly has given up its 
CW programs.  In the event of a veto one or more state parties to the CWC could request an on-
site challenge inspection to ensure the CW program was eliminated.  Claims of lacking 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
61 Id. On 23 June 2014, the last declared chemical weapons were shipped out of Syria for destruction. The chemical 
weapons were transported to a U.S. merchant chip, the Cape Ray, where a chemical destruction facility had been 
installed.  It took 42 days aboard ship to destroy 600 metric tons of chemical agents that would have been used to 
make Sarin and Mustard gas.  OPCW News, “U.S. Completes Destruction of Sarin Precursors from Syria on the 
Cape Ray, 13 August 2014; available at:  https://www.opcw.org/news/article/us-completes-destruction-of-sarin-
precursors-from-syria-on-the-cape-ray.  
62 Anthony Deutsch, “UK blames Assad regime after watchdog documents chlorine attacks,” Reuters, Sept. 10, 
2015; available at: http://uk.mobile.reuters.com/article/idUKKBN0H52A620140910?irpc=932.  
63 Anthony Deutsch, “Exclusive: Weapons inspectors find undeclared sarin and VX traces in Syria – diplomats” 
Reuters, May 8, 2015; available at: http://news.yahoo.com/exclusive-weapons-inspectors-undeclared-sarin-vx-
traces-syria-170616455.html.  
64 For a review of the UN Special Commission in Iraq, charged with uncovering Iraq’s clandestine WMD program 
see UNSCOM’s final report, S/1998/11/72 dtd 15 December 1998; available at: 
http://www.un.org/Depts/unscom/s98-1172.htm. 
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precedential value and technical inconsistencies with the CWC notwithstanding, the joint UN—
OPCW authorization and inspection team model with both organizations approval is an 
exceptionally strong legal mechanism.  The extraordinary circumstances were such that ignoring 
obligatory language in the CWC could be forgiven in light of the destruction of most of Syria’s 
chemical weapons and the exigent circumstances in which it was done.  
The inability of the inspectors to uncover the complete CW capacity of Syria is due to the ability 
of the Syrian regime to exploit, time and again, the civil war and the confrontations with ISIS 
and the rebels as an excuse for impeding inspections activities. Inspectors were unable (or 
unwilling) to reach a specific location when Syrian officials simply stated that it is too dangerous 
to proceed and there was evidence that some suspect sites were under the control of rebel or 
terrorist groups.65  Obviously, under such circumstances, it is unlikely that any inspection team, 
not backed up with its own military forces, would at their own peril proceed.  The team could 
easily be attacked “accidentally” by Syrian forces under the “fog” of the civil war. 
 
2.  Conflict of Laws:  The Impact of The UN Charter on CWC Obligations 
The directive nature of UNSC Resolution 2118 raises questions as to whether or not the UN 
Security Council has the legal authority to undo elements of a multilateral disarmament treaty 
painstakingly negotiated over decades. Is the UNSC legally empowered to amend, qualify or 
even nullify the application of international treaties? Does the UNSC have the power arbitrarily 
to amend the application of any international treaty, in the absence of consultation with the treaty 
signatories and the UN General Assembly?  
 
Article 103 of the UN Charter provides that: 
 “In the event of a conflict between the obligations of the Members of the United Nations 
under the present Charter and their obligations under any other international agreement, their 
obligations under the present Charter shall prevail.” 
Further, Article 25 of the Charter provides that: 
 “The Members of the United Nations agree to accept and carry out the decisions of the 
Security Council in accordance with the present Charter.” 
There is little doubt then that the duties placed on Members in accordance with the Charter by 
binding decisions of the Security Council are also obligations under the Charter for the purposes 
of Article 103.66  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
65 Reese Erlich, “Who Really Used Chemical Weapons in Syria”, December 1, 2014, Who, What & Why; available 
at: http://whowhatwhy.org/2014/12/01/really-used-chemical-weapons-syria/ 
66 See, e.g., Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West 
Africa) Notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970) (Advisory Opinion) [1971] ICJ Rep 16, Separate 
Opinion of Vice-President Ammoun, para 18 (observing that obligations ‘under the Charter’, as contemplated by art 
103, “clearly include obligations resulting from the provisions of the Charter and from its purposes, and also those 
laid down by the binding decisions of the organs of the United Nations”); see also Nigel D White and A Abass, 
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This was the central issue in the Lockerbie case, one of the few cases where the effects of Article 
103 have been specifically considered. As is well known, the case dealt with the question 
whether Libya was obliged to extradite two of its nationals who were accused of blowing up an 
aircraft over the Scottish village of Lockerbie. Libya relied on the 1971 Montreal Convention, 
arguing that it was only bound to extradite the suspects if it did not prosecute them domestically. 
The International Court of Justice (ICJ), however, came to the conclusion that whatever choice 
Libya might have had under the Montreal Convention, the Security Council resolution enjoyed 
priority. This was because all parties to the dispute were, “as Members of the United Nations ... 
obliged to accept and carry out the decisions of the Security Council in accordance with Article 
25 of the Charter.” The ICJ further held that in accordance with Article 103 of the Charter, the 
obligations of the Parties in complying with a Chapter VII Security Council resolution prevail 
over their obligations under any other international agreement, including the Montreal 
Convention.67 
A few decades later, in Nicaragua vs. the USA, the Court further concluded that “all regional, 
bilateral, and even multilateral, arrangements that the Parties to this case may have made ... must 
be made always subject to the provisions of Article 103.”68 
With Articles 25 and 103 in mind, UNSC resolution 2118 requires the OPCW to act in violation 
of the CWC in several important respects.  Article XII of the CWC states that only the 
Conference of the States Parties may, in consultation with the Executive Council, bring cases of 
particular gravity to the attention of the UNSC, whereas the UNSC resolution authorizes the 
Executive Council alone to do this. This disenfranchises the Conference of the States Parties, the 
only OPCW policy-making organ representing the views of all 192 member states.  
Furthermore, the UN approached Norway, Albania and Belgium, inviting them to destroy large 
quantities of Syrian chemical weapons on their territory. This was in direct contravention of the 
“no transfer” prohibition of Article 1 (a) of the CWC. Likewise, Syrian transfers of its chemical 
weapons from its territory would be a further violation of Article 1(a) of the CWC.  However, as 
demonstrated in the Syria case, a legally binding UN Security Council Resolution can supersede 
or suspend the obligations and requirements of the CWC without doing damage to the 
obligations of the rest of the states parties to the CWC.  In the Syria case, the intent in thus 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
‘Countermeasures and Sanctions’ in Evans M., ed., International Law 4th. Oxford University Press. 537-562 (n 5) 
509–32, 527 (“One effect of Article 103 of the UN Charter seems to be that mandatory sanctions resolutions adopted 
by the Security Council under Article 41 of the UN Charter result in obligations for member States that prevail over 
obligations arising under other international treaties”).  
67 Questions of Interpretation and Application of the 1971 Montreal Convention Arising from the Aerial Incident at 
Lockerbie (Libya v UK, Libya v US) (Provisional Measures) [1992] ICJ Reps 3 and 114, paras 39 and 42, 
respectively. 
Available at: http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/index.php?sum=460&p1=3&p2=3&case=89&p3=5.  
68 Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v USA) (Jurisdiction and 
Admissibility) [1984] ICJ Rep 392, para 107.  Available at: http://www.icj-
cij.org/docket/index.php?sum=367&p1=3&p2=3&case=70&p3=5.  
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modifying obligations under the CWC was to achieve the very purpose for which it is intended; 
i.e., the elimination of chemical weapons. 
3. Legal Justifications for Evading Treaty Obligations Acting Without Security 
Council Mandate 
In the absence of a legally binding UN Security Council resolution trumping the CWC’s 
obligations, international law’s justifications for non-performance of a treaty obligation 
(including impossibility, changed circumstances, and force majeure) are potentially available, 
particularly in this case of extraordinary circumstance where the primary purpose is to achieve 
the total elimination of chemical weapons from a particular country.   In this situation if 
significant numbers of other states parties objected to the removal and destruction operations 
individual nations would have to justify its actions on another legal basis, discussed further infra, 
than on a legally binding obligation imposed by the Security Council. 
One approach to the disconnect between CWC treaty obligations and the UN Security Council’s 
imposed direction is for the OPCW to agree to temporarily suspend the technically specific legal 
requirements of the CWC, to include the prohibition against transfer while carrying out removal 
and destruction operations at the direction of the OPCW’s Executive Committee.  The right of a 
nation to suspend its treaty obligations under certain conditions is well established and codified 
in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (Vienna Convention).69  The Vienna 
Convention generally codified the preexisting customary law of treaties that existed between 
State actors.70  As established by the Vienna Convention there are a number of ways and reasons 
a state can suspend its obligations under a treaty while maintaining the continued viability of the 
treaty thus recognizing the explicit fundamental principle of pacta sunt servanda (agreements 
must be kept) in international law.71   
Given the importance of the CWC as an almost universal mandate for an international 
nonproliferation norm, the notion of withdrawal by states parties involved in the disposition 
operations or termination of the CWC, while legally an option, is politically untenable and will 
not be discussed further here.72  Suspension, on the other hand, is presumably temporary and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
69 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 2, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331; UN Org, Vienna Convention 
on the Law of Treaties; available at: 
http://untreaty.un.org/ENGLISH/bible/englishinternetbible/partI/chapterXXIII/treaty1.asp.  
70 The Vienna Convention entered into force in 1980. There are currently 114 states parties with another 45 states 
which have signed but have not yet ratified. A copy of the treaty is available at:  
https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetailsIII.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=XXIII-
1&chapter=23&Temp=mtdsg3&lang=en.  The U.S. has signed but not ratified the Vienna Convention.  However, 
the U.S. considers many of the provisions of the Vienna Convention to constitute customary international law. See 
Department of State website at  http://www.state.gov/s/l/treaty/faqs/70139.htm.  
71 Supra note 70, Art. 26. 
72 When and how a treaty will end is a common issue addressed during the negotiation stage of any treaty. The event 
of termination or withdrawal effectively ends a state party’s participation in a treaty. Withdrawal from the treaty 
would imply acceptance of the use of chemical weapons and could do irreparable harm to the CW nonproliferation 
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even during the suspension period a treaty relationship continues to exist between the parties.73 
Moreover, the suspending party must “refrain from acts tending to obstruct the resumption of the 
operation of the treaty.”74 The Vienna Convention states that a party may suspend a treaty only 
through applying either the exit provisions of the treaty, or in accordance with the explicit opt 
out provisions of the Vienna Convention.75 
Article XVI of the CWC, which allows for withdrawal from the Convention, does not expressly 
address whether or not a state party can suspend its obligations.76  The CWC’s drafters may have 
intentionally excluded the right for a state party to suspend its obligations if they viewed it as an 
invitation to a “temporally opportunistic exit.”77 In this case, however, the intent of suspending 
the transfer prohibition is to effectuate the object and primary purpose of the CWC; i.e., to 
ensure the elimination of a CW program and the safe and secure destruction of all weapons, 
precursors and infrastructure related to the CW program.78    
Absent a specific option to suspend under the CWC we must look to the Vienna Convention for 
the reasons and justification for suspension.  Citing the Vienna Convention’s rule on suspension, 
a party may suspend the CWC’s operation with the consent of the parties.79 However, for 
multilateral treaties, consultation is required with other “contracting States.”80 If a State Party is 
justified in suspending a treaty’s operation, the Vienna Convention provides the procedure to be 
employed. The State must first notify all of the other parties of the treaty of its claim for 
suspension and wait three months. However, in cases of “special urgency” the three-month 
notice requirement is waived.  Finally, if an objection is raised the parties are directed to resolve 
the dispute via Article 33 of the UN Charter.81 
 
The Vienna Convention allows for five potential alternative reasons or justifications, three of 
which are relevant here, to credibly and legally justify one or more State Parties to be 
temporarily in violation of one or more legal obligations under the CWC as another more 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
norm. It can only be undone or rectified through renewing consent to be bound, which usually entails the creation of 
an entirely new treaty.  See Anthony Aust, Modern Treaty Law and Practice 225 (2000). 
73 Supra note 70, Art. 72(1)(b).   
74 Id., Art. 72(2). 
75 Id., Art. 42(2). 
76 Under CWC Article XII the Conference of States Parties, however, upon the recommendation of the Executive 
Council, may “restrict or suspend the State Party’s rights and privileges under the Convention until it undertakes the 
necessary action to conform with its obligations under this convention.” 
77 See Laurence R. Helfer, Exiting Treaties, 91 Va. L. Rev. 1579, 1625 (2005). 
78 See David S. Jonas & Thomas N. Saunders, “The Object and Purpose of a Treaty:  Three Interpretive Methods, 43 
Vand. J. Transnat’l L. 565 (2010).  
79 Id., Vienna Convention, supra note 70, Art. 57(b). 
80 Id., Art. 54(b) and 57(b); Aust, supra note 72, at 232. 
81 Article 33 of the UN Charter calls on parties to an international dispute that risks global peace and security to 
engage in some type of dispute resolution such as negotiation, arbitration, mediation, judicial settlement, or other 
peaceful means. U.N. Charter, art. 33, para. 1. If necessary, the UN Security Council can step in to request that the 
parties engage in this type of peaceful settlement process. 
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compelling legal obligation is pursued as directed by the UN Security Council or the Executive 
Council of the OPCW.82  To invoke one of these justifications, the state party must notify all 
other treaty parties of its intent to suspend at least three months prior to acting “except in cases 
of special urgency (emphasis added).” During the course of the retrieval and disposition 
operations facts on the ground in Syria--particularly the use of CW by Syrian and rebel forces--
adequately demonstrated the “special urgency” for the need to transfer these weapons and 
materials, under expedient procedures that were clearly inconsistent with the CWC’s destruction 
process83 in order to eliminate the Syrian CW threat. 
First, a treaty may be suspended as a response to a “material” breach of the treaty.84 A material 
breach is either a “repudiation of the treaty not sanctioned by the present Convention” or one 
which violates a provision “essential to the accomplishment of the object and purpose of the 
treaty.”85 If there is a material breach in a multilateral treaty, one of three scenarios may occur: 
1) the other parties may suspend or terminate a treaty by unanimous agreement between 
themselves and the breaching State or between all parties; 2) a party “specially affected” by the 
breach may suspend its operation of the treaty between itself and the breaching State; or 3) if the 
breach “radically changes the position of every party with respect to the further performance of 
its obligations under the treaty,” any non-breaching party may suspend the operation of the 
treaty.86 This final situation is especially relevant to arms control or nonproliferation treaties, 
where one party’s breach may endanger the whole group of treaty participants.87 
In this case Syria’s transfer of its chemical weapons to another party would be in violation of the 
CWC transfer ban and thus a material breach of the Convention. The Conference of States 
Parties could suspend the breaching state’s rights and privileges under the Convention.  
Obviously this would have little effect on a state that has already declared its intent to suspend its 
obligations.  Alternatively, under the CWC, in “cases of particular gravity” the breach could be 
referred to the UN for appropriate action.88  However, given that the act of breach was a 
consequence of UN Security Council direction and OPCW collusion this recourse by an 
objecting State Party would be problematic.  Hypothetically then, once the destruction operations 
were completed the State Party would return to the fold of compliant CWC states parties where, 
while unlikely, the Conference of States Parties could consider whether the disposition actions 
should be censored by the OPCW.  Noteworthy, no State Party has subsequently objected to the 
destruction process and those states parties that participated it in it. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
82 Supra note 70, Arts. 54-62. 
83 Id., Art. 65(2) and supra, note 4, CWC, Part IV(A), Destruction of Chemical Weapons and Its Verification 
Pursuant to Art. IV. 
84 Id.; See also Aust, supra note 72, at 235–36. 
85 Id., Art. 60(3). See Mohammed M. Gomaa, “Suspension or Termination of Treaties on Grounds of Breach 26-28, 
123 (1996) (arguing that article 60 “does not accommodate preemptive or preventive measures.”  Consequently, 
only an actual breach, not a potential breach, is relevant). 
86 Id., Art. 60(2). 
87 See Aust, supra note 72, at 238. 
88 CWC, Art. XII (4), supra note 4. 
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Second, because of a temporary impossibility, a state party may also suspend its treaty 
operations.89 Here one could plausibly argue that the civil war and the danger of terrorist groups 
acquiring these weapons makes it impossible for the Syrian Government and the OPCW to 
follow the procedural and verification requirements established under the CWC for chemical 
weapons disposition.  Since this is a temporary condition, it may be invoked as a ground for 
suspending the operation of the Convention.  In this context the contingencies of temporary 
impossibility of performance resembles Force Majeure, which if applicable would exonerate a 
state from liability for non-performance of one’s treaty obligations. 
Finally, a party may suspend its obligations under the treaty due to a fundamental change of 
circumstances (rebus sic stantibus) if the same criteria are met.90 However, the threshold for 
impossibility and a change of circumstances warranting suspension of obligations under the 
convention is very high.91  This justification for suspension is available where something 
fundamental has altered the feasibility of the original agreement.  The Convention limits this 
justification to situations in which: (1) the change “was not foreseen by the parties”; (2) the 
circumstances “constituted an essential basis of the consent… to be bound by the treaty;” and (3) 
“the effect of the change is radically to transform the extent of the obligations still to be 
performed under the treaty.”92  Immersed in a civil war with the potential of rebel groups 
acquiring and using Syria’s chemical weapons certainly qualifies as a fundamental change, 
particularly when added to the fact that the Syrian Government was using chemical weapons on 
its own people killing thousands.   
In sum, in the event of objection to the procedures adopted by the Security Council for the 
destruction of these chemical weapons, the Vienna Convention characterizes “supervening 
impossibility of performance” as one valid basis for suspending one’s obligation under a treaty 
whether or not the Security Council approves. Alternatively, the states parties involved in 
transferring Syria’s CW out of the country for destruction could declare that they are temporarily 
suspending their obligations under the CWC on the basis of four other related doctrines: material 
breach, impossibility, changed circumstances and force majeure.  While the circumstances for 
asserting one or more of these justifications for suspension were not contemplated by CWC 
states parties, the acts of non-compliance are nevertheless fully consistent with the object and 
purpose of the CWC, the elimination of chemical weapons.  Once the weapons have been 
destroyed and the program eliminated the justification for suspending one’s obligations under the 
CWC cease and the affected states parties will return to full compliance with their CWC 
obligations. 
4. The Joint UN – OPCW Implementation Plan: The 80% Solution 
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The Chemical Weapons Convention is meant to provide a lasting framework for destroying 
chemical weapons and controlling their proliferation. Departures from treaty requirements have 
costs for the integrity of that framework, even when they are explicitly described as not having 
precedential value. Indeed “hard cases make bad law.” This caution applies equally to the 
development of international solutions for a situation like Syria. 
As discussed supra, the states parties could have chosen to suspend their obligations under the 
CWC and justify their subsequent actions on the basis of emergency situations not contemplated 
by the CWC.  Alternatively, the U.S. and her Allies could have conducted a strike on other 
suspected Syrian CW sites, which absent UN Security Council authorization would have likely 
been viewed as illegal and further complicated diplomatic efforts to stop the use of such weapons.  
Instead, with the Russia-US Framework agreement bringing a committed Syria to the table, 
recognizing the grave urgency of keeping these weapons from being used against civilians by 
either the Syrian Government or extremist groups, a number of more viable and politically and 
legally acceptable options to getting around the impractical and self-defeating CWC prohibitions 
against transferring chemical weapons and their precursors.  
One way would be to categorize the movement of chemical weapons for purposes of destruction 
as something other than the “transfer” prohibited by the treaty. Another, possibly supplementary, 
option would be to arrange the removal of weapons from Syria so that it can be characterized as 
being undertaken by the OPCW or the UN—rather than a country. A third alternative is that the 
mission is conducted under the auspices of the UN, with the OPCW assisting—the option 
eventually chosen with the establishment of the Joint OPCW-UN Mission.  However, in the 
absence of an overriding UN Security Council resolution, using the OPCW or UN would still be 
arguably inconsistent with CWC Article I, which prohibits the transfer of chemical weapons to 
“anyone.” 
The circumstances surrounding Syria’s disarmament were unique and urgent.  Not only has the 
Security Council, in an unprecedented move, authorized Member States to “acquire, control, 
transport, transfer and destroy chemical weapons identified by the Director-General of the 
OPCW, consistent with the objective of the Chemical Weapons Convention;” in addition, the 
OPCW Executive Council’s decision also acknowledged that “this decision …does not create 
any precedent for the future.”93   
Happily, the political support for the Syria mission forged by UNSC Resolution 2118 was 
sufficiently constant to avoid subsequent challenges by potentially disgruntled states parties over 
failing to comply with procedures and obligations they were bound by.  However, while it may 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
93 OPCW Executive Council Decision on the “Destruction of Syrian Chemical Weapons,” EC-M-33/DEC.1, 
September 27, 2013; available at https://www.opcw.org/fileadmin/OPCW/EC/M-33/ecm33dec01_e_.pdf.  
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not be precedent setting, this solution may signal a shift from a narrow reading of the CWC 
towards one that understands the Convention as providing a pragmatic regulatory and policy 
framework that can be adapted by Member States to open up legal and operational space for 
future disarmament and verification under unforeseen circumstances.94 
The foregoing interpretation could certainly be limited to the present situation, without, as the 
OPCW Executive Council notes, creating “any precedent for the future.”  There is always a risk 
that one flexible interpretation could lead to another, but I believe, in order to avoid legal 
entanglements that would potentially stymie a retrieval or disposition initiative, the risk is worth 
it.  In this case Syria had one of the world’s last great caches of chemical weapons.  The chance 
to destroy it could not be missed. 
In the end, Syria was and continues to be obliged to comply with UNSC Resolution 2118 and 
CWC Executive Council guidance, which is backed by the full authority of a Security Council 
determination that Syria’s chemical weapons is a threat to international peace and security.95 
Challenges to the procedures carried out by the Joint OPCW-UN Mission as being inconsistent 
with the CWC can be refuted since obligations under the UN Charter, per Article 103 of the 
Charter, would trump those under the CWC.  This is an unprecedented issue, about which 
reasonable people may disagree.  But there should be general agreement that nonproliferation 
law should not be cynically used by the Syrian government or anyone else to avoid their 
nonproliferation obligations.   
The OPCW should fearlessly use its best technical judgment, including facilitating the removal 
of chemical weapons out of the country if that is the most prudent course, irrespective of whether 
or not it complies with the procedural provisions of the CWC.  In the largest sense, enforcing 
nonproliferation norms is vitally important to ensure the transition from armed conflict to peace 
(i.e., jus post bellum).  Continued use of such weapons or their proliferation will make peace that 
much harder to achieve, and the resulting peace less likely to be just and sustainable. 
V. Impact of U.S. Domestic Law and Regulation 
The nonproliferation treaties are non-self-executing and therefore a range of domestic laws and 
regulations were established to ensure the U.S. is in full compliance with its treaty obligations.  
In addition, each nonproliferation treaty has export control groups to share information and 
establish guidelines and control lists for treaty implementation.  These include the Nuclear 
Suppliers Group for the NPT and the Australia Group for the CWC and BWC.  These export 
control groups both share information and provide agreed lists of materials and agents that in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
94 R. Trapp, “Report:  Lessons Learned From the OPCW Mission in Syria,” 16 December 2015; available at: 
Lessons_learned_from_the_OPCW_Mission_in_Syria.pdf. 
95 See Ch. VII, Art. 39, UN Charter (The UNSC shall decide what measures will be taken “to maintain or restore 
international peace and security.”  UNSC R 2118, supra, note 48, states that Syrian CW is a threat to international 
peace and security). 
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terms of quality and quantity and purpose may be of proliferation concern and therefore subject 
to control.  The U.S. has passed implementing legislation for the CWC96 and BWC97  which 
includes regulation of those items on the suppliers control list for each treaty.   
These internal laws and regulations could possibly hinder retrieval and/or destruction operations, 
particularly when a State Party is acting under procedures contrary to the established plain 
language of the treaty and its implementing legislation even though such operations are fully 
consistent with and contributes to our overarching nonproliferation goals.  For example, the 
Secretary of Commerce has issued strict guidelines regarding the import of CW or precursors  
and many state and local governments have objected to the shipment of CW through their 
jurisdictions.98  However, in emergency circumstances these U.S. domestic legal requirements or 
restrictions can be waived by the President under the National Emergencies Act,99  the Arms 
Export Control Act,100 and the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA).101  
Under these acts, when a national emergency has been declared the President has broad powers 
to regulate commerce, to include waiving or suspending export controls, in cases where there are 
abnormal threats to the United States with respect to its economy, foreign policy, or national 
security from a foreign source.  Nevertheless, political sensitivities in the U.S. coupled with the 
failure to find one nation willing to take the materials prompted the use of a CW disposal system 
on board a U.S. cargo ship in international waters. 
In 1994, President Clinton declared a national emergency to deal with the WMD threat, declaring 
that “the proliferation of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons … and of the means of 
delivering such weapons, constitutes an unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security, 
foreign policy, and economy of the United States….”102  This executive order has been 
successively renewed by Presidents Bush and Obama.103 The net effect with regard to the Syrian 
case is that any domestic impediments to U.S. participation in CW retrieval and destruction 
operations, to include transporting the materials to a U.S. destruction facility, can be waived 
under the emergency powers provided by law to the President. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
96 The Chemical Weapons Implementation Act of 1998, 2 U.S.C. Section201 et. seq.; available at: 
http://www.cwc.gov/cwc_authority_legislation.html. See also Executive Order 13128 of June 25, 1999, 
Implementation of the Chemical Weapons Convention and the Chemical Weapons Convention Implementation Act; 
available at: http://www.cwc.gov/cwc_authority_executive.html.  
97 The Biological Anti-Terrorism Act of 1989, 18 U.S.C.§ 175 et seq. 
98 See for example EO 13128, supra note 98; Jon Harper, “MV Cape Ray gears up to destroy Syria’s chemical 
weapons,” Stars and Stripes, Jan. 4, 2014; available at: http://www.stripes.com/news/mv-cape-ray-gears-up-to-
destroy-syria-s-chemical-weapons-1.260332.  
99 50 U.S.C. Section 1601 et. seq. 
100 22 U.S.C. Section 2751 et. Seq. 
101 50 U.S.C. Section 1701 et. seq. 
102 Executive Order 12938 (November 14, 1994) Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction; available at: 
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=49489.  
103 Executive Order 13224 (September 23, 2001) extended by President Obama through 2016.  See 
https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2015/09/18/notice-continuation-national-emergency-respect-persons-
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VI. The Use of Force Approach:  Illegal but Legitimate? 
“Sometimes you have to break the law to change it, act illegally to change the law, and you will 
see […] the change will follow you.” 
--Former French Minister of Foreign and European Affairs Bernard Kouchner104 
In cases of extreme gravity, the unilateral or multilateral use of force to eliminate the threat to 
civilian populations is available as an option of last resort.  While not fully accepted as a 
variation of the “responsibility to protect,” a humanitarian intervention justification could be 
available to eliminate a CW production/storage facility.  The proliferation and use of chemical 
weapons would certainly qualify under international law as a justification for using force in the 
event all other options are unsuccessful.  Indeed, it was President Obama’s threatened use of 
force unilaterally which eventually resulted in agreement by the Security Council, the OPCW 
and Syria on the process to eliminate all of Syria’s declared CW facilities.   
As previously mentioned, the U.S. suspected that the Syrian CW declaration failed to list all the 
locations of its chemical weapons facilities and storage sites.  While nearly all of the chemical 
weapons (CW) capabilities declared by Syria have been destroyed in 2013 under the OPCW—
UN implementation plan,105 it is clear that the declared quantities, components, and facilities 
were but part of a much larger CW program.106 Syria has unveiled the existence of additional 
facilities.107 Further facilities were discovered by the inspectors;108 significant gaps and 
inconsistencies remained unexplained regarding the data provided by Syria;109 and access by 
inspectors to certain installations and to several production plants was obstructed. In addition, 
two years after Bashar al-Assad agreed to dismantle Syria’s chemical weapons stockpile, his 
forces are dropping chlorine barrel bombs on rebel-held areas.110  In light of overwhelming 
evidence of the continuing use of such weapons the UN Security Council condemned “any use of 
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105 L. Morris and M. Birnbaum, "Syria has destroyed chemical weapons facilities, international inspectors 
say," Washington Post, October 21, 2013; available at:  https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/syria-has-
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Journal, July 23, 2015; available at: http://www.wsj.com/articles/mission-to-purge-syria-of-chemical-weapons-
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107 “Syria declares new chemical weapons facilities,” BBC News, 8 October 2014; available at: 
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any toxic chemical, such as chlorine gas,” and warned that further use would warrant stronger 
measures under Chapter VII of the UN Charter.111 
During the course of negotiations on UNSCR 2118 the French attempted to include Syria’s 
biological weapons program.112  This was opposed by the Russians.113  Later the Syrians 
admitted to the OPCW that they had a ricin production facility at al-Maliha outside of Damascus 
but asserted that the city of al-Maliha was under the control of the rebels.114  The OPCW 
developed and Syria ostensibly agreed to plans for destruction of the facility and ricin stocks but 
the Syrians continue to claim that it is unsafe for inspection and retrieval teams to go into the 
town and facility.   
There continues to be overwhelming evidence that Syrian helicopters are dropping chlorine-
filled barrels on Syria’s civilian population as well as the rebels.115  ISIS has also used chlorine 
in Syria and Iraq.116  A chemical plant called the Syrian-Saudi Chemicals Company near Aleppo 
was recently taken over by rebels.117  It produces chlorine as well as other chemicals and even 
Syria’s ambassador to the UN stated that 200 tons of chlorine gas were taken from the plant by 
terrorist groups.118 
Under the circumstances, these sites could be good cases to use force in order to deny access to 
these deadly materials by government, rebel, and terrorist forces. 
Under international law, armed attack against another nation is illegal except in self-defense or 
with the authority of the UN Security Council (UNSC).119 However, this would be the use of 
force for a humanitarian purpose – such as protecting civilians from their government gassing 
them. The purported norm, never cemented in law, allows for a last resort of military 
intervention under a series of strict conditions; i.e., if a state commits genocide, war crimes, 
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ethnic cleansing, use of weapons of mass destruction, or crimes against humanity against 
civilians.120 
In such circumstances where force is considered the best of a bad set of choices, it is important, 
as with monitoring WMD destruction programs in general, to have a constant flow of updated 
intelligence.  The required intelligence must cover a range of information about the types, 
location, contents and activities of facilities that are part of the chemical weapons production 
enterprise. 
Alternatively, the use of force could be characterized as “illegal but justified” similar to the 
rationale provided for NATO’s intervention in Kosovo in 1999.121 One example would be 
Israel’s destruction of Syria’s Al Kibar nuclear reactor in 2007.122  Both sides never 
acknowledged the destruction of the facility due primarily to the illicit nature of the program 
(Syria is a member of the NPT).  Such a justification is not without its critics of course.  The 
“illegal but justified” approach shifts the focus away from questions of legality and towards 
questions of legitimacy and morality divorcing the two which can, in effect, ossify the law and 
undermine its relevance.  Doing so increases the risk of self-serving exceptionalism.123  
Nevertheless, in exigent circumstances such an approach or justification is morally if not legally 
supportable,124 recognizing the political fallout that accompanies almost every one of these 
options, even those that are not precedent setting.  
VII. Conclusion and Recommendations 
As we have examined, since the end of the Cold War there is a long history of the U.S. and its 
allies and partners retrieving and disposing of WMD and its related materials.  The international 
nonproliferation norms set forth in the NPT, BWC, and CWC are well established, and for the 
most part WMD elimination operations have been with the agreement of the possessing and 
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receiving states and interested and relevant international governmental organizations tasked with 
overseeing or enforcing these nonproliferation prohibitions.   However, there have also been 
cases where such operations have been carried out or attempted in a less than benign 
environment. In the primary case discussed here, Syria’s agreement to give up its chemical 
weapons required new and novel procedures to acquire, transfer, transport and destroy these 
weapons, procedures that were not reasonably contemplated by the CWC. 
Further, the reality on the ground of political instability and civil war severely impacted the 
OPCW’s ability to carry out elimination operations which were further complicated by CWC’s 
“never under any circumstances” prohibition on the transfer of chemical weapons.  These kinds 
of situations were obviously not contemplated by the CWC and challenged the ability of the 
international community to craft a solution to eliminating Syria’s chemical weapons program.  In 
such an environment there, nevertheless, remains a range of legally justifiable options or 
measures available to the U.S. and other nations in cases where there may be a conflict between 
the legal obligations under a nonproliferation or other international agreement and obligations or 
actions mandated and imposed by the UN Security Council.   
In the case of the CWC when for unforeseen circumstances it would be improvident to strictly 
comply with the prohibitions and technical procedures of the CWC, international law does offer 
a range of options.  In this case, the strongest legal justification was a UNSC resolution issued 
contemporaneously with an OPCW Executive Council decision authorizing actions and 
processes allowing for the transfer of these weapons notwithstanding the CWC prohibition 
against doing so.  As discussed, UN Security Council directives, under Article 103 of the 
Charter, take precedence over treaty obligations. 
While the CWC reaffirms and advances the global norm against chemical weapons, the Syrian 
case is an excellent example of the uphill battle when it came to compliance with its fundamental 
prohibitions.  More so than any other nonproliferation treaty, it is equipped with a broad and 
detailed array of arms control tools including declarations and short notice inspections. Despite 
these intrusive measures nations will continue to cheat and it will continue to be challenging to 
detect their cheating.  So, for example, in order to verify the complete removal of Syria's 
stockpiles, OPCW needed to have high confidence that the Assad government truthfully declared 
what it had.  Although since the CWC’s entry into force there has never been a “challenge 
inspection,” if there is an articulable doubt as to whether or not Syria may still has a CW 
program, any State Party that suspects Syria is hiding something could call for a "challenge 
inspection" that Syria as a member of the CWC would have no right to refuse.  The fact that no 
State Party has so far done so after evidence surfaced that Syria had not disclosed all of its 
chemical weapons evidences the fear that to do so would jeopardize further “cooperation” by 
Syria.  It also demonstrates the challenging nature of such verification measures and the 
importance of good intelligence.  As it turned out the Syrians had more than they declared and 
they were actively dispersing and continuing to use their stockpiles of agents.  They continued to 
claim that many alleged sites or facilities were in the hands of rebels or ISIS and that sending out 
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inspection/verification teams was too dangerous.  Under these circumstances, with no way to 
peacefully eliminate these weapons the use of military force becomes a viable alternative to 
disposition/destruction operations. 
In the absence of a Security Council mandate, the CWC prohibition against transfer and receipt 
of chemical weapons, along with the CWC’s strict destruction instructions, poses a higher legal 
hurdle to navigate.  Nevertheless, as discussed in detail, there are a number of alternative 
justifications that are available and supportable under international law to ensure that the transfer 
prohibition is at least temporarily overcome to rapidly and effectively eliminate Syria’s CW 
program.  These include: 
1. Bi-lateral agreement between the possessor and receiving state under exigent 
circumstances to destroy CW stocks and argue that the “transfer prohibition” does not 
apply or temporarily suspended for purposes of destruction of a CW program.  CWC 
procedures for destruction should be followed as practicable. 
 
2. In order to effectuate compliance (e.g. retrieval and destruction of clandestine CW 
program) announce suspension of obligations under the CWC or other relevant 
agreements on the basis of one of four justifications: 
a. Material breach 
b. Impossibility 
c. Fundamental change of circumstances 
d. Force majeure 
So, in cases of military necessity or exigent circumstances, similar to the Iraqi CW 
disposition discussed supra, chemical weapons could be blown up to prevent future 
possession or use by terrorist groups. 
3. Passage of a UN Security Council Resolution that would temporarily suspend the 
obligations to fully comply under the CWC in order to effectuate the object and purpose 
of the treaty; i.e. the non-proliferation or elimination of WMD.  For example, UNSCR 
2231 (2015) endorsing the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) on Iran’s 
Nuclear Program included this operative paragraph: 
 
Decides, acting under Article 41 of the Charter of the United Nations, also that the 
measures imposed in [various Security Council] resolutions … shall not apply to the 
extent necessary to carry out transfers and activities, as approved on a case-by-case basis 
in advance by the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1737 (2006), …. 
In order to give maximum flexibility to achieving nonproliferation goals and recognizing that not 
every situation can be contemplated or accommodated in these nonproliferation treaties a similar 
“opt out” provision should be included in all future such arms control agreements. 
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Indeed, it is the willingness of states parties to act in the face of noncompliance, more than the 
sophistication and comprehensiveness of its inspection provisions or the extent of data reporting 
requirements, that determines the CWC’s effectiveness. It was the willingness of Russia to agree 
with the U.S. to force Syria to join the CWC and renounce chemical weapons that provided the 
environment for at least the partial destruction of its chemical weapon stocks.  Absent the 
political will to make, enforce, and execute these agreements, they are not worth the paper on 
which they are written. If the political commitment to action is absent, authorities they provide 
will remain unimplemented. If the political strength to take on those who will not abide by the 
rules vanishes, as the reluctance to conduct “challenge inspections” even in the Syria case, the 
penalties have the impact of a mosquito – inconvenient and irritating perhaps, but no deterrent. 
The Syria case (and to a lesser extent the Iraq and Libya cases) is a plausible scenario for future 
retrieval and disposition operations.  As such it is a cautionary tale as to how challenging it is to 
understand and account for WMD programs.  It is more likely than not that in the near future we 
may be facing countries of proliferation concern such as Iran, North Korea and Pakistan or a 
terrorist group like ISIS where the elimination of their WMD program becomes a critical 
mission.  Such operations will likely be conducted under less-than-hospitable circumstances 
where local or rebel resistance, site contamination, and general instability reigns.   
Also, as the Syria case demonstrates, WMD elimination is more than just the physical seizure, 
destruction, or removal of WMD.  The Syrian government easily hid their CW program and 
infrastructure by limiting the scope of mission to declared sites only.  Instead, the mission scope 
should have included the entire process of locating and characterizing the CW program, as well 
as destroying, removing or neutralizing the weapons and ensuring that they will not be 
reconstituted or transferred in the future.  Elimination of the capability to produce and use WMD 
includes the attendant programs, infrastructure, and expertise.  WMD retrieval and 
destruction/disposition operations obviously require highly trained personnel, specialized 
equipment and enabling capabilities such as security forces, transportation assets, linguistic 
support, intelligence assets, communications equipment and other logistics.  This extensive 
capability was, of course, severely hampered by the brutal civil war in which suspect sites were 
inaccessible as a result of their being occupied by rebel forces.   
Oftentimes in highly volatile situations, speed is crucial to the success of any WMD elimination 
mission.  While fast by international diplomacy standards, the slow pace of the Syrian CW 
elimination negotiations allowed the Syrian Government to move and hide a significant portion 
of its CW capability which was subsequently used on the civilian population.   Consequently, it 
would be useful to create a standing WMD elimination capability able to operate in all situations, 
deploying rapidly with the capability to find and secure or destroy all phases and aspects of a 
WMD program.  No doubt, effective retrieval and disposition/destruction operations will require 
a unique fusion of a wide set of capabilities, subject matter expertise and good intelligence to be 
successful. 
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Ultimately, the primary concern is stopping and rolling back the proliferation of WMD.  In such 
cases where the international community has agreed on a process to eliminate a weapons 
program it is better to adhere to the spirit of the relevant non-proliferation convention rather than 
be bogged down or stymied because of a failure to strictly abide by the terms of the non-
proliferation norm concerned.  On an almost daily basis we are reminded of the determination of 
terrorists and hostile states to pursue the acquisition and use of WMD.  We must, therefore, have 
the capabilities to robustly conduct WMD retrieval and elimination operations under all 
circumstances in an expeditious manner.  International law and our commitment to 
nonproliferation treaties are not barriers but rather enablers when it comes to the object and 
purpose of these norms: eliminating the world’s most dangerous weapons in the hands of our 
most dangerous enemies. 
